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Abstract
In this thesis, I critically interrogate power relations that underlie practices, techniques and 
rationalities of contemporary forms of governance represented by the governing strategy of 
structural adjustment framework devised by the Bretton Woods institutions— especially the 
IMF and the World Bank. Far from being a technique of coercion and domination, the thesis 
demonstrates that structural adjustment framework represents a differing modality of global 
power that attempts to discursively legitimise external interventions through the imposition of 
neoliberal economic agenda. I show that structural adjustment policies are carefully constructed 
neoliberal rationalities of governing through which donors seek to transform the government of 
Ghana into a self-disciplined neoliberal subject that must behave in an appropriately competi-
tive fashion that is congruent with the ethos of market rationality. I draw on Michel Foucault’s 
nuanced conceptualisation of governmentality, a form of productive and relational power work-
ing through individuals’ subjectivities particularly as it coexists with the disciplinary rationale of 
power, and extend it to the relation between the IMF and the World Bank and the government 
of Ghana. I analyse how these interactions are embedded within a discursive formation and con-
crete practices which establish certain views of ‘a problem’ and mobilise particular authoritative 
actors, techniques and forms of truth as solutions. I also explore how over the decades the IMF 
and the World Bank through the modalities of conditionality associated with structural adjust-
ment have sought to govern, remake and regulate the economic, political and social institutions 
of recipient States. In closing, and by way of illustration, I also examine ‘non-compliance’ as one 
possibility into what Foucault has termed ‘counter-conduct’ through which subjects undermine 
and challenge governmental forms of power. This being said, within the structural adjustment 
discourse, there remains, I would be inclined to argue, repressive and dominant forms of power. 
This thesis, contributes to the contemporary scholarship on governmentality to deepen and re-
evaluate the distinctiveness of power relations in the example of the IMF and the World Bank 
adjustment programmes in Ghana. 
Keywords: Africa, Foucault, governmentality, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
Ghana, structural adjustment programmes, discourse, neoliberalism, good governance, subjectiv-
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CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction
1.1  Structural Adjustment Project in Global Governance: Overview
In the early 1980s, African countries like their counterparts in other developing parts 
of the world found itself grappling with economic tragedy manifested in the form 
of increasing budget deficits, deteriorating balance of payments, hefty external debt 
burden, high inflation, worsening terms of trade as a result of a fall in demand for 
commodities (Paczynska, 2006; Toussaint & Millet, 2010; Makube, 2007; Oakley, 
2006; Fourie, 2006; OPEC, 2007; Kaplinsky, 2007; Nwagbara, 2004). While internal 
factors played a part in creating Africans over-indebtedness and precarious balance-
of-payments crisis, well suffice it to say that Africa’s debt crisis has been severely exac-
erbated by exogenous conditions and major developments within the wider global 
political economy; and therefore provided an important basis for the surge of neo-
liberal agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s. The debt crisis of Africa came to a head 
following the demise of the Bretton Woods system of trade and exchange and the 
two oil price hikes by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in 1973-74 and 1978-79 (Harrison, 2010, p.88; Sörensen, 2009). The oil price hike 
of 1979 particularly worsened the situation. During this period, many African gov-
ernments had irresponsibly over-borrowed to fund domestic projects on the back of 
the commodity price boom of the 1970s in the erroneous belief that high prices and 
export earnings would be sustained. The oil crisis which provoked a bout of general 
global economic slowdown, combined with substantial increase in real interest rates 
during most of the 1970s in the global financial markets hit the non-oil exporting 
countries in the global south, especially hard (Harrison, 2010, p.88). Though many 
countries recovered, many did not. Low levels of savings and income and the atten-
dant shortage of investment capital, led many African countries to rely heavily on offi-
cial development assistance (ODA) and foreign borrowing to close widening resource 
and investment gap. The rising external control over capital flows between Africa 
and the rest of the world immensely contributed to the debt overhang in most Africa 
States paving the way for the promotion of painful neoliberal economic reforms. The 
deteriorating lending terms and the seductive granting of credit subject to Interna-
tional Monetary Funds’ conditionality on loans indubitably played a significant role 
in the unsustainable level of debt of the post-colonial African states.
These poverty-stricken countries that appeared not to have any alternative route or 
any room for policy manoeuvre (Adebayo, 2002) out of their deepening economic 
crisis were compelled to turn to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), on 
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the condition of implementing radical policy reforms. The international donor com-
munity led by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
the two foremost proponents of neoliberal orthodoxy (Harvey, 2005, p.15; Stiglitz, 
2002) in their passionate intensity and acting with the religious zeal of a latter day 
saint to solve the African crisis, imposed structural adjustment policies (SAPs) on 
these countries in exchange for badly needed financial resources to improve their 
economies (Mainsah & Ikezi, 2004; McGregor, 2005).
Armed with neoliberal development discourse heralded as the only panacea and 
moniker for development problems with the collapse of socialist regimes, African 
governments since the 1980s and 1990s respectively, were preoccupied in implement-
ing standard policy prescriptions earnestly linked to the Fund and its sister Bretton 
wood institution, the World Bank (Mkandawire & Olukoshi, 1995; Mkandawire & 
Soludo, 1999) :which to all intents and purposes were perceived as economic wisdom 
or common sense and key to economic growth.
In order for countries to offset their balance of payment disequilibria they have 
to adopt one-size-fits-all macroeconomic policy prescriptions (Akapori, 2006). These 
wide-ranging “good” macroeconomics policies comprised measures such as cutting 
government budgets and subsidies; privatising public operations; raising interest 
rates; opening national economies to foreign imports, corporations and capital; and 
trade liberalisation (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007; Ismi, 2004; Keen, 2005; Hartz-
ell, Hoddie & Bauer, 2010). These policy reform conditions commonly came to be 
institutionalised as structural adjustment programmes. Needless to say, structural 
adjustment policies or economic reform packages are austerity measures advocated 
by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to heavily indebted gov-
ernments as conditionality to achieve much-coveted economic recovery and growth 
(Duncan & Howell, 1992, p.5). That structural adjustment conventionally became a 
short hand reference for austerity measures adopted by recipient governments usually 
the result of a co-operation with the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank (Gibbon et al., 1996; Haines, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Ismi, 2004; Sachs, 2005; 
Todaro & Smith, 2009).
Policy reform conditions associated with structural adjustment whereby loans from 
the World Bank and the IMF and even private finance became effectively conditional 
on the agreement by the recipient governments to implement comprehensive eco-
nomic policy reforms came to animate a form of subtle external state intervention, 
which significantly and necessarily provided a logic that defines and legitimises what 
it means to govern, to what ends and through what technologies and practices (Duff-
ield, 2007; Taylor, 2006).
On similar grounds, the radical neoliberal restructuring of the State was most 
clearly demonstrated in the conditionalities contained in macroeconomic reforms of 
national policies. From this viewpoint, I argue that structural adjustment framework 
can be conceived in the modern liberal polity as representing an economic consti-
tution pursued by International Financial Institutions—that is, of being among the 
foremost economic agenda of the International Financial Institutions, and can there-
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fore be elucidated by its insertion within a wider field of economic liberalism as an 
attempt by these institutions to shape the economic policy of Africa and the rest of 
the global South through the rationalities and discipline of the market. Seen as key 
element in the re-formation of the economic and social landscape in these countries 
(Stiglitz, 2002), World Bank and the IMF extensive intervention through policy con-
ditionality is significant in redefining and reconceptualising the role of the nation-
state’s ‘complex of men and things’ (Foucault, 1991); transferring social, political and 
economic responsibility to private hands and economically rationalised self-govern-
ing individuals. For Stein:
Since 1980, the most ubiquitous and consequential set of policies influenc-
ing the developing world has been a series of economic reforms sponsored by 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral and 
bilateral donors. From their inception, these policy packages, known collec-
tively as structural adjustment, were imposed as conditions for receiving loans 
from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (2008, p.56)
Enmeshed in the regime of conditionality this study contends, is the wielding of eco-
nomic power most appropriately considered by some to represent the disciplining of 
African countries; the need and inevitability to monitor, influence and shape the eco-
nomic and development processes, and provide incentives for compliance with the 
policies that are part of its programmes without the use of power in the form of coer-
cion or domination. As will become apparent, toward the end of this thesis, I address 
the question of compliance with the International Monetary Fund conditionality 
generally, taking a point of departure, however, I analyse noncompliance as a latent 
critical metric for counter-conduct by explicitly taking into account what causes an 
adjusting government to risk a rupture in its structural adjustment programme, and 
thus its relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions.
Adjustment-inspired reforms wrought by the Fund and the World Bank across 
board, massively sought to institutionalise economic and political reforms as con-
ditions in return for receiving development financing. For instance, one of the key 
components of neoliberal development discourse and argument effectively entailed 
a process aimed at dismantling and delegitimising the authoritarian; the logic of 
neopatrimonialism and/or rent seeking African policy elites (Mkandawire, 2013; 
Olukoshi 2005, p.19-4). In other words, the concern was primarily driven by the fact 
that the postcolonial African State has allegedly been a “cold monster”, “vampire”, 
“predatory” and therefore had not been propitious for development whilst the magic 
of the market forces would ensure better development (Akobeng, 2015; Olutayo & 
Omobowale, 2007; Nooruddin & Simmons, 2006). In this agenda, the Bank and the 
Fund pontifically claim that the developmentalist and dirigisme postcolonial African 
economy has distorted the market and the development policy thinking in Africa 
(Hendrix, 2010; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2013; Oakley, 2008). As this line of argument 
goes, the Fund and the Bank flatly refused to recognise the then fashionable devel-
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opmentalist and exponentially paternalistic responsibility the State assumed in the 
postcolonial political economy (Ekanade, 2014). Consequently, in the early 1980s, 
structural adjustment discourses came to rationalise and cohere policy practices, seek-
ing to regulate and control the development policy making process of the postcolo-
nial Africa with its heavy emphasis on rolling back the State from economic activity 
(Mawuko-Yevugah, 2013).
The point that needs highlighting is that the overriding focus of the whole struc-
tural adjustment process was it simplistic and superstitious belief that ultimately the 
“invisible hand” of the market would sanitise Africa’s poor economic performance 
(Dornbusch, 2002; Easterly, 2002; Bhagwati, 2004; Williamson, 2003). This for-
mation of the adjustment model was in more respects than one, framed around the 
mainstream neoliberal development line of reasoning that minimum State would 
provide appropriate freer environment for both internal and external market forces 
to thrive. In this vein, Green argues that structural adjustment reforms were based 
on the simplistic assumption that the global economic integration through unbridled 
free trade and participation in the liberalised global markets is the commonsensical 
path to sustainable development, and to the extent that the benefits of growth will 
in the long term inure to the be benefit of both the rich and the poor (Green, 1995).
The depressing reality is that contra prevailing dogma fervently invoked by the pro-
ponents of neoliberal orthodoxy notably the Fund and the World Bank, and neo-
conservative theorists, the radical and progressive African political economists have 
ferociously and persuasively pointed out that after decades of promoting and imple-
menting adjustment packages, the evidence on the ground does not support the opti-
mism and the euphoria that greeted the approach (Stiglitz, 2002; Ismi, 2004; Bello, 
1999; Susan, 1990). A key criticism against the Washington Consensus policies rep-
resented by the orthodox structural adjustment discourse remains that they have been 
characterised by slow growth, enduring poverty, lower income, growing inequality, 
monumental and growing debt situation in most of the countries that obediently fol-
lowed this developmental model (Stiglitz, 2002a; Ismi, 2004). For instance, Adebayo 
Adedeji (1989, p.4) argues that the conceptual underpinning of neoliberal argument 
has been a stunning fiasco in Africa:
(SAPs) sustained economic growth has not materialized, the rate of investment 
rather than improve has tended to decrease, budget and balance of payments 
deficits have tended to widen after some temporary relief and debt service obli-
gations have become unbearable.
To be fair, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in response to 
these criticisms have grudgingly conceded that their own blueprint was wrong-
headed (Blanchard & Lieigh, 2013). In 1989, for example, the Bank conceded that: 
“There are countless examples of badly chosen and poorly designed public invest-
ments, including some in which the World Bank has participated. A 1987 evaluation 
revealed that half of the completed rural development projects financed by the World 
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Bank in Africa had failed. A cement plant serving Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo 
was closed in 1984 after only 4 years in operation. A state-run shoe factory in Tan-
zania, the Morongo Shoe Factory, has been operating at no more than 25 per cent 
capacity and has remained open only thanks to a large government subsidy” (p.27).
At its most bizarre, the Bank (2001) has half-heartedly admits that the initial 
assumption that these programmes would enable economies to resume growth in 
approximately 5–7 years was unrealistic and that it grossly underestimated the inten-
sity and the deep-rooted nature of the structural dislocation and imbalances of Afri-
can economies which in a sense, markedly makes it a victim of its own naïve faith in 
free-market liberalism. As a way of staving off and deflecting attention from the inef-
fectiveness of its own programmes, the World Bank and the Fund claim that reforms 
failed because of time constraints, slippages, reversals and lack of commitment on the 
part of the deficit countries (Heidhues & Obare, 2011).
Largely in response to the severe criticisms (and rebuttals) from observers who 
were concerned about more than two decades of misguided structural maladjust-
ment policies or question the rationale of the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ in 
solving the mounting socio-economic malaise for the people in those countries (Har-
rison, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002), the World Bank and the IMF begun to frame aid poli-
cies around ‘institutional and technical quick fixes’ (Sörensen, 2012). And this finds 
expression and crucially marks the movement from what Graham Harrison (2004) 
calls the construction of ’governance states’. Thus, rather than the state-retrenching 
logic embedded in the nomothetic pretensions of neoliberal structural adjustment 
prescriptions, the Bretton Woods institutions stressed that the interventionist role of 
the post-colonial African state must be acknowledged as vital in directing and fos-
tering development. These new measures focus on capacity-building state institutions 
and intervening to construct ‘civil’ society that can implement and oversee neoliberal 
reforms to mitigate the social effects on the poorest population (Ibid). This turn to 
‘governance states’, is indicative of the ambition of World Bank to promote regula-
tory and liberal project’ beyond ‘the West’ (Harrison, 2004). In these frameworks, 
“intervention is not exercised solely through conditionality and adjustment, but to 
a significant degree through closer involvement in state institutions and the employ-
ment of incentive finance” (p.77). For Harrison therefore, the Bank’s institutional 
reforms agenda serves a supplement to enhance the implementation and effectiveness 
of its global development governance and neoliberal agenda through ‘transformation 
narrative’.
But, more interestingly, concurrent with the global governance agenda was a “new 
development architecture” (Soederberg, 2004) clearly reflected in the dramatic turn 
to poverty alleviation discourses decidedly marked by the introduction of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 1999. This major turning point was hailed to 
represent a radical rupture from the ineffective conditionality structural adjust-
ment espoused by the infamous ‘Washington Consensus’ to a system which strongly 
emphasises the importance of social expenditure and an opportunity for recipient 
countries to ‘own’ their development strategies (Harrison, 2010, p.42; Sörensen, 
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2012). It bears adding here that part of this so-called fundamental policy shift in the 
discourse of development policy and practice also take on an added urgency and, even 
more importantly, engender what has been labelled as the post-Washington consensus 
with its acceptance of the importance of the State (Ruckert, 2006; Joseph, 2010a). 
These orientations towards the discourse of development policy and practice, and the 
wider ‘new architecture of aid’, as part of its conditions to receiving loans, expect the 
recipient countries to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), not only 
to reinvigorate growth economic but to address the issues of poverty as crucial factors 
for the success of development and need to be addressed simultaneously ((Sörensen, 
2012). In this manner, PRSPs sought to redress the increasingly evident failures of 
the structural adjustment programme. The rhetoric of poverty reducing interventions 
and strategies and specifically, the PRSP framework with its emphasis on inclusive 
with popular “participation” and greater country “ownership” of policies - as well as 
the promotion of the ideals of good governance, was to enhance donor power in the 
formulation and implementation of client countries policy processes. Indeed, the con-
ceptual discourses of poverty reduction under the rubric of recent aid architecture 
and international development relationships, needs to be understood, Jens Stilhoff 
Sörensen (2010, 2012) has argued persuasively, as an attempt to further institution-
alise and re-enforce the dominance of the neoliberal economic ideas and practice and 
the demands for a post-Washington consensus ideology (good governance) within 
the Bank and the Fund (Sörensen, 2010, 2012, my emphasis). The cluster of mecha-
nisms being promoted by the World Bank and other Western donors, I would argue, 
represent a new form of social control and governing technology to steer countries in 
Africa and the rest of the global south at a distance while relying on mechanisms of 
self-censorship and self-policing.
Even though structural adjustments are primarily neoliberal market-led reform pol-
icies and its purported results, intended and unintended, I argue that it is a political 
one in several respects. It entails reconfiguring the role of the state and political insti-
tutions; it privileges private entrepreneur and it involves contestations and resistance 
instead of a restricted domain of depoliticisation. The current study does not make a 
foray into the substantive content of structural adjustment; whether its implementa-
tion in Ghana in particular, and Africa, in general was justified or not, neither does 
it seek to know whether structural adjustment is having negative effects or positive 
effect on economic growth rate, or poverty reduction. It does not debate the pros and 
cons of structural adjustment project, but, it does draw predominantly on Foucault’s 
governmentality perspective in an attempt to gain crucial insights into the epistemo-
logical positions, intersecting assemblages of power relations, and the corresponding 
subjectivities that are enabled and reproduced within the broader neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms in the case of Ghana. Such are the subjects of this inquiry which I set 
out to address in my study.
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1.2 Context of the Study
With the term “governmentality”, Foucault did not only refer to the fact that the state 
becomes increasingly a governmental state, but also that this ‘governmentalisation’ is 
particularly sensitive and responsive to changing historical rationalities of power. In 
this respect, governmentality exemplifies a particular rationality (Dean, 2010; Miller 
& Rose, 2008, p.56) within the broader neoliberal context. The foregoing gives that 
the phenomenon of structural adjustment policies I would argue is a particular gov-
ernmental logic. It is my contention that this provides instructive diagnostic tool and 
begs for a more thorough analysis in scrutinising how and why structural adjustment 
policies become a domain to be reflected upon from the perspective of a governmental 
rationality and how and why it becomes regarded as a biopolitical problematisation of 
governing contemporary state as adapted by discourse of global governance. This is 
important since structural adjustment plans became a domain for policy prescription, 
an object of governmental reflection and an instrument to achieve the stated goals of 
a specific policy prescription.
The ascendency of neoliberal economic policies through the IMF and the Bank 
structural adjustment programmes provide a context of this thesis by using the con-
temporary development trajectory of Ghana as an empirical frame for understanding 
neoliberal regime and global power relations. While standard critique of the delete-
rious and destructive effects of structural adjustment discourse has been one of the 
most debated topics of our times, in this study, I develop and attempt to analyse how 
structural adjustment programmes can be understood as a particular logic of Fou-
cauldian governmentality. It is to such a perspective that this thesis is tuned, in order 
to advance a critical volley against the insidious nature of neoliberalism. At the risk 
of sounding overly pedantic the description of structural adjustment programmes 
are not repeated here. It is critically important to emphasise here that critique into 
structural adjustment has figured prominently and produced an enormous flow of lit-
erature (Bello, 1999; Cornia; Ismi, 2004; Jolly & Stewart, 1987; Mawuko-Yevugah, 
2013; Stiglitz, 2002; Susan, 1990).
The key point which is worth keeping in mind is the fact that there have been a 
robust critical literature and sustained criticisms of adjustment packages in Africa. 
African elite, over the years have articulated and championed counterhegemonic alter-
native development framework to dismiss the prevalent neoliberal agenda in Africa. 
Grudgingly defended by the Fund and the Bank, and heavily criticised by those who 
dismiss the market superiority approach inherent in the policy, orthodox adjustment 
policy packages have been, and rightfully so set the agenda of debate over the devel-
opment dilemma in Africa. This said, the dominant themes in International Relations 
in the study of structural adjustment in Ghana in particular, and Africa, in general, 
have tended to cluster around its conventional material effects and rationalist reduc-
tionist strains of thought (Carmody, 1998; Cheru, 1995; Konadu-Agyemang, 1998; 
Simsa’a, 1998; Riddell, 1992; Mlambo, 1993; Sahn et al., 1997) without linking it 
to the substantial part of the story: the dominant shifting concerns to what renders 
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them both thinkable and intelligible, the intricacies and the historically altering gov-
ernmental rationalities implicated in them. My argument is that while analyses that 
easily take its cue from a critique of the orthodox political economic model of adjust-
ment programmes can significantly contribute to the contradictions and ruptures of 
the bloodthirsty character of neoliberal hegemonic project (Gibbon, 1996; Harvey, 
1996),I feel that such analyses tend to reinforce the ascendancy and authority of the 
so-called Washington consensus development paradigm on which such programmes 
are predicated: and, as such have largely constrained our potential to imagine political 
alternatives. 
This is the more reason why I maintain an intellectual unwillingness to replicate 
the same beaten paths - the mainstream/objectivist problem-solving analyses of Afri-
canist scholarship - or, at best the far too simplistic stereotypes found in the self-refer-
ential networks often imbued with, if not tinged with Afro-pessimism that cynically 
critique the material expression of structural adjustment. I make the case that such 
claims, in short, are simplistic and hugely problematic as it fails to gain neither 
shape nor widespread acceptance in the implementation of neoliberal reforms, with 
all its difficulties. In this sense, this thesis proposes an alternative reading emphasis-
ing the need to squarely place the adjustment project itself at the centre, where the 
purpose appropriately becomes to give coherence to what is criticised. I hold that 
adjustment programmes acquire concrete forms and visibility in the configuration of 
power relations at the international inter-state level, which to a very large extent is 
actually imbricated in the wider structures and policies that make Ghana, and, for 
that matter, any African country, possible. Said another way, the neoliberal develop-
ment paradigm (for want of a better qualifier) biopolitics, gains dominance precisely 
in the silences which it imposes, justifies and defends in its ruthless quest to make the 
projects and expectations of the ‘Other’ only discursively and materially valid within 
the confines of the so-called “Washington Consensus” development paradigm. Thus, 
what is novel in this work, in the main, is that placing my argument from the van-
tage point of Michel Foucault’s governmentality perspective as a perspective and an 
explanatory concept, I seek to critically interrogate the neoliberal structural adjust-
ment policy. This interrogation arises out of an interest in power and its expression 
within structural adjustment policy.
1.3 Rationale for the Case of Ghana
Ghana is the case study of this thesis. There are a number of justifiable reasons why 
Ghana represents a particularly unique case study for examining the neoliberal gov-
ernmentality of structural adjustment reforms: first; Ghana was a country widely 
adulated and acclaimed as the “star pupil”, a “good adjuster” and the most obedient 
follower of neoliberal policies in Africa throughout the 1980s by the IMF and the 
World Bank (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999, p.58, 82, 83; IMF & World Bank, 1990; 
1995); second, Ghana was mirrored as the gold standard and convenient illustration 
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of the fruitful outcome of neoclassical economic policies in generating growth; third, 
Ghana’s acclaimed success was commonly presented as a reflection of a renewed opti-
mism and triumphalism within the expanded applicability of market-led develop-
ment in Africa. World Bank’s Ghana representative Seung Hong Choi, commenting 
on Ghana’s story success noted: “if (the miracle) can happen in Ghana, it can hap-
pen in any African country” (quoted in James Brooke, 1989, p.1); fourth, Ghana’s 
case may not represent the entire Africa region but it will provide lines of inquiry and 
analytical tools that may or may not be indicative of the power dynamics imbricated 
in structural adjustment framework in other settings, and, finally, focusing on Ghana 
is in great part compelling and noteworthy, because despite the fact that Ghana was 
one of the first African countries to adopt a comprehensive Bretton Woods institu-
tions reform programmes and one that has remarkably sustained adjustment longest, 
no comprehensive study has as yet adequately analysed how it resonates in many ways 
with distinctive features of neoliberal governmentality.
1.4  Ghana and the Neoliberal Restructuring Reforms
The government of Ghana in 1983 embarked upon a process of radically restructuring 
her economy. This neoliberal restructuring agenda has been sponsored and guided by 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This study is concerned with these 
neoliberal development governances during 1983 through 2000. At independence in 
1957, President Kwame Nkrumah-led Convention People’s Party government with a 
Marxist-Leninist philosophical makeup chose scientific socialism defined as the new 
ideology for Africa development. In economic terms, this grand effort towards social-
ism effectively translated into the introduction of a planned economy; ambitious 
expansionary nationalisation of companies and industrialisation programmes (Hutch-
ful, 1987, p.2–9). Consequently, in the decade following independence the Ghanaian 
economy relatively showed a lot of promise which quickly made her a “model”, a “gate 
way” and a “springboard” for Africa development (Herbst, 1993, p. 27, my empha-
sis). But sadly however, the mood of optimism dissipated as economic decay begun to 
loom large during the 1970s, slumped in the 1980s and subsequently became dire in 
the 1990s. The vicious circle of economic decline in Ghana between the seventies and 
eighties reflected profoundly in negative GDP figures, a precarious balance of pay-
ments position, worsening debt burden, rampant inflation and precipitous fall in the 
price of cocoa (Toye, 1991, p.153-4; Loxley, 1991, p.5-8; Kraus, 1991, p.120-4).
The general view attributable to this messy state by the International Financial 
institutions is that Ghana has not been tidy and prudent with her economic policies 
after independence mainly because of the interventionist policies and vacuous devel-
opment agenda she experimented under the guise of socialism (Hutchful, 2002). A 
particular illustration of this accorded with the long-standing features of patronage, 
brazen corruption, neopatrimonialism, prebendalism, clientellism, and other upro-
gressive aspects of postcolonial African political economy such as ‘bad’ economic pol-
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icies, and ‘bad’ governance (Nathan Andrews, 2010; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). However, 
in 1981, the military junta under the leadership of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawl-
ings not surprisingly contended that the economic malaise could be attributed to the 
local “comprador bourgeois” and “neo-colonialism”.
Imperatively, it was against the backdrop of this gloomy and hopelessly chaotic 
economic situation that characterised the move that led Ghanaian government not 
just voluntarily, but eagerly deepened and relentlessly extended the use of a neoliberal 
rationality of governance to respond to the 1970’s and 1980’s economic plight. Indeed, 
it was within this climate that the then self-styled Marxist revolutionary, Rawlings-
led Provisional National Defense Council government (PNDC) confronted by the 
new orthodoxy of neoliberal government abandoned its radical populism (Ahiakpor, 
1985; Matthew, 1991, p.235-63) and earnestly begun to initiate contacts and nego-
tiations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, leading to the 
implementation of stringent loan conditions and Economic Recovery Programmes 
(ERP) in 1983. The central animating element implicit in the Ghanaian neoliberal-
ising agenda was the notion that Economic Recovery Programme would help com-
bat and revitalise the troubled economic conditions; redressing the crippling external 
debt overhang facing the country, and improving social delivery (Mawuko-Yevugah, 
2010). As in other countries of Africa in the 1980s, so, too, in the Ghanaian context, 
“misguided” government interventions in the market was identified as the problem, 
and neoliberal approaches and practices seen as the only panacea.
Introduction of Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), Ghana’s version of the 
structural adjustment programmes indelibly constituted a radical policy shift from 
the aggressive socialist socio-economic transformation to market-led development 
model that had been laid at the attainment of independence. The main argument is 
that structural adjustment discourse as introduced in Ghana rapidly emerged in the 
old fetishism of the worst excesses of economic protectionism: which became a guid-
ing policy narrative for even rigorous and comprehensive market-led reform policies 
in the form of neoliberal conditionality restructuring and rationalisation of the pub-
lic sector through rapid privatisation, divestiture; drastic reductions of government 
spending; removing of subsidies to domestic industries; removing tariffs; general 
deregulation of the economy; radical market liberalisation; and devaluation of the 
exchange rate to encourage exports and reduce imports (Heywood, 2011, p.371; Wil-
liamson, 1993) dominating the continent’s development discourse (Mensah, 2006; 
Mkandawire, 1995).
In this way, fundamental to the changes enacted in Ghana was simply to delink 
and disengage the state from an active role in the economy and to be under the sway 
of market-friendly forces to ensure efficient and healthy economic development. Sim-
ply put, through widespread privatisation, divestiture, deregulation, liberalisation 
and personalisation, neoliberal governmentality purposefully aimed at transform-
ing, restructuring and reformulating recipients of burgeoning welfare benefits into 
economically competitive enterprising subjects, who should be self-disciplined to 
become responsiblised and socialised citizen rationalised and undergirded by a new 
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governmental reason (the extension of economic rationalism into politics). This in 
a sense was evidenced in Ghana where neoliberalism’s bureaucratic remodelling and 
reorientation of state formed an inescapable dimension of specific policies and pro-
grammes in governing every aspect of life (Ward & England, 2007; Mudge, 2008). 
Since the 1980s up until today, neoliberal structural adjustment ideas and precepts 
have ridden roughshod over any solution to the Ghanaian economic malaise particu-
larly among the political elites. As Storey richly put it ‘the new orthodoxy’ of neoliber-
alism although constructed by outside powers, is being ‘perpetuated and internalised 
by local elites (Storey, 1997, p.18).
Predictably, prominent within the government of Jerry John Rawlings thinking on 
how to pursue its policy ambitions in the direction for sustainable development is its 
accommodation and acceptance of the orthodox political economic model of neolib-
eral reforms and restructuring under auspices of International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. In tandem with this thinking, PNDC government just like other 
African countries in 1983 launched the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) under 
the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF. In particular, between August 1983 
and November 2000, PNDC regime enthusiastically embraced reform policies closely 
tied to restoring and repairing Ghana’s international economic standing in the 1980s.
The reform policies were drafted in two major phases, each geared toward respond-
ing to and addressing a particular problem identified in the economy (Mawuko-
Yevugah, 2013). The first phase of the recovery programme dubbed the stabilisation 
phase, lasted between 1983 and 1986. This aspect of the recovery was aimed at halt-
ing the economic decline, especially in the industrial and export commodity produc-
tion sector. It entailed macroeconomic stabilisation measures which included but 
not limited to: fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies; liberalisation of prices; 
and restructuring of the public and financial sectors. The second phase of between 
1987 and 1989 was the structural adjustment and development phase which mainly 
focused on liberalisation (Boafo-Arthur, 1999).
The key elements of the strategy for implementing the ERP have been: (a) a 
realignment of relative prices to encourage productive activities and exports through 
strengthening of economic incentives; (b) a progressive shift away from direct con-
trols and intervention towards greater reliance on market forces; (c) the early restora-
tion of monetary and fiscal discipline; (d) the rehabilitation of social and economic 
infrastructure; and (e) the undertaking of structural and institutional reforms to 
enhance the efficiency of the economy and encourage the expansion of private savings 
and investment (IMF, 1991).
Notably, panoply of targets, regimes, regulation, monitoring, external inspection 
and policy dialogue were co-opted and mobilised, forming the very micro-politics of 
governance. However, the point is that from the perspective of governmentality, the 
use of this arrangement of techniques of indirect controls and market-based policy 
instruments became an economic totem, an article of faith for the PNDC govern-
ment. From the apparatus of the state, every corner of the economy, from health to 
housing and social welfare, and from every nook and cranny, have been inundated 
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with such regimes, monitoring, and regulation; overwhelmingly consolidated and 
reinforced within the orthodoxy of state reason. On this point, it is the reliance 
placed in these disciplinary rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques to 
manage conduct which is perhaps most vividly exemplified in neoliberalism’s broader 
rationality of power. And this is precisely what this thesis sets out to do through criti-
cal interrogation of neoliberal development paradigm and its implications for gover-
nance in the Ghanaian context.
1.5  Framework for Analysis
The study selectively draws on Michel Foucault‘s notions of governmentality as a start-
ing point to critically interrogate the contemporary configurations of power relations 
between Bretton Woods institutions and the government of Ghana represented by 
the governing strategy of structural adjustment framework. More specifically, govern-
mentality literature offers a better critical conceptual schema to analyse International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank structural adjustment policy within the context 
of Ghana. This configuration proper to power structures and dynamics is best cap-
tured by the term neoliberal governmentality. Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) seminal 
lectures on the history of governmentality delivered at the Collège de France between 
January and April of the 1977-78 academic years have influenced a generation of the 
highly credentialed scholars. In contrast to the standard political economy critique 
that tends to view neoliberalism as a set of policies, such as privatisation of state enter-
prises, trade liberalisation, unregulated direct foreign investment and the reductions 
in state spending and regulation of virtually every kind (Williamson, 2003), the task 
here is to analyse neoliberalism as a form of governmentality and how this idea in our 
understanding neatly dovetails with what Michel Foucault called the “microphysical” 
rationalities to the analysis of power through to macrophysical rationalities “and stra-
tegic codification through the governmentalised state” ( Jessop, 2006, p. 2). That is 
to say, complex array of apparatuses of knowledge production, liberal techniques and 
competing discourses and practices are co-opted with the aim of governing human 
subjects and collectivities.
Foucault’s governmentality neologism has spawned significant array of studies. Of 
chief concern here are the twin notable intersecting ways along which most govern-
mentality tradition resides and works. It is with such points in mind that Gordon 
developed two distinctions to be had in Foucault’s own writings and lectures on gov-
ernmentality (Gordon, 1991). Perhaps more broadly, Foucault analysis of governmen-
tality refers to “the conduct of conduct”, or self-government and of the government 
of others working through their autonomy rather than through coercion (Foucault, 
2008) flagrantly reminiscent of the rise of characteristically neoliberal forms of 
government in the second half of the twentieth century (Lemke, 2012). Given this 
, governmentality as patented by Foucault can refer to strategies, techniques, meth-
ods, mechanisms and technologies deliberately employed, on the one hand, to gov-
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ern subjects either directly or indirectly by structuring the field of possibilities, and 
on the other, the configuration of subjectivity itself under the action of government. 
This meaning of governmentality is all the more eloquently addressed in Michel Fou-
cault’s “technologies of power”. Thus Foucault’s engagement with the problematics of 
government can be analysed “from the perspective of a genealogy of technologies of 
power…according to its objectives, the strategies that govern it and the program of 
political action it proposes” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 36).
There is a second, more specific and nuanced level of meaning of governmental-
ity that expounds on the art of government (Foucault often used these two terms 
interchangeably). Here government functions as specific kind of political power or 
technology of power, one that Foucault commonly highlighted and contrasted with 
sovereign power. Whereas sovereign power evokes the image of a single source of 
authority, law and right within a given domain (Rose, 2008, p.2), the discourse on the 
art of government, Foucault contends, signals a departure from the sovereign to the 
target of government itself: the population. It could certainly be argued that under-
writing Foucault’s juxtaposition is the incremental manner in which “thanks to the 
perception of the specific problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of 
the level of reality that we call the economy, that it is possible to think, reflect, and 
calculate the problem of government outside the juridical framework of sovereignty” 
(2007a, p. 104).
To fully understand this, it is crucial that we note, as Foucault does from the outset 
that governmentality refers to the historical variants of technology/neoliberal logic 
of governing in the seventeenth century under the impetus of the Polizeiwissenschaft, 
and is then reproduced within the context of liberal vision of government in the 
eighteenth century. That is governmentality as a technology/neoliberal mentality of 
governing manifested, for instance, in the “discoveries” of political economy and the 
population. Foucault explains:
The constitution of a knowledge (savoir) of government is absolutely insepara-
ble from the constitution of a knowledge of all the processes revolving around 
population in the wider sense of what we now call “the economy”…the consti-
tution of political economy was made possible when population emerged as a 
new subject…a new science called “political economy” and at the same time, a 
characteristic form of governmental intervention, that is, intervention in the 
field of the economy and population, will be brought into being by reference to 
this continuous and multiple network of relationships between the population, 
the territory, and wealth. In short…the transition in the eighteenth century 
from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated 
by techniques of government revolves around population, and consequently 
around the birth of political economy. (2007a, p. 106)
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These points are not to be taken lightly inasmuch as they disclose for Foucault how 
government and governmentality are not sterile static categories and irreducible entity 
—which need not be seen as mutually exlusive but rather their meanings remarkably 
shift, overlap and actualised in terms of the kind of problems—political and analyti-
cal—to which they were put. Governmentality Foucault notes in this respect is con-
ducive to the productive aspects of power that illuminate the ways through which 
practices and actions are shaped and constituted in conjunction with the transforma-
tion of political rationalities (Foucault, 2008; Walters, 2012, p.13–14).
According to this logic, governmentality analytics is meant to open up a flexible 
and a unifying framework for the analyses of the way in which the world is ordered, 
conceived and governed and, secondly, a specific horizon of thought well suited to 
interrogatively envisioning discussions on neoliberal governmentality. In the course 
of his lecture of 1st February 1979, Foucault proposes governmentality as a grid that 
resonates with the political rationalities that mark the advent of a distinctly mod-
ern form of governmental mode of thought—mentality. This proposal hinges on an 
understanding that Foucault’s notion of governmentality… is valid for the analysis of 
ways of conducting the conduct of mad people, patients, and children (and is equally 
valid) when we are dealing with phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an 
economic policy…or the management of a whole social body” (2008, p.186).
To be sure, governmentality is neither synonymous with liberalism or neoliberal-
ism; on the contrary, it is conceptualised in this study as specific forms of governmen-
tality. Principally, it can be asserted that it is precisely such logic of reasoning that 
prompts consideration for the study of neoliberalism that leaves open the possibility 
of non-liberal and non-Western forms of governmentality ( Jeffreys, 2009; Ferguson, 
2010; Collier, 2011; Ailio, 2011; Death, 2013). Thus understood, the term govern-
mentality will be used in this study both as a technology of governmental knowledge 
production and as apparatuses of neoliberal political rationality (Foucault, 1997, p. 
319; Rose et al., 2006, p. 85; Walters, 2012, p.5–6). Following Gordon’s reflection 
(1991, p.2), it is reasonably straightforward to understand governmentality frame-
work in general as “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of 
government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable 
of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitio-
ners and to those upon whom it is practiced”. In all of the above instances, that is, fol-
lowing the governmentality tradition that I similarly wish to locate neoliberalism, the 
philosophy that underpins and informs the economic model represented by the struc-
tural adjustment policies devised by International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
as a specific type of neoliberal governmentality. The governmentality approach is a 
promising tool in understanding how structural adjustment policies have been con-
structed, made visible, thinkable and addressed (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 
1992; Miller & Rose, 2008). This is the key focus of this study.
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1.6 Research Aims and Objectives
This thesis more broadly aims to contribute towards a more nuanced understanding 
of the comprehensive ways hegemonic neoliberal regime is shaping our contemporary 
global politics and to imagine alternative approaches for transformation and social 
change. Specifically it attempts to critically address, clears up and provide a productive 
analysis on the multiple and overlapping ways that neoliberal governmental rationali-
ties and practices seek to order social and political life (Foucault, 1991a) through the 
mantra of structural adjustment in the context of Ghana. Finally, locating my research 
within the broad theoretical framework of critical IR scholarship with special interest 
in governmentality perspective, this research attempts to offer a critical appraisal of 
this theoretical body with the aim of contributing towards it continues appeal.
1.7  Research Questions and the Statement of the Problem
The policies and practices as well as the evolution and the implementation of struc-
tural adjustment policies in Ghana in particular, and Africa in general, raise two inter-
related questions that my research sets out to explore.
The questions posed by this research were twofold:
(1) To what extent can Foucauldian governmentality perspective be applied 
to International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment pro-
grammes in Ghana? and
(2) What does a framework of governmentality help us to understand about the 
political effects of structural adjustment and the construction of development?
In addressing the first question the thesis aims to contribute to the theoretical debates 
in International Relations (IR) critical scholarship particularly in view of the recent 
interest in Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” perspective that clearly bypass 
bifurcated conceptual categories of inside vs. outside, domestic vs. international and 
micro vs. macro—viewed as broad church categories that are in and of themselves 
inextricably connected and shift in tandem with governmental rationalities and politi-
cal technologies or art of government—liberalism or neoliberalism through empirical 
research. I am not in the first place interested in developing a grand theory; instead, 
one of my chief aims is to gain crucial insights into the conceptual and operational 
underpinnings of the banal, most mundane practices, the taken-for-granted “reality”, 
and humble acts that are implicated in the production, reproduction and circulation 
of power in the structural adjustment framework (Larner & Williams, 2004, p.4; 
Vrasti, p. 12).
While research studies on neoliberal governmentality has traditionally inundated 
the IR discipline, there have been very few analyses or any consideration given to 
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the context commonly thought of as “non-Western” as well as “non-liberal” (Sigley 
& Jefferey, 2006), much less of those that focus on how “new forms of government 
that are indicated by the increasing significance of international, supranational and 
transnational organisations” like the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank (Lemke, 2007, p.12). With the significant exception of few early works (Debrix, 
2010; Dillon, 1995), most of the current Foucauldian-inspired works (Dauphinee & 
Masters, 2007; DeLarrinaga & Doucet, 2008; Dillon, 2007; Dillon & Neal, 2008; 
Dillon & Reid, 2001, 2009; Jabri, 2006; Pin-Fat, Edkins & Shapiro, 2004; Reid, 2004, 
2006; Salter, 2003), are mainly geared at clarifying the concepts of biopolitics namely, 
issues of race, population, migration and reproduction (Rabinow & Rose, 2004). It 
is not until recently that some Foucauldian scholars have shown interest to employ a 
governmentality analytics in their research within the domain of international, supra-
national and transnational organisations (Larner & Walters; Perry & Maurer, 2003; 
Walters & Haahr, 2005).
More significantly, even the little work being done from a Foucauldian govern-
mentality perspective and specifically with those dealing with issues of international 
or transnational nature is surprisingly however taking place outside of the realm of 
International Relations (Crampton & Elden, 2007; Inda, 2005; Li, 2007; Ong, 
2006; Collier & Ong, 2005; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Peck, 
2004; Rose-Redwood, 2006; Sparke, 2006). Similarly, governmentality approaches 
so far, had done little in contributing substantially to the substantive understanding 
of Foucault’s insights within the wider biopolitical projects of institutions of global 
governance (O’Brien; Goetz et al., 1998) in this case, the World Bank and the IMF 
commonly seen as being simply “over” and “above” national states (Ferguson & 
Gupta, 2002).
In fact, the gap this study humbly proposes to bridge is to investigate how the IMF 
and the Bank economic structural adjustment model in Ghana can be used in framing 
the Foucauldian readings of neoliberal governmentality as a starting point for further 
analysis as Foucault acknowledges the economic rationalisations and impulses of neo-
liberalism as calculations of global regime of power that selectively grants privileges to 
those whose conduct conforms to governmental injunctions:responsibility, autonomy 
and resourcefulness expected from a good entrepreneurial neoliberal subject rather 
than as a policy framework or an ideology (Weidner, 2009; Vrasti, 2012). In other 
words, while neoliberal government is a set of power relations that subsumes the entire 
social life to the logic of market rationality, (Kiersey, 2009, p.363; Vrasti, 2012) it also 
makes the market into the standard of truth against which all social life should be 
assessed (Foucault, 2008, p.246). This, I suggest, is congruent with the entrepreneurial 
logic of structural adjustment policies in African countries to produce adaptable and 
competent subjects who enthusiastically live up to the dictums of neoliberal market. 
Particularly many contemporary empirical treatments of governmentality analytic, 
insurance, security, accounting, crime, health, or international affairs (e.g., the Euro-
pean Union, international organisations, global civil society), despite its been a ques-
tion at the very top in the discourses of international development have been deeply 
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unsatisfying; and by large, tended to focus on an analysis on how governmental ratio-
nalities and practices worked, and less so, on how they are met with resistance (Vrasti, 
2012, p.7). It is for this reason that the present study in trying to avoid and replicate 
this trap, considers the forms of agency and subjectivity, particularly in terms of the 
ways in which power is exercised, legitimised and rationalised through practices of 
“freedom” and the ‘conduct of conduct’ in relation to the structural adjustment initia-
tives. In stark contrast to the prevalent assumptions that problematically present the 
governed as mere passive, docile and enthusiastic recipients ready to conform to the 
regulatory edicts imposed by Western, liberal model (Merlingen, 2006, p.190) I feel 
that it is critical to point to how neoliberalism might inspire resistance by looking 
at the constraining forces that cause “the governmentalisation of populations to fail” 
(2009, p.427) or “revert back to something more basic” —what Foucault has identi-
fied as “disciplinary power” ( Joseph, 2010a, p.225).
Another key question explored in this study is the degree to which the structural 
adjustment constructs global economic and development governance. Recourse to 
the Foucauldian concepts in particular, discourse, knowledge-power and subjectivity, 
and its extended case study in Ghana remain imperative in an attempt to answer this 
question. Part of why I have chosen to direct my attention to the Bank and the Fund 
through the prism of Foucauldian perspective is to question or problematise the epis-
temological foundations of governmental rationalities and technologies of structural 
adjustment framework and its accompanying policy instrument in the context of 
development-good governance matrix. In contrast to the commonplace and simplistic 
renderings of politics of development as political-economic reality or an ideological 
rhetoric that merely impoverishes the periphery, here Foucauldian concepts provide a 
more concretised account and the means in which discursive politics of development 
framing contribute to our understandings of how some things are rendered visible 
and others invisible (Abrahamsen, 2000, p. 138; Ferguson, 1994, p.20).
The discourse of development governs global politics in certain ways through 
techniques and sites such as structural adjustment plans, and this thesis is geared at 
examining how, and with what effects, this is achieved and resisted. It is hoped that 
utilising the intricacies of discourse to the study of structural adjustment plans will 
enhance our understanding of how power is embedded in the way we think of, speak 
about and relate to others— the inseparability of power-knowledge couplet and sub-
ject-object relations that reside within the structural adjustment framework. Thus, my 
research aims at unpacking and exposing the Orwellian designs and disruptions con-
ceptualised and defined through structural adjustment which will serve as opportuni-
ties to recover alternatives.
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1.8 Research Methodology
A Foucauldian approach does not limit the use of other methodologies and critical 
devices. Foucault is clear: discourse “is so complex a reality that we not only can but 
should approach it at different levels and with different methods” (Foucault, 1974, p. 
xiv). I share this opinion, and hence methodologically I am motivated by a desire to 
evoke the historical and contextual analysis on the existing secondary literature on the 
structural adjustment regime in Ghana in particular and Africa in general as a dom-
inant prismatic lens through which to elucidate neoliberal discursive formations as 
packaged through the of liberal frameworks of ‘good governance’ agenda (Chandler, 
2010; Springer, 2012b). Through the analysis of ‘good governance’ agenda I show the 
ways Bretton Woods institutions relied upon certain objects of knowledge and exper-
tise, interventionist forms of power and production of subjectivation that legitimise 
specific and core assumptions of global economic and development governance; and 
how it shapes and gives direction to new political spaces within the context of Ghana. 
The analysis of ‘good governance’ is based on a number of key discursive statements as 
epitomised in the 1989 World Bank report entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis 
to Sustainable Growth, the 1999 Governance and Development publication, 1997 The 
State in a Changing World and 2002 Building Institutions for Markets reports. These 
policy texts were purposefully selected because of its canonical and prominent status 
as well as the coherence of their visions to act as primary producers of neoliberal dis-
course in the Ghanaian context. These empirical data have become increasingly central 
in establishing the neoliberal logic of the World Bank and the IMF. And accordingly 
in order to deconstruct discourses inherent in the politics of adjustment, I draw on 
Bretton Woods institutions statements on structural adjustment to show how it func-
tioned as a key technique to “govern at a distance” (Barry et al., 1996; Larner, 2000) 
in which the scope, forms and identities of governmental action — conceived as “the 
conduct of conduct”—were determined (Foucault, 2000, p.201–222): and the ways 
in which the discourse of development was defined, shaped, maintained and repro-
duced in global governance (Abrahamsen, 2004).
By supplementing (and complementing) my case study with a range of official and 
unofficial policy documents, relevant reviews for analysis which include documents 
drawn from both official Bretton Woods institutions as well as non-Bretton Woods 
institutions, we can construct an epistemology around the structural adjustment 
framework as a regulatory mechanism and/or a new disciplinary framework. Even 
though a Foucauldian discourse inevitably has its biases, imperfections and shortcom-
ings, however it offers a much wanted insight, sophisticated analytical perspective 
and most promising methodological avenue that cast a critical and sustained sense of 
rigour on structural adjustment experience. And it also has much to contribute to our 
understanding of the effects of the politics of development and its affinity with ‘good 
governance’ discourse within the global political economy (Connolly, 1993, p.221; 
Shapiro, 1981).
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1.9 Synopsis of the Study
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The two chapter sets out to explain three Fou-
cauldian concepts in particular: discourse, power-knowledge and subjectivity. Here I 
delineate the epistemological matrix on which this thesis is based. Using Foucault’s 
critical purchase on discursive formation of ideas and practices, I show how politics of 
development establishes forms of knowledge, techniques and technologies of power 
that are productive of a specifically neoliberal form of subjectivity— nation-state. In 
particular, I demonstrate how both the discursive formations and non-discursive con-
sequences of politics of development are put into play through the power-knowledge 
nexus; highlighting how it asserts particular understandings within which subjectivi-
ties are produced and how such critical perspectives are extended in the light of the 
neoliberal structural adjustment project proselytised and rationalised by International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank within the milieu of Ghana.
In my exposition in the third chapter, I address the main intellectual challenges 
posed by neoliberalism by looking at the political and economic thoughts of Freder-
ick Albert Hayek and Milton Friedman. I further suggest that one of the ways we can 
approach the contemporary neoliberal challenge is to survey the ideas of the intel-
lectual arch fathers of neoliberalism by re-reading and re-interpreting the intellectual 
works of most prominently F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman. As well, this section 
is woven around my own description, interpretation and critique of the political and 
economic thoughts of both Hayek and Friedman. Ultimately, I conclude that by con-
sidering the subtleties and the complexities of some specific ideas of their works, the 
so-called elusiveness of neoliberalism can be somewhat rendered understandable, 
knowable and simplified.
As a way of developing an alternative account for studying neoliberalism, in the 
fourth chapter, I turn to Foucault’s reading of neoliberalism published as The Birth of 
Biopolitics. In it, I find that Foucault’s uncannily prescient analysis offers a clear dis-
tinction between the governmental rationality of liberalism and neoliberalism. In the 
ensuing discussion, I walk the reader through the remarkable steps Foucault made in 
offering a more sophisticated reading of neoliberalism. I then suggest that relying on 
Foucauldian-inspired thoughts on governmentality through and through, provide an 
ideal lens to understand the discursive politics of neoliberalism. Paradoxically how-
ever, there is also a lively dispute particularly animated by quasi-Marxist epigones as 
to whether or not Foucault’s unflinching position towards what he enthusiastically 
characterised as neoliberalism could wholly be applied to the uniquely changing con-
ditions that confront us in our historical present. While I remain sympathetic to these 
provocations, I acknowledge this is an issue I cannot conclusively settle here — that 
certainly would be another project in its own right.
As a way of unpacking neoliberalism, the main concepts used in this thesis, chapter 
five explores why neoliberalism despite it perceived dominance has proven to be so 
elusive in often highly popular accounts. In fact, differences in terms of its incoher-
ence and contradictions illustrate the many disagreements in voluminous scholarship 
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on neoliberalism. I argue that the reason why neoliberalism appears to be elusive is 
that we have largely been heedless of its discursive qualities.
Chapter six is motivated by a Foucauldian discourse analytic to examine key dis-
courses, power-knowledge dynamics and production of subjectivities as packaged in 
the neoliberal ‘good governance’ development paradigm devised by Bretton woods 
officials. This chapter contends that neoliberal subject formation in Ghana was vali-
dated precisely through the proliferation of legitimising discursive formations like 
‘good governance’ as consent for neoliberal development paradigm. In consistent 
with Foucault’s model of the discursive formation, my intent is to focus on the condi-
tions that constrain and make ‘good governance’ discourses possible, and instead of 
searching for meaning, I look for “external conditions of existence”. One of the main 
goals of Chapter six is to give an indication of how narratives of resistance are imbued 
within neoliberal discourses. This is crucial if we are to counter problematic notions 
and obfuscations of neoliberalism as inevitable or monolithic imperative and begin to 
have a radical (re)appraisal of neoliberal logic and its fundamental rationale and how 
it becomes operable on the ground in Ghana and beyond.
In the seventh chapter, I direct attention towards the examination of the techniques 
of “disciplining” power enacted by disciplinary technologies of structural adjustment 
framework. For my purposes, I employ the notion of power as inherent function of 
relationship a key concept developed by Michel Foucault. In the following, I prefer 
to evoke the concept of power as productive in which considerable freedom, possi-
bility and autonomy is exercised by the subject in the practice of his/her own indi-
vidual subjectivity. And, in being so, my discussion will draw on the ways in which 
the circumscription of state regulatory authority in domestic policy space within the 
orthodox structural adjustment framework transformed subjects into objects, i.e., the 
re-appropriation of Ghana as a locus to be managed, administered and reformed. In 
closing, and by way of illustration, I offer ‘non-compliance’ as one possibility into 
what Foucault terms “counter-conducts” or the tactical reversals within the context of 
neoliberal governmentality.
Finally in Chapter Eight I reflexively conclude by summarising my findings and 
provide a general conclusion that clearly emerged as significant next steps in this vein 
of research. It also discusses the contribution of the research. I hypothesised that neo-
liberalism at its core is a kind of politics that achieves its goals discursively (Springer, 
2012b) by rearticulating our social world and how we ought to be governed. In short, 
a neoliberal governmentality par excellence which I will attempt to answer in the 
body of the thesis.




The objective of this chapter is to explain three interconnected Foucauldian concepts 
in particular: discourse, power-knowledge and subjectivity to carefully and reflectively 
delineate the methodological orientation for this thesis. Foucault’s analytical purchase 
on discourse is crucial in discerning both discursive and non-discursive consequences 
of politics of development. It also holds possibility in exposing and destabilising the 
constructions of power-knowledge relations and certain regimes of “truth” that con-
dition the ways in which we can think about ourselves as reinforcing and embody-
ing certain subject positions; and the ways that such critical perspectives could be 
extended in the light of the neoliberal structural adjustment project devised by the 
twin Washington-based institutions within the milieu of Ghana.
Obviously, this decision is, of course, not altogether arbitrary at all. The overarching 
objective is to suggest that the focus on the intricacies of discourse, power-knowledge 
and subjectivity are well suited to offer a luminous interpretation of what politics of 
development and discursive legitimation of neoliberal structural adjustment actually 
do in an attempt to understand how they pertain to contemporary relations of power 
and government. Contra doctrinaire and simplistic interpretation of development as a 
monolithic imperative or an ideological mystification that merely entrenches existing 
power relations, Michel Foucault’s conceptual apparatuses provide a more concretised 
account that shine significant light on discursive formations in respect of the dynam-
ics of visible and the hidden, permeated through the use of almost unchallenged and 
the marginalised ideas which gain wider acceptance in institutions pertaining to the 
discourse of development.
It is not enough to all too frequently blame structural adjustment programmes 
devastating resonant failings to solve development problems arguing that it is more 
productive and fruitful, however, to also ask what is solely served or wholly produced 
by their failings, and how they structure global governance in certain ways (Fou-
cault, 1975, p.272; Abrahamsen, 2000, p. 138; Ferguson, 1994, p.20) beyond simply 
describing it. Therefore, I argue that Foucault’s work is, in this respect, a compul-
sory reference insofar as it exposes, unpacks and deconstructs the intricate linguistic 
utterances and discursive understanding of development which overwhelmingly give 
coherence and legitimacy to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank’s 
penetrations within the context of Ghana and beyond not as natural. But this chapter 
asserts that it should instead be seen as intimately bound up with the production and 
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re-production of global power relations formed out of contextually specific material 
circumstances for their possibilities and justification.
To concretise these remarks, I first dissect Foucault’s understanding of discourse 
to discern how politics of development frames our understandings of issues or set of 
problems in a particular way. By taking a radical rethinking in mapping out the inter-
sections between politics of development and its corresponding discursive formations 
and practices as a starting point, this chapter seeks to vigorously problematise, contest 
and tear down the assumed inevitability and all-encompassing version of neoliberal 
theology to render “the familiar strange” (Foucault, 1980). I then set out to exam-
ine the way politics of development as discourses and practices effectively function to 
legitimise and instil certain forms of superior economic knowledge, entrench forms of 
power regimes coagulate under subjectivation (Springer, 2012b).
2.2 Discourse Analysis à la Foucault
Michel Foucault’s theoretical and empirical corpus on discourse has received incred-
ible expansion and become a source of inspiration to authors in the broad field of 
development thinking in the past two decades (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Cornwall 
& Eade, 2010; Cooper & Packard, 1997; Crunch, 1995; Eriksson Baaz, 2005; Fergu-
son, 1994; Grillo & Stirrat, 1997; Groves & Hinton, 2005; Moore & Schmitz, 1995; 
Mosse & Lewis, 2005; Rahnema, 1997; Ziai, 2015). In articulating the significance 
of discourse, Michel Foucault (1972) who is among the foremost seminal thinkers 
of discourse analysis, was centrally concerned in cultivating a cutting edge approach 
for understanding how the bigger social world is represented and how this primarily 
tend to influence the perceptions and preferences about the way people understand 
themselves as self-evident reality. That is, a reality which perpetuates the constructed-
ness of others as subjects is tightly aligned with discourse due to its formative power. 
Discourses Foucault famously described are “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1970, p.54).
Discourse, knowledge and power are all intrinsically linked and mutually imbri-
cated domains. As Foucault (1981, p.52-53) writes, “discourse is not simply that 
which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and 
by which there is a struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized”. It must be 
acknowledged that in Foucault’s oeuvre, the definition of discourse is unclear, noto-
riously elastic and not easy to pin down: “sometimes as the general domain of all 
statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a 
regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements” (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 90). It was not until page 131 in Archaeology of Knowledge that he gave tentative 
definitions of the concept— “we shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as 
they belong to the same discursive formation”. Whereas the general misunderstand-
ing of definition of Foucault’s discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis, in my view, 
though, its utility certainly is of central concern to this thesis.
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With that being said, I utilise Foucault’s notion that discourse—more correctly 
discursive formations —explicitly constitutes “the general domain of all statements” 
(”enounces”) or “an individualisable group of statements” (1972, p.90) —in this case, 
the Fund and the Bank’s statements that have been discursively produced (Hall, 2003, 
p.72; Sribas, 2014). The “statement”, pace Deleuze (1988, p.15) is extracted in Fou-
cault’s theorisation from the simple techniques of exactly what can (not)be said and 
what can be thought and enunciated at a particular time and place (Pitsoe & Letseka, 
2013, p.24) established as “truth”(how what is said gains authority).
Development discourses as Arturo Escobar correctly points out “results in concrete 
practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is produced” (Esco-
bar, 1995, p. 216). Put this way, Foucault strikingly aims at no less (but no more) 
than describing the statement, in an entirely different sense. It is not merely as lan-
guage -in-use, sets of thoughts or sayings per se (Young, 2001) but as a “function” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 98) in Pêcheux’s (1975) sense of the term that install regimes of 
truth (knowledge). This underscores the fact that Foucault’s depiction of “statement” 
as “function” that can be theorised as a bundle of interconnected discursive practices 
and forms of knowledge that may overlap and coincide as they change historically to 
define a particular relations of power; triggering what Judith Butler expressed as pro-
cess of interpellation (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1990) whereby one can “recognize and 
isolate an act of formulation” (Foucault, 1972, p.93).
The “statement”, a principal theme that runs through Foucault’s analytics of dis-
course and discursive practices, again need somehow to be thought of and grasped 
as a “special mode of existence” (1972, p.100) which, by implication, “enables rules 
or forms to become manifest” (p.99). Thus in his attempt to navigate and make sense 
of the tactics related to the construction of psychiatric “truth” inscribed in power-
knowledge specific to the discourse of natural history, Foucault repeatedly and sys-
tematically looks,
to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse 
the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains 
that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articu-
lated. (1972, p.86‐87)
The very fact of this focus, Foucault himself has often claimed, is on how discourse 
evidently constitutes its objects rather than merely representing it. In the Foucauld-
ian formulation, what needs to be analysed and hence understood, is to specify how 
for example psychiatry practices and institutional apparatuses find a way of limiting 
its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object 
—and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, observable, measurable, classifiable 
and describable” (Foucault, 1972, p.46). As Hall (2001) conveys, “discourse “rules in” 
certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to 
talk, write, or conduct oneself “and “rules out” limits and restricts other ways of talk-
ing, or conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about 
24 | Amo-Agyemang: Understanding Neoliberalism as Governmentality
it” (p.72). The primary argument being made here by Foucault is not to ask for how 
a group of statements (discourses) and practices function not to define “objects, fully 
formed and armed” (Foucault, 1972, p.47) but to call into question “what it means 
for them to have appeared, when and where they did and not others”(Foucault, 
1989b, p.109). The interest is obviously to study how “things said” could be in the 
true— accepted as an accredited form of knowledge.
Thus conceived, Gilles Deleuze (1988, p. 8) in recounting Foucault’s interest in 
statements even suggests that “statement has a “discursive object” which does not 
derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement 
itself ”. Interestingly and instructively, drawing freely from him if statements are “the 
words, phrases and propositions which revolve round different focal points of power… 
set in play by a particular problem” (p.17); then similarly for this study, what is of 
deepest importance is to locate ‘statements’ that enable/disable as things said within 
the discourses used to describe problematic structural adjustment model that func-
tion with constitutive effects to speak into existence of heavily indebted poor coun-
tries as a recognisable (Butler, 1993) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972, p.50) .
In essence, this should thoroughly alert us to the fact that in considering structural 
adjustment packages which characterised African states elites as deviant objects who 
need tutelage (Escobar, 1995,p.30) in order to be delivered or redeemed “from the 
undignified condition called underdevelopment” (Esteva, 1992, p.7), reciprocally, it 
is these discourses we need to analysis in order to open up the problematic of ways of 
thinking through the system by which these particular truth‐objects are formed and 
the specific enunciative modalities (Foucault, 1972, p.205) or types of statements and 
practices that embody such as subject position and subjectivity.
Finally, Foucault discusses subject-positions defined by the enunciative function 
played within discursive practices which make possible the objectification and subjec-
tivation of human beings. This clearly suggests and echoes what Foucault portrayed 
(in the broadest sense possible as the construction of the ideal form of man as sub-
ject and object of knowledge): “Man appears in his ambitious position as an object 
of knowledge and a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator (...) “ 
(Foucault, 1973, p. 312). The value of Foucault’s explications resides to a large extent 
in its analysis of objectification as the chief means and a positive foundation that dic-
tates a definitive technique of visibility (Deleuze, 1992; Ewald, 1992): a method, says 
Scheurich (1997, p. 107) capable of illuminating how a “group is seen or known as a 
problem”.
This interpretation and its extension to the sphere of Ghana , I will illustrate, tacitly 
assumes that once conceived as an object of a particular sort, individuals - the nation-
states, can be transmitted, diffused and dispersed into disciplinary spaces within 
that “grid of social regularity” (p.98). From this, individuals — the nation-states, 
could become subject to particular discourses, practices and rationalities, and thence 
exhibit a nexus of regularities that result in what Butler most appropriately (1997b, 
p.358‐359) describes as, the “on‐going” subjugation: which significantly come across 
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as the very operation of interpellation, that continually repeated action of discourse 
by which subjects are formed in subjugation”.
It may be said that narrativisation of objectification aligns with the idea that indi-
viduals not only come to occupy spaces in the elaborate “social hierarchy but through 
their continual subjugation, ordinarily come to know themselves and accept their 
world” (Graham, 2011, p.672). Therefore, one could suggest, following Foucault 
that statements are articulations that may possibly be said (and done) that look at 
particular ways of being, acting, seeing and thinking actively constituted as an object 
of expertise or knowledge. This line of thinking typifies and mirrors the discursive 
neoliberal logic which I contend has become all-pervasive way of life and altogether 
invisible that other ways of being, of saying, and of doing politics are increasingly 
becoming (or already have become completely) lost?
Consider, for instance, the case of Arturo’s Encountering Development: The Mak-
ing and Unmaking of the Third World: the systems of discourse and representation of 
“reality” associated with the advent of “development” as “a domain of thought and 
action” in the immediate post-1945 period has not only significantly created an effi-
cient principal mechanism for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power 
over the Third World”, the organisation of the third world into a social Darwinistic 
model of progress has made it possible for the successful deployment of “a regime of 
government over the Third World, the one half of a starkly bifurcated architecture—
the abstract oppositions between “developed” and “underdeveloped”, “modern” and 
“traditional”, “rich” and “poor” (Escobar, 1995, p.9-10; Tan , 2011, my emphasis)
In the considered view of Escobar (1995), the process of “development” as consti-
tuting a part of the “anthropology of modernity”, a complex historical conjunction 
(Naz, 2006, p.68) is characterised by what Badie (2000, p.77) tells us is “the logic of 
universalization”. There are three issues that need to be rationally unpicked here. To 
begin with, a distinct and distinctive regularity of statements, which is neither lin-
guistically or logically correct both in general form and dispersion, come to represent 
a discursive formation itself; a “family of statements” (Deleuze, 1988, p.11). This, in 
turn, forms the surface of a discourse or a certain “positivity” (Lemke, 1997) which 
points towards the constituting field of power‐knowledge that characterise a particu-
lar discursive social relations (Foucault, 1972, p.48). Secondly, once a demarcation of 
a field of an object of scrutiny has been validated through the discursive practices of 
a particular regime of knowledge, that object becomes attached increasingly to that 
domain; and, thirdly, the discourse that constitutes the object also to a degree, consti-
tutes a complex mix of knowledges and practices that will inevitably come to function 
as an instrument of power through which that object is disciplined (Foucault, 1972).
The portrait I have painted so far has focused selectively on how discursive practices 
are much more textualistic (Spivak, 1993, p.56). However textual studies clearly form 
an infinitesimal part of what constitutes discursive practices. Textual productions, 
classically conceived, exist as an interlinking ensemble of social practices generating in 
the process what is controlled, selected, organised, redistributed and excluded to form 
discourse (McNay, 1992, p.27). To the extent that discourse consists of a densely com-
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plexity of converging, enwrapping and diverging practices, researchers writing from a 
disciplinary background of development have included spatial and temporal contex-
tual realm in their understanding of discourse.
Breaking free of a model that tend to conventionalise textual forms, it is the cen-
tral premise of this endeavour not only to include textual materials in my analysis but 
hope to do justice to the networks of heterogeneous material elements as a “archaeol-
ogy of knowledge” (Foucault, 1972). This approach of course has significant corre-
spondence with neoliberalism as discourse for the central reasons of both “structure” 
and “agency”; “thus adequately capturing the discursive production of neoliberalism” 
(Springer, 2012b, p.135). This is important mainly because, materialities (state forma-
tion through policy and programmes that is both constituted by and constitutive of 
the subjectivation) characterised structural adjustment model in this instance, for the 
re-invention of Ghana as a local arena for external intervention: “their power, in effect, 
derives from their capacity to translate ideas into material form” (Best, 2014, p.13). 
More importantly too, Following Foucault (1984, p.252) who declared that “space is 
fundamental in any exercise of power…” it is my submission that these material condi-
tions or accounts offer a nuanced appreciation of manipulating and defining a hierar-
chy of power relations within the discursive field of international development. 
By portraying discourse as a regularity of practices which shape what can be thought 
and said, it is my contention that Foucault’s work on discourse can productively be 
read as inherently connecting materiality and the discursivity. It is exactly in this sense 
that discourse cannot be constructed, established, consolidated and validated in isola-
tion of material drivers (Cotoi, 2011). What is perfectly certain is that discourses are 
not simply free-floating signifiers or insular. It rather revolves itself entirely around 
the power of material conditions and social effects in which they have been used. It 
is this effect in Foucault’s language that presents an extremely efficient mode of power 
that enormously paints an acute picture of how discourses always function which in 
this instance again were institutionally framed by the orthodoxies of structural adjust-
ment model. It evokes and considerably has an important consequence for revealing 
the implications of discursive practices as an instrument of power: discursive practices 
...take shape in technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioural schemes, in types 
of transmission and dissemination, in pedagogical forms that both impose and main-
tain them (Foucault, 1984, p.12).
Potentially more problematic though is that at any one time, there will be a multi-
plicity and discontinuous set of discourses which bear directly on the potential rup-
tures and struggles with each other; always changing, absorbing, and transforming 
other discourses (Young, 2001, p.402). It is this framing discontinuity of discourses 
or episteme (the knowledge system of a particular time), I take to be the key element 
which will turn out to be absolutely crucial in opening possibility of counter hege-
monic discourses and spaces for the hope of resistance.
Once again it can be argued that because Foucault understands discourse to be 
embedded in social systems with its attendant description of discursive formations 
and their discontinuities, discourse, I think, should not be conceptualised as mono-
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lithic or hegemonic totality (Cohen & Arato, 1994, p.291-292; Pieterse, 2000, p.175-
191); or overly restrictive, dominating and finally “mostly oppressive” (Dryzek, 2006, 
p.39) but has a constitutive and determinative role in producing partial and situated 
reality.
On another related tangent, Foucault has been accused by feminists and Marx-
ists for being extravagantly vague and or neglecting the exact influence that material 
objects expressed in discourses, say economy has on the formation of discourses (Saw-
yer, 2002, p. 441). Suffice to point out that as far as this imprecision is concerned, 
Hall (1988, p.51) and Dean (1994, p.17) go as far as to suggest that Foucault’s predi-
lection of “primary relations” in his archaeological work is a clear enough indication 
that he uncompromisingly saw awesome non‐discursive practices as a necessary pre-
condition for discursive transformation to take place. In fact this blatant misunder-
standing of Foucault’s archaeological method has also been corroborated by Rabinow 
(1991, p.10) pointing out that Foucault is consistently materialist in asking how dis-
course functions, and that practices are just as much discursive as language.
Michel Foucault is worth quoting at length here:
...in discourses something is formed, according to clearly definable rules: that 
this something exists, submits, changes, disappears, according to equally defin-
able rules; in short, that alongside everything a society can produce (alongside: 
that is to say, in a determinate relationship with) there is the formation and 
transformation of “things said”. It is the history of these “things said” that I 
have undertaken to write. (Foucault, 1991a, p.63)
Recognising the multiplicity and materiality framework, it is worth keeping in mind 
that in the field of development policy, discourses coexist and compete with tightly-
knit and disparate webs of discourses that interweave with competing discourses 
which coalesce, take hold and clash: thereby producing incongruent meanings which 
weave into different strands over time and hence open to tropological displacement 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). This multiplicity is what Foucault, would simply call the 
“tactical polyvalence of discourses” (Foucault, 1997, p.100-102). This obviously does 
not mean either that neoliberal discourse as a dominant paradigm has stayed unchal-
lenged or “the potential for subaltern discourses to unsettle the orthodoxy remains” 
(Springer, 2012b, p.143).
Jeniffer Milliken sort of agrees. He, too, argues that “the open-endedness and insta-
bility of discourses means that they are liable to slip and slide into new relationships 
via resistances that their articulation and operationalisation may engender” (Milliken, 
1999, p.242). This, then, is the substance of the matter. Consequently, “it is this rela-
tionship among discourses; these intra-discursive, inter-discursive and extra-discursive 
dependencies or webs that we should try to analyse” (Foucault, 1989f, p.163, my 
emphasis). It is also, I submit, precisely this friction, perturbations and disturbances 
that create the whole field of power and the positions that ultimately construct sub-
ject positions within discourse. In this context, discourse is not a place into which 
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the subjectivity irrupts (Foucault, 1991c, p.58); it is quintessentially a place where 
power-knowledge produces them. Perhaps it might be more interesting to examine 
how Foucault negotiates with these philosophical concerns which form the substance 
of my subsequent sections: precisely because for Foucault, the questions of subjection 
and power and power-knowledge form the cornerstone for any understanding of dis-
course. As should be sufficiently clear by now, Foucauldian discourse is an ensemble 
of social practices and conditions through which a situated or historically specific 
reality is made intelligible. Discourses shape the world and simultaneously structure 
power relations in certain ways. They have a situated character as it were and sub-
sequently produce partial, incomplete and situated knowledges which are arbitrarily 
fixed, uncertain, and potentially open to contestation and negotiation (McNay, 1994, 
p.74-76). Predictably perhaps, in understanding and resolving the tensions within 
these negotiations the task at hand not least will be an engagement with power, a con-
cern I turn my attention towards now.
2.3 Enter Power-Knowledge Nexus
2.3.1 Bringing Power Back In
Although I will provide a fuller discussion of power and its relation to knowledge 
I am looking at in this chapter, before this however, I think it is worth spending a 
moment highlighting Foucault’s analytic that describes the functioning of power — 
the other half of the power-knowledge nexus in its positivity and in its contextual 
specificities (Ewald, 1978; Walters, 2012). If we accept Foucault’s contention that 
“it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault, 1980b, p.52), then one cannot help 
but also recognise the effects of power linked to knowledge. Let me first make clear 
how I am using the concept here: given that the question of power is one that has 
been discussed at length in the last chapter; I am not going to reflect anew on it here. 
What I want to do here instead is to undertake some necessary conceptual clarifica-
tion of sovereignty, biopower and discipline for comprehending how objects-subjects 
or domains are reinscribed within a particular power-knowledge formation.
Foucault in interrogating power beyond historicisation and functionalism insisted 
upon different rationalities or modalities of power immanent in discourse (power-
knowledge) that have been developed from the eighteenth century up to now. Fou-
cault characterises the various technologies of power to challenge, classify prevailing 
governmental forms of power, and to indicate trajectories towards other, to newly 
emerging governmentality: Sovereign power, biopower and disciplinary power of 
which the relationship among them is one of “historical transformation but which of 
course is not necessarily entirely linear (Foucault, 1975, p.209): although these ratio-
nalities face each other in the second half of the eighteenth century, “in the end it 
was the third that was adopted”: discipline (p.131). This does not at once imply that 
discipline saturates and dominates all relationships of power; it does merely imply 
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as Foucault himself notices that diverse technologies of power are reassembled and 
heterogeneously overlap, intersect, or even contradict in the contemporary societies 
(Fiaccadori, 2015).
He begins by distinguishing what he calls sovereign or juridical model of power, 
which as he argues is a historical situation in which earliest form of power was held 
by monarchs over their subjects. He is a “material and physical presence, “and the ori-
gin of a “force that he himself deploys or transmits to some few others” (Foucault, 
1975, p. 208): sovereignty had the sword and the law as its primary instrument. The 
“juridico-discursive” (Foucault, 1976,p.82) liberal technologies of power to repeat the 
Foucauldian mantra was used by monarchs which denotes a configuration of awesome 
power over life and death, and in fact the state and its entire people (Foucault, 1990). 
Thus, the capacity to decide on life and death is essentially the ‘right to take life or 
let live’ (Foucault, 1976, p.136). Foucault’s conceptualisation of sovereign forms of 
power is understood as power exercised over individuals and the population through 
prohibitions and increasingly state apparatuses which are grounded on the regimes of 
truth and the functioning of discursive practices involved. But opposed to all justifica-
tory narratives of juridico-discursive rationale of liberal technologies of power in line 
with Lemke, is the installation of the “notion of freedom of a (sovereign) subject on 
the one hand and the instance of political sovereignty on the other” (Lemke, 2010). 
This is key as it aims at non-juridical understanding of concept of power that is not 
expressed in terms of its origin in the institutions of the state.
On the other hand , the concept of biopower, or “domain of life over which power 
has taken control” (Membe, 1993) developed by Foucault in both The History of Sex-
uality, vol. 1, and Society Must be Defended emerged as a relatively new and distinct 
form of power in the course of the seventeenth century in Europe as a form of pastoral 
techniques of governing (Foucault, 1982, p.215) through procedures to conduct the 
conduct of individuals to conform to preordained acts (Golder, 2007, p.95; Miller & 
Rose, 2008, p.16): pastoral power is thus an individualising power which infiltrates, 
sustains and produces one’s conduct.
Biopower profoundly entails power over people’s body and as power to foster a 
positive influence on life. Biopower says Foucault, is intensely related to technolo-
gies that endeavours to administer and continued optimisation of the human body: 
“shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns” (Foucault, 
1990, p. 137)—which is in dramatic contrast to the traditional juridical model of 
power that involved the ritualistic marking of the body through terror and torture, 
which was exactly what Foucault set out to move away from (Fiaccadori, 2015). In a 
sense therefore, the species life of populations is intensively administered and shaped 
to bring them in line within a prescribed and defined norm (Reid, 2006). At the 
anatomo-political, bodily level, biopower has been involved with collecting demo-
graphical statistical values in order to vigorously pathologise elements of the popula-
tion on a whole range of issues such as subjectivity, illness, gender and other measures 
in regulating modern societies (Foucault, 1978, p. 140-141; 1995, p. 25; 2003, p.249). 
It seems then, that biopower, as I understand it predominantly produces a kind of 
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power-knowledge and truths which are used to institute mechanisms which consist of 
individuation and subjectivation through discipline and surveillance (Dillion & Reid, 
2001).
In other words regulatory mechanism that primarily operates at the level of the 
collectivised body of a population functions as a foil or a hinge which gave ultimate 
realisation to biopolitical regimes of power aimed at regulating and management of 
the life of a new political subject, the population (Mills, 2013, p.85) or the species 
through global governmental programmes and its practices (Reid, 2010, 2006). Bio-
politics as a fundamental trajectory of power emerged in the eighteenth century with 
the task to “rationalise specific problems presented to governmental practices by the 
phenomenon characteristic of a group of human beings constituted as a population: 
health insurance, sanitation, birth rate, economic prosperity, longevity, fertility, sex 
education, race (Foucault, 1997a, p.73). Biopolitical tactics as we know “takes spe-
cies life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation 
of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power-knowledge” (Dillion 
& Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, p.257). As with the biopower, here too biopolitical fram-
ing of government of life if we follow Foucault (1990) foster and to a great extent 
deploy forms of power-knowledge and political rationality to produce discourses 
which are used to devise techniques to objectify, subjugate and control the biologi-
cal in a specific form (Dillion & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, p.257). Foucault thus claims 
that human beings have been subjected to these “truths” through the “normalisation 
of life processes” and coercion (Foucault, 1978, p.144; 2003, p.24); which is to say 
that biopolitical technologies and biopower complementarity (Collier, 2009, p.85) 
serve “instruments of the state institutions or techniques of power” both of which 
essentially constitute an integral part of the disciplinary normalising logic of power 
(p.82-87).
Foucault finally turns his attention to what he calls disciplinary technology—“an 
anatomo-politics of the human body” (Foucault, 1976, p.139), whereupon claiming 
a distinctive epochal shift in terms of the dominant and prevalent mode of power. 
Thus what Foucault suggests is “the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the 
whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary 
society” (Foucault, 1975 , p.209).
Disciplinary rationale of power that mainly, although not exclusively, manifested 
itself in the transformations of the penal systems in the late eighteenth century Fou-
cault repeatedly stresses, produced a form of subjection that enabled bodies to per-
form their tasks in modern society (Reid, 2006). Foucault claims that discipline as the 
rise of a new form of power prescribes certain practices, norms and compels individu-
als to take up their role in society emerged when the figure of the king was not a sym-
bolic identifiable centre of power. Briefly put: “the right to punish has been shifted 
from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society” (Foucault, 1976, p.90).
Indeed, Foucault (1980c) points to the fact that in parallel with the decisive reart-
iculation and reconfiguration of biopower which was primarily concerned with the 
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regulation of the individual and the population; disciplinary rationale of power oper-
ates from the epistemological discovery of Man as object of knowledge: Man can be 
watched, measured, ordered, and controlled (Foucault, 1976, p.136). The importance 
of this point can hardly be overstated. As Foucault notes: this power was “instituted 
so that it reaches into the grain of individuals …and inserts itself into their action 
and attitudes, their discourses and everyday lives” (p.39). This is about the mundane 
encounters within the locus of the everyday-life, to loosely appropriate a phenomeno-
logical concept - that the deeply problematic world of structural adjustment is danger-
ously ingrained into the non-problematic experiences of everyday reality: in Lefebvre’s 
(1984, p.24) terms — it is the quotidian that on the contrary it is taken literally for 
granted, rarely questioned and even cursorily addressed.
Crucially, the tight grip on human body through the normalising logic of sur-
veillance, hierarchical observation, examination, monitoring, standardising and 
uniformising (Foucault, 1995, my emphasis) in my view is only one among many 
processes of thorough individualisation in disciplinary technologies of power. In fact 
one could claim therefore that reforms wrought by structural adjustment also sub-
stantially comprise of standardising and uniformising elements which are innocuously 
and subtly used to collect data which is translated into expert knowledge upon which 
adjusting countries are represented in the global marketplace (Best, 2007); which was 
precisely the concern of the state elites in Ghana. Through these governance strategies 
countries quite simply are sufficiently rendered visible phenomena to the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund for an extensive state intervention.
Producing regimes of visibility in this way, to a greater extent facilitates the con-
struction of multiple representations about these countries which occurred invisibly, 
anonymously and out of the realm of the general public and yet pervade the entire 
social fabric (Debrix & Barder, 2012, p.100). The essential point to note, for Fou-
cault is that the task is to directly regulate the body ( Joseph, 2013), i.e., the state elites 
internally so that they control their actions and conform to the strictures of the inter-
national economy to make them governable —all of which create the frame of nor-
malisation process: “a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of 
power centered on life” (Foucault, 1978, p.144).
Let me illustrate this with the intriguing case of Ghana to get a better glimpse and 
more adequate sense of how donor adjustment model, among other examples, is more 
expressive techniques and technologies of interventionist global government. What 
I want to point out is that orthodox adjustment, as instruments of a will to power 
of as usual an inherently nihilistic and narcissistic neoliberal practices and discourses 
is intimately tied to the attempts at framing the normalisation and the stabilisation 
process within which the government of Ghana in a sense, voluntarily submitted itself 
to the power of Bretton Woods institutions without being aware of it: neoliberal 
structural adjustment legitimates itself through emancipatory discursive formations 
by increasingly insinuating into people’s quotidian life or even tries to reshape and 
refashion that life.
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What Foucault’s analysis of discipline rationale boils down to is that power does 
not simply repress. As he puts it: “in fact, power produces; it produces reality; it pro-
duces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that 
may be gained of him belong to this production” (1975, p.194). Thus what Foucault 
has focus so particularly on and sensitive to was the question of “how multiple bodies, 
forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actu-
ally and materially constituted as subjects, or as subject” (Foucault, 2003,p.28)
Using Jeremy Bentham’s panoptical systems of disciplinary surveillance (1995), 
Foucault provides an insightful contemplation on how panopticism was an important 
technique through which disciplinary forms of power is able to function within social 
practices such as a prison setting and its significant contribution to power relations 
in the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1995, p.195-228; 2008b, p.73-79). He showed 
how for instance, the panopticon as a machine was designed purposely to make it 
visible and legible for the prison supervisors to control and surveil the inmates con-
duct (Monk et al., 2008). By keeping a record of each inmate observed they gathered 
knowledge which are used to develop further mechanisms for “correcting” individuals. 
Strictly speaking therefore, when Foucault asserts that “discipline makes “individuals” 
(Foucault, 1975, p. 170), he alludes to the individualising effect of power-knowledge 
nexus.
Constant gaze through non-juridical logic of surveillance and observation Fou-
cault maintains, incite states of compliance and to uncompromisingly produce “docile 
bodies” (Foucault, 1995, p.135-69) in which power is exercised over them (Angus & 
Winslade, 2015). The subject of observation by contrast, disciplines him-or herself to 
conform to the norms (Dean, 1999; Morgan, 2005). In short, the disciplinary gaze 
is a normalising gaze (Foucault, 1995, p.183) “which is continually (re)produced by 
the “omnipresence of the mechanisms of discipline underpinning society” (Springer, 
2012b, p.941). Here, I argue through Foucault that much like the focus on the pan-
optical qualities of the development of penal discipline, the concern here, I think, 
is the economic surveillance of what Gill (1995) calls “disciplinary neoliberalism” 
which becomes abundantly clear in the case of Ghana.
Looking back at panopticism (Foucault, 1990) it becomes apparent how the sub-
ject is subjected to relations of power as she or he is individualised, categorised, classi-
fied, hierarchised, normalised, surveilled, and provoked to self-surveillance. The thesis 
is that discourses as a product of an articulatory practice are used to construct peo-
ple as subjects through disciplinary power which operates invisibly to control their 
conduct as prisoners. In this sense, the goal is to become aware of the rules as ’truth-
claims’ and internalise them for fear of the repercussions of non-conformity.
In this section, I have examined the interrelationships among different competing 
rationalities of government: sovereign, biopower and discipline based on the fields 
of visibility they reveal, the regimes of knowledge they construct, techniques and 
technologies they legitimise and the forms of subjectivity and identity they produce 
(Dean, 1999, p.20). It is the two main correlates of Foucauldian model of biopower, 
i.e. disciplinary (or anatomo-political), and regulatory (or biopolitical) forms of 
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power with reference to the process of normalisation as opposed to biopower that will 
be the central analytical and explanatory utility in the coming chapters.
But as indicated elsewhere, this does not mean that all other forms of power have 
simply been displaced. Not at all, merely that disciplinary and biopolitical rationale 
are compatible strategies of power to the extent that objectification of discipline can 
for instance, intimately be connected with the subjectification of biopolitics. Or, to 
put it precisely, both strategies function more and more as normalising techniques as 
firmly embedded within discourses (Agrawal, 2005). That being the case, my discus-
sion will draw on the ways in which the circumscription of state regulatory authority 
in local social contexts within the orthodox structural adjustment transform subjects 
into objects, i.e. the re-appropriation of Ghana as a locus to be managed, adminis-
tered and reformed in particular ways.
2.4 Power and its Relation to Knowledge
Through Benthamite panopticon, Foucault explicitly constructs a systematic analysis 
of power as a set of discourses and practices which functioned as a spatial diagram of 
visibility and intelligibility to influence conduct for a specific rationale and strategy 
(Foucault, 1995, p.195-228; 2008b, p.73-79). Foucault’s critical focus on the explana-
tory potential of Bentham’s panopticon enables the telling of highly intrinsic and irre-
versible relationship between power and knowledge on one’s action. Thus Foucault 
wants us to recognise how power relations can be grasped exclusively in terms of its 
target for knowledge which ostensibly manifests itself in the constitution of human 
subjectivity (Sarasin, 2009). Foucault (1990) lucidly expresses this point in the fol-
lowing passage: “every power relationship is imbued through and through with cal-
culation, there is no power relationship that is exercised without a series of aims or 
objectives” (p.95). That is to say any exercise of power leads to a complex network 
of power-knowledge relations and when knowledge is deeply connected and firmly 
nested to power it assumes certain truths (Hall, 2003). One obvious expression of this 
claim is that rather than studying knowledge and power separately, it is the “nexus of 
knowledge power” (Foucault, 1997e, p.53) that greatly needs to be described in order 
to effectively grasp the acceptability of the knowledge power system.
Consider the following passage: “power and knowledge directly imply one another, 
meaning that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field 
of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p.27). Now, the crux of the issue —for 
Foucault as for Nieztche before him—is that power-knowledge first and foremost 
primarily influences the discourses that people take in and are shaped by (Nieztche, 
2011). Foucault’s radical analysis on the question of power and knowledge in turn, 
has consequences for what he calls “regimes of truth” and also raises the question of 
the critical role of discourse and discursive practice and its ramifications for the sta-
tus of human subjects in contemporary societies (Foucault, 1977). Encapsulating this 
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position, Foucault notes that ‘truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it” ; and a such “truth is already power” (Foucault, 2000, p.132-133). It 
is in this sense that, Foucault’s conception of discourse as I have argued previously is 
expressive of the essential link between the role of power relations and the historical 
production of knowledge-truth we live by: “there is no knowledge without a particu-
lar discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge 
that it forms” (Foucault, 1969, p.201).
It should be clear then that power operates to both produce and establish which 
discourses are regarded as universal or transcendental truths on which all else deci-
sively depends (Foucault, 1970) by rejecting other truths (perceived or designated as 
false), so to speak. And thus clearly the analysis of discourse in Foucault’s formulation, 
“does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were “really” say-
ing … it is a description of things said, precisely as they were said” (Foucault, 2002, 
p.123). To illustrate this, we can consider the discursively constructed regimes of 
truths around adjusting countries. Through relations of power, Bretton Woods Insti-
tutions impart their products of “knowledge” that masquerade as the “truth” upon 
adjusting countries usually by discourses of neoliberalism: and worse yet, they have 
uncritically come to be understood and perceived as “common sense”, “natural” and 
rarely questioned. What this also hints at is that knowledge that is embedded in dis-
cursive practice is not only seen as a reflection of an allegedly universal truths, but it 
also have consequences on how it becomes an instrument of domination and exer-
cise of power: that is ways of making sense of the world which Foucault denotes as 
“power knowledge discourse” (Ebrahim, 2003, p.11-12; Rossi, 2004, p.1-2). Thus, for 
instance, Foucault says,
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn’t outside power or lacking 
in power: contrary to a myth whose history and function would repay further 
study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirit, the child of a protracted solicitude, 
nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth 
is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of con-
straints. And it induces general effects of power. Each society has its regime 
of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which 
it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each 
is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition 
of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
(1984a)
This quotation poignantly sums up Foucault’s point that “truths” are discursively 
produced effects situated in a specific, historically rooted power-knowledge network 
which conditions the rules for practices and discourses by which humans can be con-
stituted as subjects (Foucault, 1995, p.194). This is perhaps another way of saying that 
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there is acknowledgment of power when discursive truths, practices and of course 
disciplinary techniques regulate discourse and the conduct of human beings (Hall, 
2003). This way of thinking goes some way to problematise and reverse the long-held 
Baconian aphorism that “knowledge is power” (Gordon, 1980, p. 233-234).
And indeed such a reversal, I claim provides helpful insights to see power as imma-
nent in knowledge rather than two interrelated hazy notions. In fact, in its most gen-
eral form, formations of power-knowledge such as politics of development as Foucault 
would argue, is a fact of discourse.
Arguably it is for similar reasons I contend that it is perfectly plausible and rea-
sonable to analyse the flows of power within to seriously complicate and to consider 
as the starting points of our inquiries why and how certain “regime(s) of truth” has 
become widely acceptable and being perpetually institutionalised to the point where 
it is seen as “common sense”. Such a reflection in my estimation, enables us not just 
to question and reject why historically situated technologies, strategies, the discur-
sive production of truths and tactics of power have gradually become codified and 
reinforced in some institutions (most important is perhaps the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund): but so germane and critically important to opening 
alternative political imaginaries (Dillon & Reid, 2009) to the possibility of change.
It is here, within the matrix of power-knowledge that Foucauldian approach to 
politics of development comes to the forefront; and which yet again has many reso-
nances to my argument. First of all, therefore, it presents a distinctly revealing outline 
to the problems and the explicit problematisation of a “fictitious construct” (under-
development) (Escobar, 1995) as not pre-given and unproblematic scientifically neu-
tral transcendental “Truth”: but have always been discursively constructed which falls 
well within the logic of power relations that have (de)legitimised a particular topic as 
an object of investigation. The second, related point is that primarily because under-
development and poverty do not simplistically exist as Platonic forms, but, rather 
commonly understood to be underpinned by their historically and discursively con-
structed structures of meaning; then their constitution as objects of scientific enquiry 
can be understood only in the materialised intersections of the prevailing balance of 
forces at the time of their formation (Naz, 2006, my emphasis). In thinking about 
development state of affairs most overtly via the dynamics of discourse and power as 
articulated by Escobar (1995) from my perspective throws doubt and opens various 
fields for exploring the possibility for more fundamental truths or thinking otherwise, 
since these forms of development knowledge are always produced by and through 
particular power relationships (Smith et al., 1996, p.16).
But again this is a most crucial observation and, to the extent that it allows us to 
“stand detached from (development), bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyse the 
theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated” (Foucault, 1986, 
p. 3). In fact, if development knowledge essentially emerged as a social construction 
that is contextualised historically and discursively (Omar, 2012, p.46) then it does 
even foreclose and particularly shift focus from “what is” to how subjects and forms 
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of knowledge are always constructed within this discourse as so-called developed and 
underdeveloped.
Power and its relation to knowledge as far as I can see, make evident, identify, rec-
ognise and unavoidably expose the political and strategic nature of discourse embed-
ded in power relations by virtue of their presumed status of “truth” as solutions. The 
task requires us to deny and denaturalise the concreteness of discourse, power, knowl-
edge and truth about certain objects and importantly in this context repose the per-
tinent question once posed starkly by Michel Foucault (1980, p.115), thus: “for what 
and” for whom do certain policies, practices and discourses serve? And in doing so 
serves as a filter for saying all that can be said and be critiqued. In this respect, Fergu-
son’s (1994) refreshing study, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticiza-
tion, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho alludes to how World Bank’s development 
discourse constructs Lesotho as a “Less-Developed Country” (“LDC”) where World 
Bank is able to create a “structure of knowledge” (p. xiv) around the object (Leso-
tho-as-LDC) by organising interventions on the basis of this structure. By epitomis-
ing Lesotho as having an aboriginal economy and agricultural society, it becomes 
taken for granted that Lesotho is an LDC and that it needs the kind of intervention 
(knowledge) that the Bank offers. The main line of argument being advanced here is 
that that development programmes as Ferguson skilfully reveals, pretends to rely on 
the fallacy that its intentions are mostly motivated by technical and scientific research, 
for that matter, inherently devoid of any political considerations and essentialist rep-
resentations (Della Faille, 2011).
In arguing this, I am referring precisely to how Foucault’s instructive understand-
ing of discourse as power-knowledge corroborates and sufficiently accounts for how 
knowledge primarily constituted as discourse about Ghana, I should say, could have 
been produced with a particular truth-effects (the established economic truism and 
good governance agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions): a certain vision of eco-
nomic reality that was used to design belligerent policy initiatives portrayed as a sole 
purveyor of all manner of political-economic transformations. And as a matter of 
fact, in this, is Foucault assertion that all truth claims are merely fabricated fictions 
and unattainable. More than ever, he concludes:
No! I amnot looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem 
in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by another peo-
ple. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions—and that’s the 
reason why I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to do the geneal-
ogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but 
that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything 
is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to 
apathy but to a hyper— and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1984, p.343)
Chapter two – Discourse, Power-Knowledge, Subjectivity | 37
And since “everything is dangerous … the ethical political choice we have to make 
every day is to determine which is the main danger” (p.256). The point Foucault 
makes is that we should consistently be careful about the consequences of the façade 
of invincibility of truth; the precarious nature of knowledge claims and be critical 
about the effects of all discourses and ways in which they shape, and frame or reart-
iculate what is possible to think, say or do.
In all regard, this aptly signifies that discourses of the neoliberal governing projects 
instituted by the Fund and the Bank this thesis makes clear, were not inherently bad 
or good; and in being so I think it seems fair to say that, the outcomes of development 
programmes that come attendant to neoliberal structural adjustment are not bad, or 
not altogether bad. Surely I do concede that they often arguably bring changes of a 
kind that people supposedly want and so in Foucauldian fashion, I resist the attempt 
to grandly critique nor cynically dismiss or unveil the objective “truth” behind struc-
tural adjustment packages. To put the matter otherwise, “I don’t try to universalise 
what I say; conversely, what I don’t say isn’t meant to be thereby disqualified as 
being of no importance” (Foucault, 2003c, p.246). In other words, my intention is 
to develop a biopolitical perspective on structural adjustment in an attempt to make 
helpful contribution to what Foucault (2003, p.7) magisterially calls the “insurrection 
of subjugated knowledges”. By subjugated knowledges Foucault meant two things. 
On the one hand, as either “historical contents that have been buried or masked in 
functionalist coherences or formal systematizations” and, on the other, “as a whole 
series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges and as 
insufficiently elaborated knowledges” (2003, p.7). The empirical analysis of this thesis 
explores the historical presuppositions of a episteme of system of thought (Olssen, 
2004) contents, structures and conditions, and the formation of discourse in a par-
ticular period that have largely remained severed and masked under powerful political 
economic systems in our contemporary context (neoliberalism). In untying, unmask-
ing and exposing these historically specific contents, structures and conditions, this 
thesis makes a crucial contribution to the insurrection of subjugated knowledges 
therefore. Alternatively, by employing Foucault’s “toolbox” to develop a biopolitical 
perspective on structural adjustment, and thereby elaborating and expanding further 
on his empirically informed theoretical concepts, this thesis endervours to provide 
cutting insight into the insurrection of subjugated knowledges.
In fine: it is more productive to suggest that the analysis of Foucault’s conceptual 
architecture of the power-knowledge complexes offer the possibility of problematis-
ing certain discourses (good governance) and disciplinary practices (structural adjust-
ment) instituted by international Monetary Fund and the World Bank to influence 
policy direction in Ghana. Foucault’s theorisation of how the common matrix of 
power and knowledge contributes to subject production, I gather, is obviously crucial 
for an analysis of structural adjustment and the struggle over the knowledges caught 
up in and tightly bound up by “truths” of neoliberal discursive formations.
Bringing a Foucauldian perspective on the internality of power and knowledge, I 
inquire: how does discursive formation like “good” governance and its effects, evoke 
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certain views of “a problem” to which various programmes, interventions and prac-
tices attempt to give an answer; authorises and empowers certain experts, mobilises 
techniques and systems of “truth” as solutions (Frazier, 1997). More than overly sim-
plistic and familiar account that ideally portray development in terms of ideologi-
cal cleavages deployed to mystify and obscure the exploitation of particular classes, 
I think it is more accurate to recast and recalibrate the ways the discursive politics of 
development framing enable us to ask for instance, how Ghana was demarcated as 
a particular problem space and the ways in which her situation should be improved 
during the adjustment period.
The analysis of power-knowledge through discursive formations called archaeol-
ogy I would argue also lurks within the emergence of the genealogy of the subject. 
This is true of course, and enormously important for the analysis of how power and 
knowledge give rise to a certain type of neoliberal subject taking into account both 
discursive and non-discursive practices. A consideration of the aspect of how these 
discourses cross fertilised and co-constitutively (re)define particular subject positions 
and subjectivities forms the basis of the next section.
2.5 Understanding Subjectivities
Foucault throughout his intellectual life remained implacably hostile to the prac-
tice of “systematizing and universalizing political and scientific theory which turned 
subjects into objects” (Maddigan, 1992, p.266). “Subject” as, in Foucault’s words, is 
“being subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own iden-
tity by conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 1982, p.212). Theoretically clarify-
ing — and reconceptualising, of course— his usage on the human subject, Foucault’s 
analysis can be said to reveal an additional sense of a pluralised world of multiple 
subjects. He was centrally motivated by the desire to theorise forms of subjectivity 
because “man was a fictional construct produced in those regimes of truth that claim 
to describe them” (Walkerdine, 1997, p.61)—and thus a product of historical devel-
opments shaped by discursive knowledges, power relations, institutionalised practices 
(Danaher et al., 2000, p.123) which are irrevocably linked to social relations.
Resolutely opposed as Foucault was to the embodied subjectivities as historically 
contingent - he was not indeed naïve and negligent of the ontological possibility of a 
naturally autonomous and productive human subject; only this way one can explicitly 
grasp what a human individual is: “to become individual one must become subject” 
(Foucault, 2007, p.231). And yet, he completely rejects and disavows any a priori or 
suprahistorical perspective of the subject as presented in existentialism or phenom-
enology (Foucault, 1997a, p.290) suggesting instead to read and think power pre-
cisely in terms of its productivity. This is all the more so as in the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault (Foucault, 1979, p.70) tells us that subjection is largely 
attributable to a product of social practices effected by discursive formations (disci-
plinary knowledges). Foucault in his work documented the centrality of the practices 
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and techniques used for the production of truth and how eventually “a truth willing 
subjects” is constituted (Foucault, 1985).
Again, in his distinctive and mind-blowing essay called “The Subject and Power”, 
Foucault explains that his “objective… has been to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 1982, 
p. 777). In this essay, Foucault offers an acute picture of how subjects were perceived 
and enacted in particular ways. Yet again, in The Subject and Power, Foucault (1982, 
p.208) explores three modes of objectification that have historically been the enabling 
moment in transforming human beings into objectified subjects. This, that is to say 
points to the objectifying effects of the so called scientific inquiry arguing that it is 
this objectification that forms the power-knowledge constellation, before moving on 
later to the objectification of man in what he refers to as dividing practices and the 
attendant dangers inherent in them. The final mode of objectification is neatly illus-
trated through an analysis of sexuality on how human beings turn themselves into 
subjects which has a constitutive effect in either shaping new identities, actions or cre-
ating a new awareness (Oksala, 2007).
This description provides a case in point with respect to the challenges of political 
elites in Ghana which I maintain could definitely be linked to the way they have been 
transformed as political subjects and how this transformation limits the number of 
alternatives available for them to act as policy makers. Here we can look to the influ-
ence of Foucault’s work which played pivotal role in how human and social sciences 
have defined and shaped the way man is understood for a long time: in other words, 
demonstrating a broader interest in how people’s political subjectivity, including the 
political subject of the nation-states was shaped thanks to disciplinary power often 
through social institutions such as prisons and defined norms which made people 
think in given ways. In History of Madness, what Foucault sees, is one’s subjectivity 
can be shaped through categories and labels such as illness and madness (Foucault, 
1994a). This, essentially, I claim was as true for the adjusting countries as for the 
History of Madness. Supplementing Foucault’s argument on History of Madness (for 
example, Ghanaian state) was discursively constructed as weak, predatory, neo-pat-
rimonial, crony, personalistic, prebendal, kleptocratic, rentier (Olukoshi, 1998); this 
owes, I will suggest, by particular discourses within particular regimes of truth.
This at any rate separates them from the so-called Western leaders and possibly 
shapes the way they are perceived by others and how they think about themselves. Yet 
this insight is played down as Foucault in his work on Technologies of the Self, sheds a 
grander light on the continued importance of how people can also invariably choose 
to be subjects, wherein they take the initiative to have what he calls “relation with 
oneself ” by working through techniques of the self to transform, negotiate, fashion 
their own identity and relate to themselves as subjects (Foucault, 1994a, p.88). This 
understanding reinforces and provides a fascinating view of the sheer transformative 
and the productive power of neoliberal discursive practices (structural adjustment 
thinking) which precisely lies in its regulation of life and thenceforth creates subjects 
through a focus on subjectivities without recourse to domination and control: “neo-
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liberal subjectivation works on individuals who are rendered as subjects and subjected 
to relations of power through discourse” (Springer, 2012b, p.139).
In large part working through responsible, self-governing subjects, I want to argue, 
most prominently justifies the presence and practices of the structural adjustment 
which ipso facto is a product of a sooner example of advanced liberal governmental-
ity. Evidently, by offering an attentive reading on power working through freedom 
and the processes of subjectification this involves, Foucault’s insights as post-Marxist 
and neo-Foucauldian theorists are eager to explain vehemently resists and does away 
with the common impression interpreting it purely in terms of - for instance all pow-
erful global institutions suppressing say less powerful African states - but rather shows 
how practices of government intersect and overlap in the constitution of global power 
relations. As long as this is so, I think, Foucault’s approach to the analysis of constitu-
tion of subjects — or subject formations —within discourses faithfully then, provide 
the possibility, an escape route and the means of identifying how suitable neoliberal 
subjects are produced and constructed.
2.6  Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have engaged with the Foucauldian concept of discourse to interro-
gate the political effects of the discourse of development and the politics of structural 
adjustment. I have explained how an understanding of governmentality contributes 
to how sovereign, disciplinary, and regulatory forms of power work to regulate the 
conduct of conduct through self-knowing, autonomous and reasonable subjects 
(Springer, 2012b) acting according to the calculating logic of discursive politics of 
neoliberalism. By following Foucault in seeing power as deeply imbricated and con-
tained within, each other in the production of knowledge with subjectivity and its 
discursive nature, it has moved away from the fetishisation of development as an 
unproblematic instrumental concept simply obscured to entrench existing power rela-
tionships. Rather I would propose politics of development must be read as discourse 
which establishes specific regimes of visibility, authorises particular regimes of knowl-
edge, institutionalises a range of practices and techniques, and produces certain sub-
jects and legitimate actors (Frazier, 1997).
I have shown how the influence of power-knowledge is evident in the constructed 
discourses and regimes of truth that have historically and to date played a signifi-
cant role in repeatedly producing forms of subjectivities or identities (Dean, 1999, 
p.23). But here there arises two interesting issues in particular. One is that it expressly 
imparts the view that these alleged truths appear to form the basis for the Bretton 
woods Institutions extensive policy interventions which subjugate the state and the 
work of political elites in this study. Another is that in Foucault’s reading, the influ-
ence of power-knowledge allows these institutions to de-fang, control, entrap and dis-
cipline the State elites so that they wilfully conform to these truths. As was argued, 
a Foucauldian reading of this study in every instance suggests that many challenges 
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encountered by state elites in Ghana emerge because they have to strike a delicate bal-
ance between indigenous forms of knowledge, the hegemon imperatives of scientific 
and economic forms of knowledge. As we witnessed with Foucault, each of these dis-
courses is strictly speaking predicated on different truths about the seductive over-
tones and “common sense” rhetoric of development and what is important.
State elites in Ghana in particular and Africa in general keep stumbling over and 
are gravely faced with competing imperatives that define appropriate conduct often 
in different ways, apparently. We might conclude that these challenges emerge very 
largely because these truths are generally (or at least) premised on experiences within 
“advanced” or Western contexts imposed upon the African (Ghana) as best practice. 
It is on this strength that the possible assumptions, knowledge, discourses, truths, dis-
ciplinary practices and norms rationalised through practices of freedom about neolib-
eral development paradigm in Ghana are being contested and challenged.
As Foucault reminds us, we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or 
against. One can, after all, be face-to-face, and upright (debout et en face). Working 
with a government doesn’t imply either subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can 
work with and be intransigent at the same time” (Foucault, 2000, p.455–456). And 
it is precisely this stance of standing face-to-face which is always informed by critical 
engagement and incessant questioning: “to do criticism is to make harder those acts 
which are now too easy” (Abrahamsen, 2000, p.138).Consequently this study seeks 
to recognise, politicise and question the forms of rules established by development 
discourse within which the nomos of structural adjustment becomes internalised and 
realised. This is manifestly part of the broader ethical agenda of discourse analysis 
itself which ultimately “seeks to make visible the political consequences of adopting 
one representation of social reality rather than another” (Ibid). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Neoliberal Challenge:  
A Critical Re-reading of the Political Economy  
of A. F. Hayek and Milton Friedman,  
and of the Intellectual History of Neoliberalism
”In order to get close to what a writer is all about, you have to get close to the words 
they actually use and be shown how to read these words”. Simon Critchley.
3.1 Introduction
The overarching objective of this chapter is to critically explore the seeming tensions 
between twentieth century and contemporary neoliberal political theories on one 
hand, and the political and economic theories of among others Friedrich. A. Hayek 
and Milton Friedman, on the other. This chapter contains the description and my own 
interpretation of the political and economic thoughts of both Hayek and Friedman, 
as well as some circumspect criticisms of their thoughts. In the ensuing discussion, I 
suggest that one of the ways we can approach the contemporary neoliberal challenge 
is to survey the ideas of the intellectual arch fathers of neoliberalism by re-reading 
and re-interpreting the intellectual works of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman. It is 
my contention that one of the virtues in focusing on the subtleties and the complexi-
ties of some specific ideas of their works they claim to represent is that it illuminates 
and offers a unique insight into the historical excavation of neoliberalism much more 
broadly and hopefully give answers to political and economic problems of our times. 
In turn, this thesis does not also claim that the intellectual positions fiercely defended 
by Hayek and Friedman only constitute “neoliberal-ness” so to speak or will lead us 
to nirvana, for if anything at all, the intellectual history of neoliberalism has several 
roots if not many branches, of which Hayek and Friedman may be just two possible 
representatives and therefore their explorations admittedly, is not a fait accompli as 
there are blind-spots. I emphasise that “every reading or re-reading of any literary 
or philosophical text is always something of a singular experience”, which of course, 
is clearly no easy task and could sometimes be problematic and tricky, albeit with a 
caveat (Trent, 2010, p.164, emphasis mine).
Without claiming to offer an accurate overview of their works, I take consolation 
from Foucault’s admonition that, “there is no single true, accurate, or right way to 
read a text and that we might do well to concern ourselves least of all with an author’s 
intentions as a guarantee of that singular truth” (Trent, 2010,p.163). And that is 
exactly what I intend to do in this chapter. Moreover, the reality is that I am not thor-
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oughly convinced that these early fascinating, compelling and thoughtful explorations 
by Hayek and Friedman have left much indelible imprint on the forms of economic 
government of the late 20th and early 21st century. This is not to say that they are not 
purposeful and authoritative, yet they may not be quite as significant for a history of 
the present. However, the argument of this thesis is that their ideas have a high pur-
chase in serving as a starting point in “arresting” the so-called incongruity and chal-
lenge of neoliberalism and to further expose the blurring lines that seemingly exist 
within the neoliberal intellectual project, and rethink the political positions that neo-
liberalism initially sought to reject. These discussions of two of the most celebrated 
political theorists of the twentieth century will certainly serve as a background for the 
fourth chapter of this thesis.
3.2 Neoliberalism: Historical and Intellectual Context
The purpose of this section is to analyse and explore the intellectual and histori-
cal context within which neoliberalism evolved in the 1930s and 1940s. Precisely 
because of the different ways with which neoliberalism has been defined it is barely 
difficult to pinpoint its intellectual and historical origins (Turner, 2008). However, it 
has its intellectual and historical roots which can squarely be located within an “ide-
ological movement that met at Mont Pelerin in Switzerland to expose the dangers 
they felt were inherent in collectivism and to create an international forum for the 
rebirth of liberalism” (Turner, 2008, p.1). Or more accurately, neoliberalism emerged 
in the years immediately before World War Two (Denord, 2009; Cros, 1950), which 
includes intellectuals such as the Austrian economist and political theorist Friedrich 
August von Hayek, who had received world- wide acclaim for himself three years ear-
lier with the publication of his polemical book, The Road to Serfdom (Harvey, 2005, 
Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Clarke, 2005; Munck, 2005; Palley, 2005; Campbell 
& Pederson; 2001; Dean ,1999; Chalfin, 2010). At best, while Hayek and his like-
minded Pelerians less explicitly used the term neoliberalism, they doubtlessly inexo-
rably “took the political ideals of individual liberty and freedom as sacrosanct” and 
gospel (Harvey, 2007, p.24, emphasis mine). In this connection, as I have hinted 
elsewhere, I review the works of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman among the intel-
lectuals who formed the nucleus of Mont Pelerin Society, two prominent political 
theorists whose names have come to be commonly associated with neoliberalism in 
recent times. More especially, Hayek who has been described variously as the “path-
finder and intellectual architect of neoliberalism”—is perhaps the most central theo-
rist of the neoliberal tradition of political thought” (Fogh Rasmussen, 1993, p.49-57).
My principal reason for zeroing in on Hayek and Friedman is not that the works 
of other members are less important or that they are to be disregarded but, rather, to 
make a case that reviewing the works of all the neoliberals who formed the nucleus 
of Mont Pelerin Society would certainly amount to an intellectual autobiography. In 
part, I analyse the political thoughts of these two political theorists fundamentally 
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because their entire corpus of scholarly work was geared towards vigorous defense of 
the ideals of free-market extremism which include but not limited to liberalisation, 
privatisation, deregulation, commodification, marketisation, flexibilisation, financiali-
sation and delimited role of government which have decidedly and overwhelmingly 
become pivotal for global economic governance and North-South relations since the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (Abrahamsen , 2004).
The strategic formulation of neoliberalism emanated from the core principles 
underlying the formation of Mont Pelerin Society found around the Australian phi-
losopher-economist Frederick August von Hayek in 1947 (Steger & Roy, 2010; Har-
vey, 2005). In the opening statement of Mont Pelerin Society in outlining its aims, 
it gave a grim spectacle of the prevailing circumstances which confront them at the 
time:
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the 
earth’s surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have 
already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the devel-
opment of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the 
voluntary groups are progressively undermined by the extension of arbitrary 
power . . . The group believes that these developments have been fostered by 
the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and 
by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It 
holds further that they have been fostered by the decline of belief in private 
property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and ini-
tiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in 
which freedom may be effectively preserved. (Turner, 2008, p.2)
In many instances, the society delivered a scathing critique on economic planning 
and socialism which in their view, obliquely constitute a danger to the survival of free 
market liberalism and therefore ought to be screwed back (Harvey, 2005; Steger & 
Roy, 2010; Turner, 2008). The primary aim of the society was to revive classical politi-
cal economy in order to protect personal freedom, private property and free market 
against the burgeoning influence of totalitarianism and welfare-capitalism.
Thus it notes,
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s 
surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already dis-
appeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of 
current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary 
group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that 
most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, 
is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance 
when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in 
which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own.
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That is to say, the formation of The Mont Pèlerin Society by Hayek in 1947 success-
fully galvanised the intellectual community at the time and served as a fulcrum in 
shaping what Mirowski & Plehwe (2009) have commented as the “neoliberal thought 
collective”:
Effective endeavors to elaborate the general principles of a liberal order are 
practicable only among a group of people who are in agreement on fundamen-
tals, and among whom basic conceptions are not questioned at every step. . . . 
What we need are people who have faced the arguments from the other side, 
who have struggled with them and fought themselves through to a position 
from which they can both critically meet the objections against it and justify 
their own views . . . this should be regarded as a private meeting and all that is 
said here in discussion as “off the record.” . . . it must remain a closed society, 
not open to all and sundry. (1967, p.149, 151, 153, 158)
This quotation accomplishes four essential facts: (1) It gives a general description of 
what constitutes the core objective of the society, (2) It provides Hayek’s philosophi-
cal take on the new liberal agenda he and his acolytes are able to reconstruct and its 
inherent excesses (3) It provides a backdrop to the fierce debate that raged on that 
the state should not in any way create an “artificial order” which has the potential 
to eclipse the spontaneous order of market economy (4) How these intellectuals 
should show solidarity among themselves, persevere in their intellectual inquiries and 
worked tirelessly to see the world become a better place for the habitation of mankind 
through unfettered market.
More importantly, the society had firm belief about the neoliberal ideals of mini-
mal government, unfettered markets, and strong private property rights (Mont Pèlerin 
Society, no date; Plehwe, 2009) but was however ambivalent about the surge of totali-
tarianism and economic planning in the embryonic democratic welfare states:
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the 
earth’s surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have 
already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the devel-
opment of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the 
voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. 
Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and 
expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege 
of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a posi-
tion of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own. 
The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth of 
a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth 
of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further 
that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the 
competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated 
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with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may 
be effectively preserved. (Mont Pèlerin Society, no date)
Most palpably manifest in Hayek’s opening address to the members of the society 
was his identification of three ailments namely, socialism, excessive rationalism and 
nationalism as central enemies that effectively afflict the society that he envisages he 
and his cohorts will be able to recreate. In one sense, therefore, Hayek saw the state 
as an enemy which can potentially foreshadow the “spontaneous order” of the market 
economy. And perhaps ultimately, to construct a society based around the collective 
ideal of social order which would ultimately ensure human fulfilment, happiness and 
condition that would be more morally lovely (Sheamur, 1996) which significantly 
sharply contrasts with other libertarian suspects such as Karl Popper and Robert Zod-
ick who favour a more “egalitarian” and “organised” liberalism.
The basic conviction which has guided me in my efforts is that, if the ideals 
which I believe unite us, and for which, in spite of so much abuse of the term, 
there is still no better name than liberal, are to have any chance of revival, a great 
intellectual task must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional 
liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it 
in the course of time and also facing up to some real problems which an over-
simplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it 
has turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed. (Hayek, 1967, p.149)
It is, I think, important that we fully realize that the popular liberal creed, on 
the Continent and in America more than in England, contained many ele-
ments which on the one hand often led its adherents directly into the folds of 
socialism or nationalism, and on the other hand antagonized many who shared 
the basic values of individual freedom but were repelled by the aggressive ratio-
nalism which would recognize no values except those whose utility (for an 
ultimate purpose never disclosed) could be demonstrated by individual reason, 
and which presumed that science was competent to tell us not only what is but 
also what ought to be. Personally I believe that this false rationalism, which 
gained influence in the French Revolution and which during the past hundred 
years has exercised its influence mainly through the twin movements of Posi-
tivism and Hegelianism, is an expression of an intellectual hubris which is the 
opposite of that intellectual humility which is the essence of the true liberalism 
that regards with reverence those spontaneous social forces through which the 
individual creates things greater than he knows .(Hayek, 1967, p.154-155)
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3.3  Fredrick Albert Hayek — A Case of his Economic and Political 
Philosophy
In this section, I analyse and critically engage in more detail the continuing relevance 
and distinctive perspectives of Hayek’s political economy vis-a-vi the contemporary 
times. In part, his brand of fiery intellectualism in various ways inevitably becomes 
pivotal to our understanding of the contemporary market operation or “market 
Order” as (Hayek affectionately calls it) and therefore it becomes imperative to pur-
sue as far as possible the Hayekian approach to classical liberalism which in my view 
is well worth further exploration. In particular, I discuss Hayek’s works — notably his 
Road to Selfdom, Constitution of Liberty and parts of his Law, Legislation and Liberty 
in the 1940s which were his major works at the time, which clearly relates, in inter-
esting ways to his political, economic and social ideas. Descended from the Austrian 
nobility, Hayek was born in 1899 in Vienna the heart of Austrian-Hungarian Empire 
and one of the leading intellectual capitals in Europe. Friedrich August von Hayek 
was generally considered arguably as the most prominent, most fearless, accom-
plished, influential, prolific thinker and classical liberal political economist of the 
twentieth century (Plehwe & Mirowski, 2009 emphasis added). As Gordon (1981, 
p.471), rightly notes, Hayek’s “writings on these matters (the relation of economics to 
political philosophy) are unequalled in profundity, historical scholarship, and current 
relevance”.Quite regrettably, “until recently, F. A. Hayek was very much an intellectual 
outcast”. To this very day, Hayek’s economics is almost completely unknown to his 
fellow-economists, and Hayek the economist remains a lone ranger even though his 
intellectual fecundity has been acclaimed as unapparalled”(p.472).
F.A. Hayek was one thinker who spent a life’s time trying to show how socialism 
and economic planning is a chronic danger to solving economic problems and that it 
is unworkable. Hayek strongly believed that the surest way to reverse the stranglehold 
of collectivism in the politics and economies of the West was to frontally launch an 
“intellectual assault” against it (Turner, 2008, p.48, 63-64, 75). The apparent decline 
of socialism somehow someway confirmed his worst fears that socialism was ulti-
mately doomed to failure. To a remarkable degree, Hayek’s personal and professional 
fortunes and the intellectual battles in which he found himself are also the story of 
the 20th century. Hayek was a prodigious writer who was the author of 25 books 
and hundreds of scholarly articles in which he articulated an elaborate and an inspir-
ing vision of a free society unencumbered by government. To be sure, Hayek wrote 
profusely covering a large swath of topics of enormous interest to the society. Hayek’s 
seminal book, The Road to Selfdom written towards the end of the Second World War 
is an insightfully interesting, provocative and at once polemical. His illuminating 
insights doubtlessly continue to shape how we think about the economic and social 
problems of our time.
Substantially, in his works such as The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek, 1960) or 
Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek, 1973; 1976, p.19), Hayek, vehemently opposed 
planned economy and advocated a smaller government and more unfettered markets. 
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It is therefore quite only natural to re-read his political theory as a clemency for a 
transfer of political power from the state to individuals, corporations, and the market 
economy which can aptly be described under the rubric of neoliberalism. To this end, 
A. F. Hayek’s political and economy can be viewed as particularly radical form of neo-
liberalism centred on a belief in the minimal state — or almost everything in between 
(Røe Isaksen, 2008; Nilsen & Smedshaug, 2011; Astrup & Nilsen, 2011). Hayek 
places a lot of premium on economic freedom. He argues that economic freedom 
should be considered as the political and moral force that “shaped all others aspect 
of a free and open society” (Steger & Roy, 2010, p.15). He further argues that “eco-
nomic freedom will not only lead to increase in economic growth and advancement 
of science and technology but also indispensably to the “undersigned and unforeseen 
by-product of political freedom” (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p.16). He says:
...if we are to avoid such a development we must be able to offer a new liberal 
program, which appeals to the imagination. We must make the building of a 
free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. (Hayek, 
1949b, cited in Plehwe & Walpen, 2006, p. 33)
For Hayek, individuals” freedom is indispensable for the development of the entire 
society. But what is even more significant to observe here is that Hayek considers as 
fundamentally anti-liberal and an affront any attempt on the part of not even under 
the so- called democratic society to redistribute public wealth and resources tightly 
held within the ambit of the ideal social justice and cohesion. And he rejected out 
rightly as irrelevant the ideal of redistribution of wealth. To Hayek, central planning is 
irreconcilable with democratic principles — Hayek has grave misgivings about central 
planning. For him, planning leads to an imposition of priorities on the people. And 
this account unsurprisingly became the centrepiece and most interesting themes in 
Hayek’s explanation of totalitarianism in The Road to Serfdom; Hayek is by no means 
clear-cut and unflappable in his views in what he says on this theme:
Especially in contrast to socialism it may be said that liberalism is concerned 
with commutative justice and not with what is called distributive or now more 
frequently “social justice” (Hayek, 1978, p.139). The ideal of distributive justice 
has frequently attracted liberal thinkers, and has become probably one of the 
main factors which led so many of them from liberalism to socialism. The rea-
son why it must be rejected by consistent liberals is the double one that there 
exist no recognized or discoverable general principles of distributive justice, 
and that, even if such principles could be agreed upon, they could not be put 
into effect in a society whose productivity rests on the individuals being free to 
use their own knowledge and abilities for their own purposes. (Hayek, 1978, 
p.140)
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Hayek was an implacable and ardent opponent of state interventionism in any form 
and saw it as a disturbing echoes in his time; he had a good deal of sympathy for free 
market competition and a lot of discomfort for overreaching government. Broadly 
speaking, Hayek’s line of argument is that state interventionism is counterproductive 
and has catastrophic consequences for individual personality since the state lacks the 
capacity to maintain impartiality.
If the state is precisely to foresee the incidence of its actions, it means that it 
can leave those affected no choice … In a world where everything was precisely 
foreseen, the state could hardly do anything and remain impartial … The state 
ceases to be a piece of utilitarian machinery intended to help individuals in 
the fullest development of their individual personality and becomes a “moral” 
institution —where “moral” is not used in contrast to immoral, but describes 
an institution which imposes on its members its views on all moral questions, 
whether these views be moral or highly immoral. In this sense the Nazi or any 
other collectivist state is “moral”, while the liberal state is not. (Hayek, 1944, 
p.57)
Hayek comments that economic freedom in central planning is nothing short of col-
lectivism instead of individualism. For seen in this light, Hayek contends, Socialist 
systems tend to neglect concepts of economic and political freedom: “As soon as the 
state takes upon itself the task of planning the whole economic life, the problem of 
the due station of the different individuals and groups must indeed inevitably become 
the central political problem” (p.80). It must be borne in mind that it is within this 
context that Hayek made a broad argument against socialism. Thus, he resolutely 
argues that socialism is the root cause of totalitarianism. He writes: “socialism was the 
very root of totalitarianism and that every ideal of distributive justice was nothing 
other than “the road to serfdom”, (Hayek, 1947, chapt 7, 8, 10 & 11). The rationale 
behind Hayek’s critique against totalitarianism in his Road to Selfdom was to ensure 
free market competition, and the complete elimination of public economic planning. 
Further, he was concerned about the danger of an unholy alliance between economic 
planning and social democracy which in his view could result in a totalitarian state.
The basic conviction which has guided me in my efforts is that, if the ideals 
which I believe unite us, and for which, in spite of so much abuse of the term, 
there is still no better name than liberal, are to have any chance of revival, a great 
intellectual task must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional 
liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it 
in the course of time and also facing up to some real problems which an over-
simplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it 
has turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed. (Hayek, 1967, p.149)
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It is, I think, important that we fully realize that the popular liberal creed, on 
the Continent and in America more than in England, contained many ele-
ments which on the one hand often led its adherents directly into the folds of 
socialism or nationalism, and on the other hand antagonized many who shared 
the basic values of individual freedom but were repelled by the aggressive ratio-
nalism which would recognize no values except those whose utility (for an 
ultimate purpose never disclosed) could be demonstrated by individual reason, 
and which presumed that science was competent to tell us not only what is but 
also what ought to be. Personally I believe that this false rationalism, which 
gained influence in the French Revolution and which during the past hundred 
years has exercised its influence mainly through the twin movements of Posi-
tivism and Hegelianism, is an expression of an intellectual hubris which is the 
opposite of that intellectual humility which is the essence of the true liberalism 
that regards with reverence those spontaneous social forces through which the 
individual creates things greater than he knows .(Hayek, 1967, p.154-155)
Sprinking from this again lays Hayek’s conviction that the best institutions that we 
can choose have ineliminable imperfections. It is again a theme which runs through-
out and which Hayek repeatedly and tirelessly returns in many places in his writings. 
In my view, this is Hayek’s most profound and influential contribution to political 
thought. However, this important contribution seriously runs into trouble. Here is 
the rub. Hayek message in Road to Selfdom has little or no relevance in historical 
reality as “Political Science has already revealed that totalitarianism in and of itself 
is one phenomenon and authoritarianism another. Economic control by itself would 
at most lead to authoritarianism, but not to totalitarianism, the cause of which is not 
economic but inherently political” (Yamanaka, 2009). The truth of the matter is that 
Hayek’s target of criticism was directed typically towards the German and the Soviet 
totalitarian regimes and to a lesser extent those of the welfare states in the 20th cen-
tury (Yamanaka, 2009, p.3).
Happily however, as S. Tormey’s (1995 as cited in Yamanaka) critique of Hayek 
clearly indicates this assertion by Hayek is definitively historically inaccurate to say 
the least. For, according to Torney, Nazi Germany never at any point in their annals 
of history operated a wholesale socialist planning system (Torney, 1995, p.21-24 as 
cited in Yamanaka) and that “Nazis presided over a considerable capitalist economy 
in which most of the productive apparatus was privately owned” (Yamanaka, 2009, 
p. 4). Significantly, the Soviet Union was neck deep in the so called infamous reign of 
terror long before they embarked on central planning (Yamanaka, 2009) and there-
fore the dictatorial tendencies of the Soviet state, had less to do with any economic 
measures introduced by the Bolsheviks in any way (Tormey, 1995, p.25-27).
Finally and most importantly, as Torney insightfully points out, Hayek’s assump-
tion that economic planning necessarily leads to totalitarianism to put it mildly is 
badly mistaken for in my interpretation, Hayek dismally failed to qualitatively distin-
guished totalitarianism from authoritarianism. At the same time, it would seem to me 
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that Hayek’s thesis that economic planning leads to totalitarianism would have been 
greatly enhanced if it had been contextually grounded and the concept unpacked in 
more detail rather than the blanket and omnibus manner with which he presented it 
unless of course the term totalitarianism was used loosely to cover almost anything 
and everything bad from that which is not. I do not mean to extol the virtues of total-
itarianism. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The point, however, is that it is 
simply not adequate to say that socialism inevitably leads to totalitarianism.
Hayek claims that many of the problems associated with free market economy are 
invariably the price one has to pay to have a market economy in the first place. As 
unjust and unfair as Poverty and inequality might seem, they are inevitable in a market 
economy. According to Hayek, free market liberalism offers the best and most efficient 
way of allocating scarce resources. In essence, the benefits that accrue from deregula-
tion are thought to far outweigh any conceivable drawbacks it can engender precisely 
because the drawbacks of such policies explicitly pale into insignificance than the ben-
efits of state’s intervention which will only make things worse, and therefore one must 
unquestionably accept the unfortunate and deleterious effects of unregulated market 
willy-nilly (Hayek, 1978, p.57-68) otherwise, our choices for mixed economy will 
eventually send us to the road of destruction. In other words, free market is God-like 
and virtuous, it can do no wrong. And even if it does, there will always be good tid-
ings of great joy out of its apparent evil. This is illustrative in his magnum opus called 
Law, Legislation and Liberty:
There exists no third principle for the organization of the economics process 
which can be rationally chosen to achieve any desirable ends, in addition to 
either a functioning market in which nobody can conclusively determine how 
well-off particular groups or individuals will be, or a central direction where 
a group organized for power determines it. The two principles are irreconcil-
able, since any combination prevents the achievement of the aims of either. 
And while we can never reach what the socialists imagine, the general licence 
to politicians to grant special benefits to those whose support they need still 
must destroy that self-forming order of the market which serves the general 
good, and replace it by a forcibly imposed order determined by some arbitrary 
human wills. We face an inescapable choice between to irreconcilable princi-
ples, and however far we may always remain from fully realizing either, there 
can be no stable compromise. Whichever principle we make the foundation of 
our proceedings; it will drive us on, no doubt always to something imperfect, 
but more and more closely resembling one of the two extremes.
Two things must be emphasised here. Firstly, from the perspective of Hayek, we must 
either choose between an entirely unfettered market economy on one hand, and a 
planned economy, on the other and there is no alternative. The point of this is that 
unfettered market has no hand, the only hand it has is the hand of avoidable exploi-
tation, unmitigated suffering and hardship. But perhaps the most troubling of it all 
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which is intimately related to the first one is that Hayek offers no “third way” as far 
as the organisation of the economic process is concerned only his kind of “imperial 
edict” (unregulated market) must be accepted hook, line and sinker; his kind of pro-
posals must be taken as Catechism which makes Hayek decidedly dogmatic.
In part, it seems to me that the Hayekian case for neoliberal creed was not merely 
on policy justification as it were but rather more grounded on policy recommenda-
tions. However, it does appear that in his attempt to justify his neoliberal policy rec-
ommendations, Hayek seems to oscillate between consequentialist and deontological 
views (Lundstrum, 1993). Or, more to the point, it is not clear how Hayek differenti-
ates between deontological and consequentialist views with respect to the economy. 
Here, the argument for minimalist state (which is mine not Hayek’s) as far as his con-
sequentialist view is concerned is that rolling back the frontiers of the state, namely 
deregulation, privatisation and tax cuts among others will have favourable conse-
quences for the overall economic situation and deontological, because such a move 
will ultimately make the society more morally lovely and satisfying, irrespective of the 
consequences. Hayek firmly sees smaller government and a fewer fetters on the mar-
ket as an end in itself rather than a means to an end which is incessantly ironic and 
contradictory. One at times gets quaint and queasy as to whether Hayek was writing 
as a moral philosopher or an economist.
Another theme underpinning Hayek’s neoliberal configuration is the notion of a 
“spontaneous order” of social life which according to Hayek’s understanding is far 
better than any artificially created order as far as the individual liberty is concerned.
A proactive welfare state will inevitably, no matter how benevolent its inten-
tions are, stifle economic growth and put an unjustifiable limit on individual 
liberty, all in the name of an ideal of social justice which according to Hayek is 
little more than a mirage (cf. especially Hayek, 1944/ 2001, 1973, 1976)
Crucial to the neoliberals’ market order is the spontaneous order (Turner, 2008). A 
spontaneous order, for Hayek, “is the result of human action, but not human design” 
(p.16). Indeed, in Hayek’s account, the market order is beneficial because it “increases” 
‘and even makes’ as clear and great as possible the prospects and chance of everyone 
selected at random” (Hayek, 1976, p.79). Hayek here highlights the following:
The most important spontaneous order for neo-liberals is the market order. 
Hayek defined the market order as a “catallaxy” rather than an economy. His 
concept of catallaxy is the modern counterpart to Smith’s “invisible hand”. A 
catallaxy is a collection of interacting economies, all operating within a frame-
work of abstract rules. Unlike an economy, a catallaxy has no specific unitary 
hierarchy of ends; it has evolved without any conscious design, from the vol-
untary transactions of individuals. By referring to the market order in this way, 
Hayek did not base the market on the old naïve assumptions of perfect compe-
tition and general equilibrium associated with the classical economists. Rather, 
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he perceived the market as an evolving discovery mechanism, complete with 
uncertainty and shocks. (Turner, 2008, p.122)
It is more striking, and perhaps ironic that despite his charismatic defense of the mar-
ket order, he also has his own pessimisms against the infinite wisdom of the so-called 
market order particularly his fear for ordinary people who he thought quite rightly 
would find it extremely difficult if not impossible to cope with the strict and some-
times even “merciless and immense ruthlessness of market competitions without the 
fear of horrible totalitarianism” (Yamanaka, 2009). It is in “recognising the state as an 
important feature of real markets that he allocated it a catalogue of important tasks 
in maintaining, correcting and supplementing market deficiencies” (Turner, 2008, 
p.125) which perhaps possibly springs from his nostalgic flight for humanitarian sym-
pathy with socialism which is a complete turning point in Hayekian approach to free 
market liberalism (Sheamur, 1996).
There is no reason why in a society which has reached the general level of wealth 
which ours has attained the first kind of security (he had earlier mentioned 
“security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum 
of sustenance for all”) should not be guaranteed to all without endangering 
general freedom. There are difficult questions about the precise standard which 
should thus be assured; there is particularly the important question whether 
those who thus rely on the community should indefinitely enjoy all the same 
liberties as the rest. An incautious handling of these problems might well cause 
serious and perhaps dangerous political problems; but there can be no doubt 
that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health 
and the capacity for work, can be assured to everybody.
Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist the individuals in 
providing for those common hazards of life against which, because of their 
uncertainty, few individuals can make adequate provision. Where, as in the 
case of sickness and accident, neither the desire to avoid such calamities nor the 
efforts to overcome their consequences are as a rule weakened by the provision 
of assistance-where, in short, we deal with genuinely insurable risks-the case 
for the state’s helping to organize a comprehensive system of social insurance is 
very strong . (Hayek, 1944/ 1976, p.120-21)
My sense is that even the kind of role Hayek allocates to the state is profoundly qual-
ified and —halfhearted because at the next moment, Hayek asserts that “I had not 
wholly freed myself from all the current interventionist superstitions, and in conse-
quence still made various concessions which I now think unwarranted” (1944; 1976, 
p.21) which is flagrantly-self-refuting. Clearly, the only consistency about Hayek is 
his inconsistency which sets his political philosophy greatly in confusion rather than 
compromise. Moreover, the role Hayek gives to the state is even more political than 
economic and I think that Hayek was completely wrong-ended in looking to politi-
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cal solutions to economic problems. On the other hand, one could also argue that 
Hayek’s argument for certain forms of governmental intervention is a stark reminder 
of the fact that as a young man, he had receptive ideas for Fabian socialism which 
according to him was the very motive he became an economist (Yamanaka, 2009). 
His Inaugural Address at the LSE in 1933 succinctly captures it all, The Trend of Eco-
nomic Thinking”, Hayek said:
It is probably true that economic analysis has never been the product of 
detached intellectual curiosity about the why of social phenomena, but of an 
intense urge to reconstruct a world which gives rise to profound dissatisfaction. 
This is as true of the phylogenesis of economics as of the ontogenesis of prob-
ably every economist (Hayek, 1991, p.19).
He equally quoted Pigou:
It is not wonder, but the social enthusiasm which revolts from the sordidness 
of mean streets and the joylessness of withered lives that is the beginning of 
economic science .(Arthur, 1932, p.22)
In some ways, Hayek’s change of heart and soul for certain forms of government 
intervention with market order despite his initial virulent warning of “market or ser-
vitude” in selfdom seems to me personally as suggestive of the fact that he himself is 
after all, no admirer of the market economy he religiously offers legitimate argument 
in defense. Little wonder then Lundström asserts that Hayek’s “instrumentalist view 
of human conceptions sometimes “enables him to defend ideas which he himself does 
not wholly accept” (Lundström, 1993, p.224). My argument is that this Hayekian 
case for the possibility of potential government intervention is hugely compatible 
and in sync with individual freedom and rationality at least to secure equity in society 
as any attempt to prevent government in interfering in market order can potentially 
cause unimaginable pain to the poor.
To conclude on Hayek. What is socialism? Communism? Social democracy? Dem-
ocratic socialism? Mixed economy? Planned economy? Totalitarianism? Hayek’s expli-
cation does not make clear distinctions about these crucially important questions, the 
debates that were triggered, and the way the conceptual understanding of these con-
structs shaped the 1940s and 1950s. My contention is that Hayek could have avoided 
the definitional conundrums of these constructs and probably freed his unsuspect-
ing readers from any philosophical and theoretical fix if he had added some dialectic 
legitimacy to his arguments. Let me make my objections as clear as possible. My larger 
point is that Socialism is not completely deceased and buried or passe’. Socialism must 
have gone through many surmountable challenges, but its defining spirit is that it has 
always picked and dusted itself up anytime it has “fallen”. And that is a historical fact 
that cannot necessarily be controverted if not disputed. Now it appears that Socialism 
is very much alive and integral to some of the greatest, powerful and more successful 
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economies in the world (Laidler, 2007). Most notably, new form of thinking have 
sought to grasp the practice of social democracy or democratic socialism in the Scan-
dinavian or Nordic countries: it considers the economic frameworks of these coun-
tries – especially in understanding the effects of socialism on political, economic and 
social life the growth of these countries and this enable us to rethink the welfarist 
ethos practiced by these Scandinavian or Nordic economies.
More interestingly, it engages in how welfarism is reflected in new approaches in 
understanding Human Development Index (DHI) particularly focusing on explaining 
how most Scandinavian economies, if not all, have almost always made it to the upper 
echelon of this list since its inception in 1990. Again, how do Nordic countries count 
among the happiest countries on the planet, within the wider framework of mixed/
planned economy approaches, as opposed to the so-called free market economies or 
capitalist like Africa? Of importance, for me, is how the shift towards socialism has 
contributed to this interesting phenomenon? I emphasise again that the framework of 
thought which underpins socialism and welfarism have led to the spread of socialist 
and communist political parties globally (Hattersley & Hickson, 2013) and to sug-
gest that neither socialism nor communism is dead. We do also know that socialism 
and communism have become part and parcel of the changing framework of discus-
sion of governance in relation to several polities with mixed/planned economies such 
as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Chile, etc. (Ibid). Indeed the changing nature and 
dynamics of mixed/planned economic practices of Brazil, for instance, have facili-
tated the development of its sound economic and industrial growth. Why have Carib-
bean/Latin American countries deployed system of mixed/planned economy, social 
democracy, or socialism in terms of shifting their political economies in relation to 
market and market rationality? And yet Hayek makes this infamous argument that it 
is highly unthinkable and unreasonable for a mixed economy to have a dalliance with 
distributive justice.
Indeed, “if theoretical and philosophical analysis provide the sole possible bench-
mark against which to assess a program, then only one conclusion is possible about 
Austrian, analysis’: it is deficient”(Cadwell, 1997, p.1856-1890). Peck (2008, p.5-6), 
in his assessment of The Road to Serfdom, movingly writes, “the book may have been 
a best-seller, but it was practically an act of self-immolation for Hayek — the econo-
mist.” If Hayek he had had a crystal ball to look into maybe, just maybe, he would 
have seen how reticent and resilient socialism is and how for instance socialism might 
be a lesser evil than what replaced it. Personally, Hayek was too dogmatic and fanati-
cal. He would have received much wider appeal if he had been intellectually agnostic, 
pragmatic and realistic. However, in fairness to Hayek, he was a skilful and thorough 
organiser as he was able to develop a distinctive “knowledge-based” critique of social-
ism and economic planning (Caldwell, 1997) which was on the ascendancy (Plehwe, 
2009, p.16). The strategic formation of Mont Pelerin society, a cohesive society which 
was his midwife unarguably proportionately responded to socialism which eventu-
ally greatly helped in his meteoric rise to prominence culminating in the neoliberal 
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thought collective” and ultimately helped to push back the tide of Keynesianism and 
economic planning.
3.4 Milton Friedman’s Neoliberal Political Economy
Milton Friedman, the Pulitzer Prize winning economist profound contribution in 
popularising neoliberalism as a dominant global blueprint is priceless and well docu-
mented. His vast intellectual resources according to Laidler (2007, p.1) “is rivalled 
only by John Maynard Keynes as the most influential political economists of the 
20th Century”. This statement is attested to by Lawrence Summers” (2006) when he 
asserts that, “we are now all Friedmanites”. While Hayek might have certainly had a 
pre-eminent influence in Friedman’s thinking and writings, Friedman adds to Hayek’s 
contributions in a number of distinctive ways. While Hayek is widely seen as a pio-
neer of neoliberalism, Friedman has been credited as the strategist and mastermind of 
neoliberalism, not least through his role as political advisor to for instance the Pino-
chet regime in Chile (Klein, 2007). In his bestselling book Capitalism and Freedom 
(1962), which represents his foremost contribution to political economy, Friedman 
like Hayek makes fierce defence for pro-market and minimalist government view of 
the world (Friedman, 1962). This contribution is perhaps the most enduring and 
influential aspect of his legacy. According to Harvey (2005, p.8-20), Friedman was 
a champion of unregulated market, personal freedom and had a close affinity with the 
neoliberal group of economists known as “Chicago boys”. Friedman in my candid 
opinion was less sophisticated than Hayek but his book Capitalism and Freedom, a 
rendition of Hayek’s Road to Selfdom, received a wider reception among Americans 
far more than Hayek or any public intellectual could have imagined (Van Horn & 
Murkowski, 2009; Malnes, 1998, p.312-313).
Friedman in his Capitalism and Freedom (1962 /1982), argues among other things 
that a free market economic liberalism is organically part of freedom. At its simplest, 
“…freedom in economic arrangement is itself a component of freedom broadly under-
stood, so economic freedom is an end in itself ”’ (Friedman, 1962, p.8.) First, Fried-
man made a broad argument in support of free market economic policies which for 
him is vitally important for a free society. He contends that, “economic freedom” is 
necessarily part and parcel of freedom”. He further argues that market is an essen-
tial ingredient in the spread of democracy, prosperity and above all personal freedom 
(Callahan & Wassuna, 2006, p.10-11). Underlying the assumptions of Friedman core 
belief is that individual’s freedom and choice is optimally attained in free market but 
not in a planned economy (Edwards, 2002, p.39-40, 76-78; Hamilton, 2003, p.64; 
Harvey, 2005, p.7).
According to Friedmaniac logic, you are either for free market liberalism or you are 
against freedom. As Friedman puts it, “underlying most arguments against the free 
market is a lack of belief in freedom (Friedman, 1962, p.15). This was of special con-
cern to Freidman because of his view of the advantages of market for ensuring free-
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dom, and in his opinion market is a far better mechanism for ensuring proportional 
representation than democratic processes. And in re-echoing Adams smith, intimates 
that, “the market allows the voluntary exchange of goods between individuals with-
out coercion”. “Exchange can therefore bring about co-ordination without coercion” 
(Friedman, 1963, p.13) .Consequently, “no exchange will take place unless both par-
ties do benefit from it: Cooperation is thereby achieved without coercion” (Friedman, 
1962, p.13).
So long as effective freedom of exchange is maintained, the central feature of 
the market organization of economic activity is that it presents one person 
from interfering with another in respect of most of his activities” (Friedman, 
1963, p.14). The market thus “gives people what they want instead of what a 
particular group thinks they ought to want” (Friedman, 1962, p.15). 
He continues:
The great advantage of the market… is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in 
political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, 
as it were, for the color of the tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see 
what color the majority wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit. It is 
this feature of the market that we refer to when we say that he market provides 
economic freedom”. (p.26)
All these emphatically mean that his preference for free market is not rooted on 
how sound it is but rather free market and freedom are directly correlated therefore 
anybody who profess to truly uphold the tenets of a free society must of necessity 
subscribe to a free market economic policy (Laidler, 2007). For only this, in his view, 
enables one to be a true believer in the values of freedom. But the major problem of 
Friedman’s proclivity and impulse for the values of freedom is that it clearly amounts 
to an imposition of his moral values and tastes on everybody (Guerra-Pujol, 2012, 
p.29). Furthermore, according to Friedman “there are only two ways of co-ordinating 
the economic activities of millions” (Friedman, 1962, p.13). “One is central direction 
involving the use of coercion— the technique of the army and of the modern totali-
tarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals - the technique of the 
market place” (Ibid). For Friedman, economic freedom is an indispensible condition 
for political freedom. “There is an intimate connection between economics and poli-
tics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are pos-
sible, and that, in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in 
the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom” (p.8). Friedman (1962) argues that the 
claim that socialist society can ensure freedom is untenable as no one, so far, had been 
seen to talk in favour of socialism and freedom at the same time:
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By contrast, it is clear how a free market capitalist society fosters freedom ... 
One may believe, as I do, that communism would destroy all of our freedoms, 
one may be opposed to it as firmly and as strongly as possible, and yet, at the 
same time, also believe that in a free society it is intolerable for a man to be 
prevented from making voluntary arrangements with others that are mutually 
attractive because he believes in or is trying to promote communism. (1962, 
p.19-20)
But on a closer scrutiny, these formulations by Friedman are not entirely true and 
are in fact starkly inconsistent with his own devious personal involvement in Chilean 
economy where despotism, repression and unrestricted free markets were all inextrica-
bly linked. The free market absolutism and monetarist ideas which were implemented 
under his watch during the military junta of Dictator General Augusto Pinochet in 
the 1970s as Chile became the laboratory of neoliberal economics experiment did 
not by any stretch of the imagination bring about personal freedom in any shape or 
form. Rather, regrettably, the military junta under General Pinochet was severely criti-
cised and blamed for murdering and torturing thousands of free citizens which left an 
indelible stains on the reputations of classical economic liberalism. As well, it is worth 
noting that under General Pinochet, rather than economic freedom forging personal 
freedom at least according to the thinking of Friedman, freedom was sacrificed on 
the crucifix of repression. And this of course invariably means that economic freedom 
should be treated merely as means but not as ends. In other words, economic freedom 
should be treated solely as instrumental but not as values in and of itself. And this 
clear-cut distinction between political freedom and economic freedom escapes Fried-
man. One would have thought that the unsavoury events following the neoliberal virus 
which perilously infected Chilean people would have helped Friedman to rehearse his 
understanding of the marriage of dysfunction between economic freedom and political 
freedom/liberty as the two ends do not meet. Perhaps, they will meet in infinity. How-
ever, quite unsurprisingly, he countered it by redefining freedom which to my mind 
was an exercise in futility. To put it directly, it smacks of pure damage control which 
muddied the already murkier waters as he misdiagnosed the whole issue.
Be this as it may, Freidman shared two indispensable features with Hayek. Through-
out his writings, Friedman strongly championed the idea that the scope of govern-
ment should be minimised as “governmental intervention in the economy serves as a 
restraint of freedom” (Guerra-Pujol, 2012, p.14) whilst the role of the market should 
be maximised. That is to say, firstly, “the scope of government must be limited, and 
secondly, government powers must be dispersed” (Friedman, 1962, p.2). In articulat-
ing his profound disgust for extensive government powers (Friedman, 2002, p.34-36), 
echoes:
Even the relatively limited government of the United States ought to be rolled 
back and reduced in size, in order to secure the establishment of a “free soci-
ety”, and government programs from agricultural subsidies, via regulation of 
Chapter three – The Neoliberal Challenge: A Critical Re-reading of the Political Economy… | 59
the financial industry, to national parks and toll roads, ought to be completely 
abolished.
But Friedman like Hayek also nevertheless recognises the critical role the government 
can play to ensure efficient market. According to Friedman, government is crucial first 
in determining the “rules of the game” and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the 
rules decided on. But “the characteristic feature of action through political channels is 
that it tends to require or enforce substantial conformity — the typical issue must be 
decided by a yes or no” (p.28).
There are clearly some matters with respect to which effective proportional rep-
resentation is impossible. I cannot get the amount of national defense I want 
and you, a different amount. With respect to such indivisible matters we can 
discuss, and argue, and vote. But having decided we must conform. It is pre-
cisely the existence of indivisible matters- protection of the individual and the 
nation from coercion is clearly the most basic-that prevents exclusive reliance 
on individual action through the market. If we are to use some of our resources 
for such indivisible items, we must employ political channels to reconcile dif-
ferences. (p.30)
A government which maintained law and order, defined property rights, served 
as a means whereby we could modify property rights and other rules of the 
economic game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the rules, 
enforced contracts promoted competition, provided a monetary framework, 
engaged in activities to counter technical monopolies and to overcome neigh-
bourhood effects widely regarded as sufficiently important to justify govern-
ment intervention, and which supplemented private charity and the private 
family in protecting the irresponsible, whether madman or child —such a gov-
ernment would clearly have important functions to perform. The consistent 
liberal is not an anarchist. (Friedman, 1962, 2002, p.34)
It is important to point out yet again that both Hayek and Friedman view the role 
of state in their own time as too overreaching and overly involved in issues which 
ought to remain exclusively in the hands of “free citizens” living in a “free society” 
and yet paradoxically however do not also recommend the complete disengagement 
and delinking of the state from governmental activities. To these duos, what the state 
should rather concern itself with is to ensure effective and efficient promulgation and 
enforcement of laws which are essential for the proper functioning of market.
They warned that beyond this the state should not venture or attempt wittingly 
or unwittingly to redistribute wealth as this would ipso facto constitutes a virulent 
threat to liberty, rule of law and democracy at least in the not too distant future 
(Hayek /1944, 2001, p.59-90; Friedman , 1962/ 2002, p.7-36). The thinking behind 
these explications by Hayek and Friedman is the view that it is unattractive and or 
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improper for any political system to encumber the state with a lot of tasks. Instead, 
it is more attractive, aesthetic or may be romantic for the state to be assigned a rela-
tively small and clearly demarcated role. Anything short of this particularly when the 
state attempts to implement economic planning is a clear indication of the state’s slip-
pery slope towards totalitarianism. Hayek sums up this shared position in The Road 
to Serfdom:
It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are 
restricted to the fields where true agreement exists, and that in some fields 
things must be left to chance. But in a society which for its functioning depends 
on central planning, this control cannot be made dependent on a majority 
being able to agree; it will often be necessary that the will of a small minority 
be imposed upon the people, because this minority will be the largest group 
able to agree among themselves on the question at issue. Democratic govern-
ment has worked successfully where, and as long as, the functions of the gov-
ernment were, by a widely accepted creed, restricted to fields where agreement 
among a majority could be achieved by free discussion; and it is the great merit 
of the liberal creed that it reduced the range of subjects on which agreement 
was necessary to one on which it was likely to exist in a society of free men. It 
is now often said that democracy will not tolerate “capitalism”. If “capitalism” 
means here a competitive system based on the free disposal over private prop-
erty, it is far more important to realise that only within this system is democ-
racy possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy 
will inevitably destroy itself. (Hayek, 1944/ 2001, p. 73)
Both Hayek and Friedman throughout their works, incessantly recommend a roll-
ing back of the frontiers of the state. As Friedman (1962/2002, p.34-36) writes, even 
the relatively limited government of the United States ought to be rolled back and 
reduced in size, in order to secure the establishment of a “free society”, and govern-
ment programs from agricultural subsidies, via regulation of the financial industry, to 
national parks and toll roads, ought to be completely abolished. At the same time, the 
state has a legitimate role to play when it comes to the fulfilment of handful of rather 
central tasks:
A government which maintained law and order, defined property rights, served 
as a means whereby we could modify property rights and other rules of the 
economic game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the rules, 
enforced contracts, promoted competition, provided a monetary framework, 
engaged in activities to counter technical monopolies and to overcome neigh-
bourhood effects widely regarded as sufficiently important to justify govern-
ment intervention, and which supplemented private charity and the private 
family in protecting the irresponsible, whether madman or child — such a 
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government would clearly have important functions to perform. The consistent 
liberal is not an anarchist. (Friedman, 1962/ 2002, p.34)
Taken overall, “economic policy everywhere has moved significantly in Friedman and 
Hayek’s preferred direction since the early 1960s” (Laidler, 2007, p.7) which has irre-
futably helped to “reshape modern capitalism”(Wall Street Journal, 2006, p.1) “partly 
in response to events no doubt, but also under their profound influence. In academia, 
neoliberal dogmatic doctrine became a dominant discourse which gained a lot of 
credence and subsequently became a substantial political-economy theory cum- gov-
ernmental strategy following the Nobel Prize in economics award that was given to 
Hayek in 1974 and Friedman in 1976 respectively for their work on neoliberalism. If 
their role in the development of their own discipline alone was enough to make them 
economists of the first order of importance, therefore, this broader impact surely con-
firms Friedman and Hayek’s status as two of the twentieth century’s greatest politi-
cal economists. Perhaps only Maynard Keynes stands as a serious rival” (laidler, 2007, 
p.7).
3.5 Conclusions of this chapter
I have critically and thoroughly appraised the views of F.A. Hayek and Milton Fried-
man which are remarkably exemplary and add texture in explaining the registered 
diversity and plurality of the discursive market politics of neoliberalism. It presents us 
with a rich repertoire of the various neoliberal articulations. What came forward from 
their analysis is that they discursively articulate novel political rationalities that were 
staunchly anti-statist that derived its legitimacy of government from the market. Their 
impassioned appeal for neoliberalism finds expression in the market as the epitome of 
individual freedom which will ultimately truly guarantee among other things a com-
mon decency for humanity. In other words, both Hayek and Friedman primarily take 
freedom as the ultimate appeal of the market coupled with their growing disenchant-
ment with overbearing state.
Finally, I present some preliminary and more pertinent questions about social 
democracy, democratic socialism, communism, socialism, authoritarianism, central 
planning, mixed economy and totalitarianism especially Hayek’s unfortunate one-sid-
edness, penchant, warped and fallacious conception in equating central planning to 
totalitarianism as well as its broader implications for our recent times which I found 
logically untidy and yet Hayek’s explication in many respects, incredulously failed to 
clearly distinguish. It remains therefore dismissive of those who tend to naively equate 
central planning with totalitarianism without giving us any decisive and convincing 
argument. It seems to me that such facile presumptions obliquely disguise the degree 
with which the mere absence of central planning is by no means enough to guarantee 
personal liberty for every Tom, Dick and Harry. And this is what incredibly continues 
to boggle my mind. That being said, both Hayek and Friedman’s political theory and 
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ideas provide us with challenging and complex readings of neoliberalism. One might 
perhaps say, therefore, that their works technically and commonsensically require a 
close re-reading if one is to notice the many nuances of the neoliberal challenge in 
order to describe some recent trends in our contemporary economic and political 
thoughts. Put very simply, we may with a certain measure of justice describe Hayek 
and Friedman’s economic and political theories as the most central neoliberal politi-
cal tradition which has gained currency globally (Blomgren, 1997), so it seems to me 
at least if one primarily looks at the way their ideas have influenced and still continue 
to influence policy making in many countries and international organisations ( Judt, 
2005/ 2010; Harvey, 2005). To avoid been “accused” of offering simply a convenient 
re-reading of their works, in the next chapter, I present Michel Foucault’s genealogy 
of neoliberalism which I claim provides a more theoretically matured understanding 
coupled with no-stones-left-unturned analysis of the “history of the present”.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Foucault, Governmentality and Neoliberal Reason
4.1 Introduction
To resolve or, at least, ameliorate the utter conceptual and seeming theoretical impasse 
that lies at the heart of neoliberalism, it is vitally important to think in a historically 
specific way. And to think in a historically specific way, we need to take a substantial 
theoretical step. And this substantial theoretical step this chapter claims involves a 
genealogical interrogation of neoliberalism. As I will attempt to show, I chart Fou-
cault’s account of neoliberalism published as The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) which 
consists of a series of lectures given in 1978 /79 academic year in which Foucault has 
deservedly received world-wide acclaim and celebrated for delivering an uncannily 
prescient and a more richer understanding of neoliberalism (Tribe, 2009). As this the-
sis seeks to unambiguously clarify, I will argue that Michel Foucault’s account pro-
vides versatile theoretical insights and perspicuously explores the intellectual origins 
of the modern view of neoliberalism and gives us a much more rigorous understand-
ing of how we have come to this moment (Foucault, 1993, p.10).
I hold the view that Foucault’s account gives a kaleidoscopic mirror picture of 
the world right now (Vrasti, 2013, p.12, my emphasis) even though I contend it still 
remains an open and a matter of dispute if indeed Foucault’s unflinching position 
towards what he gleefully characterised as neoliberalism could wholly be applied to 
our modern day versions of it (Behrent, 2009) which I cannot conclusively settle here. 
But still, I do suggest though, that his articulations have been influential and have 
analytical and explanatory purchase regarding the provocative question of the way 
our contemporary global politics is and can tell us something illuminating about the 
operation of politics in the so called societies outside Western liberal democracies. I 
demonstrate that relying on Foucauldian - inspired thoughts on neoliberal govern-
mentality not least provides a comprehensive, promising and productive theoretical 
cocktail for a robust understanding in analysing the markedly changing rationalities 
that governs us today with respect to their origins and context (Oskala, 2013, p.53) 
which I dare say will plainly and concretely help in pinning down the so-called amor-
phous nature of neoliberalism. This chapter proceeds as follows: First I broach the 
concept of governmentality by making the case for how this neologism contributes 
to our understanding of the debate on the nature of dominant power relations in 
contemporary societies. I show how this concept could be understood as analytical 
framework to rethink power relations, subject and object formation, more generally. 
Second I exhaustively explore the perspectives offered by neoliberal governmental-
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ity by tracing the historical genealogy of neoliberal reasoning in order to unpack 
and disentangle how Foucault profoundly contrasts German liberalism and its cold-
hearted cousin of American neoliberalism to illustrate more contestable modalities 
of its recent mutations which sum up the biopolitics of today—before briefly explor-
ing more recent critiques that have been directed at neoliberal governmentality stud-
ies. I conclude by briefly sketching how I intend to extend governmentality to the 
relationship between supranational institutions and the Government of Ghana in the 
area of economic reforms to demonstrate how deployment of a new technology of 
power working through recipient countries greater autonomy and the ethos of self-
regulation have been supported by the implementation of the structural adjustment 
programmes.
4.2 Foucault’s Governmentality: Power as the Art of Government
”It is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research” (Fou-
cault, 2001, p.1042)
In this section I explain the concept of governmentality and how the introduction 
of this neologism by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in his 1978 and 1979 
series lectures (security, territory, population) at the Collège de France have rightly 
been recognised for its nuanced and sophisticated contribution; its increasing rele-
vance in understanding the rationalities, technologies as well as the techniques of con-
temporary power relations discourses in social and political thought (Dean, 2010). 
Foucault’s understanding of the notion of governmentality is broad (2007, p.108) and 
thus there may be different applications for the concept. It is beyond the scope and 
ambition of this thesis to examine every aspect of Foucault’s concept of governmen-
tality. For the sake of brevity and clarity, my own interest however, is to employ gov-
ernmentality as historically specific forms of political power, and to develop the claim 
that it helps situate the supranational institutions — the Bank and the Fund within 
the general philosophy of contemporary configurations of power relations, and as an 
intersection between various contestable modalities, on the other, for example (Appa-
durai, 1996; Ong, 2006; Sharma & Gupta, 2006). I will simply show in this study 
how liberal technologies, rationalities and discursive structures are used to steer the 
‘the conduct of conduct’ of receipient governments and states and how these tech-
nologies and rationalities in turn reproduce very specific subject positions and codes 
of conduct (Foucault, 1988; Dean, 1999; Miller & Rose, 2008, p.33).
Since the early 1990s, Foucault’s insightful seminar on governmentality from the 
late 1970s in particular, (Burchell et al., 1991; Dean ,1991; 1994; 1999; Barry et al., 
1996; Rose, 1996c; 1999a; 1999b; Lemke, 1997) have sparked “exponential increase 
in the number of publications that have taken governmentality as their central meth-
odological starting point”(van Baar, 2011, p.27). And yet paradoxically, “this recent 
boom, has not necessarily and inevitably contributed to an increase of clear articula-
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tions of the concept and its analytical scope and methodological ambitions” (Ibid) 
which undoubtedly stretches back to Foucault’s own work which was characterised 
and plagued with apparent shifts of focus, ambiguities, confusion and attention in 
terms of it central parameters (Ibid).
However, what is more gratifying is that in the early 1980s when he begun to 
elaborate on technologies of self and the practices of freedom, he developed a fur-
ther explanation of the conceptual scope of governmentality that many Foucauldian 
scholars have relatively neglected in spite of the fact that it constitutes an integral part 
of governing technologies which deserves immediate correction (Foucault, 1997d, 
1997b, 2005a, 2010). Thus is it, in other words, that in contrast to Foucault’s two 
other modes of power—those of sovereignty and discipline which rule through law 
and imposition, producing mere docile bodies to be corrected and disciplined— gov-
ernmentality rules through and produces subjects as free and responsible agent in 
social interactions (Foucault, 1991, p.102, my emphasis). Against this, governmen-
tality seeks to regulate and steer the behaviour or conduct of individuals in order to 
achieve certain goals (Boyce & Davids, 2004; Dean, 2010), yet doing so through ideas 
of responsible and consenting subjectivities. Based on the liberal problematisation 
of (interventionist) power, governmentality works as a self-limiting form of power, 
which is ever conscious of the counter-productive effects of imposition, and there-
fore ever in pursuit of the “involvement”, “co-ownership” and “willingness” of those it 
seeks to rule” (Helle, 2012, p.6).
The notion of governmentality enabled Foucault to clearly distinguish between 
power seen as strategic games by which the conduct of others can be affected in rela-
tions of domination (Foucault, 1997a, p.299). More substantively, in the late discus-
sion of his governmentality lectures between 1977 and 1979 at the Collège de France, 
Foucault refined, reconsidered and redirected his own theory of power by recognising 
that governmental techniques and logics of strategies can be mobilised to maintain 
as well as contest dominant power relations, and to govern both selves and others at 
different governmental scales” (van Baar, 2011, my emphasis). And this has unfor-
tunately been misread by the trove of works that have referred or employed gov-
ernmentality. As will become clear in this thesis, the proclivity on the part of some 
Foucauldian scholars who have somewhat engaged in caricatured reading of this 
particular variant of the concept has led to an ambivalent, yet persistent impression 
in some inquiries into governmentality to misleadingly conceive Foucault’s neolo-
gism as one form of power that is mainly domination and subjugation without suf-
ficiently offering a view of how this form of domination could be contested, resisted 
and the many avenues or possibilities of counter-conduct available (Death, 2011; 
Odysseos, 2011; van Baar, 2011). I argue that such jaundiced view of Foucault’s con-
ceptualisation of power can and should be vehemently denounced and resisted for 
Foucault steadily distinguished between several forms of power “later in his theoreti-
cal life”(Lemke, 2010,p. 6). As Foucault himself tells us thus. He notes: “It seems to 
me that we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games 
between liberties (...) and the states of domination that people ordinarily call “power”. 
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And, between the two, between games of power and “techniques of domination” as 
sketched out in the Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) you have technologies of 
government” (Foucault, 1997, p.299). Given this, it would be possible to approach 
and analyse Foucault’s methodology of studying the manifestations of power and the 
dynamic interplay of power relations— as oppose to simply studying the effects of 
powerful institutions which is immensely helpful in mapping out topologically (Col-
lier, 2009) the transition and means though which this power is incited or rather, in 
the means through which discipline is exercised over the objects of power (Foucault, 
1994; 340-345; 1991, p.261-266).
Power ultimately in Foucauldian scheme is essentially immanent to the object 
it regulates, it is productive rather than hierarchical to be possessed by individuals, 
institutions or states apparatuses when they exercise control over another individual, 
institution or state (Foucault, 1994, p.340-343). Conceptualising power in this way 
highlights how African debtor states in this study are also imbued with considerable 
autonomy and agency to influence the activities of the Bank and Fund and vice versa. 
Foucauldian analytics of power conventionally conceived rests upon the understand-
ing of power as the sum of power relations: “Power exists only as exercised by some 
on others, only when it is put into action” (Ibid, p.340). In being so, the activity of 
governing is “to structure the possible fields of action of others” (Foucault, 2000e, 
p. 341). It follows from this that the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the 
action of others includes the conditions of relative freedom: “power is exercised only 
over free subjects, and only in so far as they are “free”. Indeed to the extent that the 
individual has a degree of freedom, “power relationships will often be unstable and 
reversible, subject to resistance or evasion” (Hindess, 1996, p.97).
Reversibility in this context, for Foucault, indicates how “individual or collective 
subjects are saliently faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of con-
duct; several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available” (Foucault, 2000e, 
p.341-42). Focusing in particular on the technologies of SAPs architecture that were 
used to steer the conduct of Africa debtor states, we need to understand the dynamics 
between the parties to the architecture and their relationship to each other and differ-
ent and overlapping discipline to which they are subjected.
This study in stark contrast to the tiresome understanding of power in IR (Kangas, 
2014, p.2) suggests that these power relations are far from a one-sided relationship 
between an allegedly passive, powerless, docile and a suppressed Africa debtor state 
object and an allegedly all-powerful supranational institutions subject International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for example. Let me put the point another way: 
power relations are much more heterogeneous, diverse and underpinned by the ele-
ment of relative freedom, rather than merely abiding and docile conduct accounted 
for on the simple ontology of domination or repression. The central argument I wish 
to make here is that while the technologies of policy conditionality in the case of SAPs 
for example, was to produce distinct forms of rationalities, technical apparatuses, dis-
cursive structures and subjectification, they were nevertheless overwhelmingly tem-
pered with tactical reversals, defiance and counter-conducts which will undeniably 
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confound post-Marxist critique or even Foucauldian inspired studies— or so it seems. 
Recall that in Foucault’s post-1979 work, he intimately linked technologies of power 
to what he terms “technologies of the self ” (Foucault, 1982). Generally less known is 
that Foucault’s own work as I have underlined elsewhere, subsequently steadily moved 
away from an emphasis on the “subjectivation” and forms of “subjectification” towards 
an overwhelming emphasis “on how selves were fashioned and then lived in ways 
which were both heteronomously and autonomously determined” (Danica & Pearce, 
2001, p. 125, my emphasis) :which in turn suffices in transforming selves in situations 
of relative freedom thereby significantly reconceptualising and recontextualising the 
relation between techniques of self and forms of domination/ subjugation.
The exercise of power as Foucault described, is “a management of possibilities” 
(Foucault, 1994, p.341) and in understanding the operations of power, it obliges us to 
understand how these possibilities saturate all fields and administered over the object 
of the power relations: either inciting, inducing or seducing the object to be disci-
plined or making things easier or more difficult for it, releasing or contriving, mak-
ing probable or less and “in the extreme” constraining or forbidding absolutely (Ibid). 
Indeed as Foucault in his characteristic fashion reasons, it is the exercise of such power 
and how it is applied over the process of economic production and reproduction is 
the crux of what constitutes the mode of action called “government” (p.341). It is in 
this context that it makes sense to ask why and how the process of governmentality as 
Foucault asserts is characterised by an ensemble of institutions, procedures, analyses 
and reflections, calculation and strategies (Foucault, 1991, p.99-101) “that allow the 
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” and “the development of a 
whole complex of knowledges” to manage the objects of this power (p.219-220).
Read as such, we can say Foucault’s paradigm gives us a concrete entry in prob-
lematising the critical historical conditions, trajectories and shifts that gave rise to the 
principles that underlie the SAPs architecture (Foucault, 2008) and to precisely situ-
ate them within the intersection of the SAPs as a mechanism of neoliberalism on one 
hand, and power relations as the interplay between various contestable and contested 
modalities of governmentality, on the other (Foucault, 2000a). In this way, we will be 
able to usefully unmask and expose the dynamics of power inherent in this regulatory 
framework and for instance, excavate the objectifying narratives of its underlying dis-
ciplinary norms and critically assess their wider impact on the construction of other 
regulatory (or biopolitical) forms of power. This is what Scheurich (1997, p.94-118) 
eloquently calls, “policy archaeology” — the deconstruction of a priori assumptions 
about a problematic that contributes to policy research and the “powerful “grids” or 
networks of regularities” that determine the problematising of key concepts within 
policy studies.
Finally, but not less important, if power according to Foucault functions in terms 
of the “conduct of conduct” (Dean, 2010, p.26) but not a zero-sum game, (Kangas, 
2014, p.2; Sending & Neumann, 2006); then Foucault’s analytics of governmentality 
I believe, enable us to clearly problematise how contemporary configuration of power 
is clearly exercised, nurtured and ordered through various clearly defined regulatory 
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instruments at the global level to regulate, shape and control territories (Foucault, 
2008; Walters, 2012, p.13-14) : including how the SAPs framework clearly came to 
represent a differing modality of global power and a technique of governance that 
was used to influence the conduct of African debtor states (Foucault, 2000a, 2000c). 
Along these lines, l particularly want to consider how the SAPs framework clearly 
constitutes what Michel Foucault astutely terms the technologies of the self (Foucault, 
1994, p.220-221; 1991, p.261-263). Or, better still, disciplinary supervision of societ-
ies — in this case, aid-receipent States.
4.3 Liberal and Neoliberal Governmentalities
As we may recall, Foucault in his genealogy of governmentality first introduced the 
notion of governmentality as a way to analyse the nature of contemporary configu-
ration of political power. It was in the course of this lecture that Foucault made it 
absolutely clear that in our modern age political power is significantly exercised in the 
form of government. However Foucault argues that, there was a paradigmatic shift 
in the 18th century where one critically observes the emergence and the ascendancy 
of a liberal governmentality in which a naturalised market is presented as a limit to 
government (Flew, 2012b). In Foucault’s analysis, at the heart of liberal problematisa-
tion is the notion of “frugal government” by which the question of “the too much 
and too little” develops into the central criterion around which the art of government 
will revolve” (Foucault, 2008, p.28-30; Gudmand-Høyer & Lopdrup Hjorth, 2009, 
p.110): through encouraging the autonomous existence and self-regulating freedoms 
of populations” (Dillion & Reid, 2001, p.47). I should note that, Foucault does not 
analyse the liberal regime as all- embracing ideology (Larner, 2006) rather, he sees it 
as a critique of other forms of government rationality and as a “principle and method 
of the rationalization of the exercise of government”(Foucault, 2008, p.338), which 
is strongly mediated by political economy (Fougner, 2012). What Foucault’s account 
boils down to is the biopolitical and liberal art of governing which emerged for the 
first time in the eighteenth century: and includes forms of government whose basic 
forms “we can still recognize in its contemporary modifications” (Foucault, 2007b, 
p.354).
To get to grips of these modifications, I focus on Foucault’s incisive account as it 
can be found in his lectures in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). Foucault’s 1978/79 lec-
tures on The Birth of Biopolitics employs two historical case studies of the origins of 
neoliberal reason : post-war West German “Ordoliberalism” of the Freiburg school 
(Lemke, 1997, p.3; Sven-Olov, 2013) to the more super radical American neoliber-
alism of the Chicago school or the “Anarcho-liberalism” (Sven-Olov, 2013; Kiersey, 
2011; Flew, 2012b). All in all, it seems that Foucault’s attempt was to distinguish 
these schools of thought from liberalism as a political rationality (Biebricher, 2014, 
p.4) in order to identify the essential redefinition of the relation between the state 
and the market.
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Based largely on an explication of various biopolitical aspects that can be gleaned 
from Foucault’s interpretations, in the next section, I examine “Ordoliberals” thought 
which Foucault considered (Hans-Martin, 2013) “more important theoretically than 
the others (the Austrian and American variants) for the problem of governmentality 
(Hans-Martin, 2013; Ptak, 2009): to get a satisfactory account of neoliberalism as 
a distinctively “novel problematisation of rule (Dillion & Reid, 2009, p.25) which 
firmly relies on a role of the market.
4.3.1 Post-War German “Ordoliberalism”
The German model which is being defused, debated, and forms part of our actual-
ity, structuring it and carving out its real shape, is the model of possible neo-liberal 
governmentality (Foucault, 2008, p. 192).
Foucault’s focus on “Ordoliberal” thinkers I think might have emanated from the fact 
that the “governmental style that marks the specific form of German neoliberalism is 
something that we are “immersed in”—the contemporary neo-liberalism which actu-
ally involves us” (Foucault, 2008, p.192). Foucault underlines that “Ordoliberalism” is, 
“real neoliberalism both in practice and theory; indeed, the most clearly stated liberal 
governmentality. A governmentality that regulates the behavior of subjects between 
each other: the behavior of the governed among themselves, as well as their behavior 
towards the government” (Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2007, p.2). Fou-
cault’s overriding concern was to establish how “Ordoliberals” tradition is an original 
contribution to the biopolitical practices of art of liberal government which sought 
to make neoliberalism hegemonic in Germany at a time when the rest of Europe 
was strongly committed to the Keynesian rigidity (Peters, 2007). To accomplish this 
diagnostic task, he gives a scrupulous account of how “Ordoliberalism” as a variety of 
neoliberalism can be distinguished from liberalism as a political rationality (Senellart, 
2008; Peters, 2008; Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2007; Gudmand-Høyer 
and Hjorth, 2009, p.116).
Relying in particular on the “Ordoliberals” “reinterpretations of the market and 
their role within a particular historico-political context, i.e. post-war Germany as a 
political rationality” (Biebricher, 2014, p.4), Foucault illustrates how the German 
neoliberals had been extremely concerned with the haunted question of how to con-
struct a new state on the basis of a “space of economic freedom” (Foucault, 2008, 
p.87& 116; Sven-Olov, 2013): which as Foucault claims, is the distinctive feature of 
liberal political rationality which breaks from the “hegemony of “reason of state”, and 
its dictum of maximum government intervention (Foucault, 1979, p.77). This does 
obviously mean that Foucault presents the German neoliberals project as an attempt 
to reconstruct and reconfigure the uncanny relation between market and the state. 
And thus readily shows “the point at which in Kantian sense governing was always 
governing “too much” and the participation of the governed come to be understood 
as the most technically efficient “system of governmental economy” (p.176).
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In its minimalism, part of the narrative of “Ordoliberalism” agenda Foucault con-
tends, is that the market is in principle the best way of organising the economy and to 
some very large extent all sphere of social life. In reality, however, it requires a strong 
state being there, “fundamentally, to serve the market as establishing the best-possible 
conditions for it to prosper” (Foucault, 2010, p.240; Ptak, 2009; Sven-Olov, 2013). 
What characterises this thought is that free economy can only be realised and make 
possible by means of a strong state authority: and decisive political engineering the 
explicit aim of which is to define their approach as a distinctive contribution to neo-
liberal reasoning (Bonefeld, 2015).
To substantiate how “Ordoliberalism” typifies neoliberal notion of government, 
Foucault to an extent makes strong reference in his lectures by developing a genea-
logical analysis of theories which fleetingly referred to the speech by Chancellor Lud-
wig Erhard (Flew, 2012b; Peters, 2007). Perhaps because of the fundamental role he 
played in shaping neoliberal thinking in the twentieth century as far as social market 
economic policies in Germany is concerned. In Chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s address 
to the Scientific Council in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War which 
comprises typically of the top apparachicks of “Ordoliberals” he usefully notices: “We 
must free the economy from state controls … only a state that establishes both the 
freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in the name of the 
people” (cited in Foucault, 2008, p.80-81).
In a broad sense, Foucault reads Erhard as claiming a new legitimacy for the state 
as he inverts the liberal idea of the relation between the economy and the state. How-
ever, Erhard’s message seems to convey an idea which is logically inconsistent with the 
maxim at the heart of “Ordoliberals” notion about the economy. In particular, but 
not exclusively, his proposition is contradictory namely that the state should unequiv-
ocally and without exception desist from intervening in the rationality and the logic 
of market which is quintessentially liberal idea. And yet Foucault reads Erhard as 
claiming something much more radical. Nonetheless, the second leg of his quotation 
is quite interesting. In the second leg of the quote, Erhard apparently seems to argue 
from a diametrically opposite direction of the liberal idea about the economy. There 
he proposes an intricate and interwoven relationship between the state and market 
through which the state can derive its legitimacy albeit in the service of the economy 
(Peck, 2010).
Properly understood, here, Erhard seeks to reformulate and reimagine the state 
as the pivot of the market and crucially being the guarantor of individual freedom 
especially against the background of post-war Germany: where the state was strangely 
absent, weak, pliable and had virtually lost all its legitimate powers. Therefore, the 
Erhardian logic was to reconstruct and reimagine a governmental logic which is 
decidedly contrary to the liberal idea of government at least in its standard under-
standing: the one in which the market legitimises the state and the individual liberty 
as a key concern of governmental rationality and political economy as opposed to the 
one which in fact undermines it, for example. If, rightly or wrongly, we take Foucault 
seriously then we have to understand Erhard’s proposal not as an example of a liberal 
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governmentality but rather as neoliberal art of government in which the existence of 
the state is made legitimate by the market.
According to Foucault, the entire point of neoliberal governmentality concept has 
been to show how the market and the state are mutually exclusive and that the ratio-
nality of government is defined a la the market. More than that, as could be recalled 
from the example of Erhard, in neoliberal logic, market hierarchically assumes a more 
predominant role. However, in classical liberal conception, market is free-wheeling 
and eminently autonomous but hierarchically subservient to government. Similarly, 
while liberalism relied on an objective and naturalised view of the market, neoliberal-
ism instead tightly holds on to a constructivist view. As can be illustrated through the 
Erhard’s example, government gains legitimacy when it constructs and institutes mar-
ket conditions which enshrine individuals’ freedom.
This constructivist view is for instance reflected within “Ordoliberals” concept of 
“Ordnungspolitik and Ordnung”, or market regulation—regulations that intervene in 
the market, but do so by respecting the conditions of the market upon which econo-
mies or economic systems are based’ (Peters, 2007, p.173). Here the emphasis will be 
on a grand attempt to create and enhance the conditions of the market within which 
metaphorically the “invisible hand” that Adam Smith had described can be expected 
to do its work” (Vanberg, 2004, p.8). Following Lemke (2001, p.196), it therefore 
seems safe to say that in Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism, the most important fea-
ture underlying neoliberal government has been —and still is—its anti-naturalistic 
and constructivist view of the market in which the market is no longer just a quasi-
natural phenomenon but rather serves as a constructivist vision for government.
For Foucault to concretely sharpen the central thrust of the market constructiv-
ism for this governmentality, he outlined a number of examples from “Ordoliberals” 
thought to structure his analysis. For instance, in thinking through the implications of 
the shift in liberal thought, he shows how with the German neoliberalism, the mean-
ing of the market has shifted from “exchange” to “competition” (Adaman & Mandra, 
2014). In stark opposition to the governmentality of classical liberalism which has 
a principle of the market as a site of exchange, German neoliberals view the market 
fundamentally as a site of competition. It is with respect to classical liberals view of 
the market in terms of equitable exchange which made them view exchange and com-
petition as something that would flourish with or without government intervention. 
“Ordoliberals” contention is that liberal govermentality principle of non-intervention 
in the market (laissez-faire) could only amount to “naïve naturalism” about the econ-
omy. Neoliberalism as a matter of fact is no, “Laissez-faire”, it is rather a “cultivation 
of the market”, a “culture of entrepreneurship” (Gertenbach, 2010, p.15). More to 
the point, liberal politics of laissez faire Foucault mentions is the defining feature for 
understanding the naturalistic view of the market.
Contra classical liberalism, German neoliberals will argue that competition is 
not purely a natural phenomenon because market for them does not have any natu-
ral inner logic at all. It is for this reason among other things that they rather posi-
tively see the state intervention as crucial in designing active policies to prevent the 
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distortion of competition and creation of monopolies (Streit & Wohlgemuth, 2000, 
p.230, my emphasis). According to Foucault, German neoliberals innovatively devise 
and advocate active policies which will stimulate “markets order” in order to become 
more competitive and protect them from harmful monopolistic tendencies (Medema, 
2009, p. 22-5). What is especially salient in this understanding of market order is that 
it attests to and amplifies what Foucault referred to as “conformable actions”. If for 
the classical liberals, monopoly is a natural ally of competitive market, “Ordoliberals” 
defiant response would be resoundingly: “Not true, the natural order, what is under-
stood by the natural order, what the classical economists or, at any rate, those of the 
eighteenth century understood by a natural order, is nothing other than the effect of a 
particular legal order” (Foucault, 2008, p.162).
Not only does the German “Ordoliberals” strongly believe that “competition is a 
necessity”, they also belief that without it “man (is) not a “human being” (Eucken, 
1948, p.3). What is visible and clear in this characterisation is Foucault’s own argu-
ment that it is in this concept of a “competitive order” that a whole new architecture 
of governmentality tissue is framed. Foucault maintains that the market and competi-
tion “can only appear … if it is produced by an active governmentality … One must 
govern for the market, rather than because of the market” (Foucault, 2008, p.121). 
“Ordoliberals” endorse the logic of competition as socially beneficial model (Mandra, 
2014) which strongly resonates and manifests itself within the constructivist view of 
the market. The point here is obviously that this is a clear shift from the rhetoric of 
competition as naturalistic, depoliticised and predetermined given representations to 
a view of competition as, “an historical objective of governmental art “to be actively 
pursued by the state (Foucault, 2008, p.120). “Ordoliberals” have no qualms whatso-
ever with state’s intervention insofar as it is not to constrain the market, but in society 
to ensure order that support competition.
This is the logic which underpins “Ordoliberals” perspective that puts unques-
tioned belief in the ability of the state involvement to effectively assuage the fragility 
of the market processes. At bottom, they envisage as Foucault points out, a “perma-
nent and multiform interventionism”, properly understood as the “historical and 
social condition of possibility for a market economy” (p.160). One of the core axioms 
of “Ordoliberals” thought “was to establish “order” as a set of legal rules for a soci-
ety of essentially self-reliant decision makers whose actions are controlled and coor-
dinated by market competition” (p.231). With this as their objective, they distance 
themselves from the naturalistic fallacy of the market. The crux of the matter lays in 
the neoliberals’ viewpoint of government as strictly speaking no longer one of laissez 
faire market fundamentalism and retreat of the state. But needless to say, market com-
petition is seen as the object of active policies and state intervention. It is in consistent 
with this that German neoliberals adamantly reject and shrugged off laissez-faire the-
ology for been counterproductive: because it ominously tends to undercut the whole 
fabric of society to the detriment of the market, if left unrestricted. This argument 
is confirmed and repeatedly reinforced by Foucault: that they cannot be subsumed 
under the rubric of the notorious laissez-faire market fundamentalism which they 
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view as deeply flawed, erroneous and dangerous. “Foucault traces how rather, they 
propose the market as a “principle of formalization” with its own internal logic, whose 
positive effects are produced only when this logic is strictly adhered to and respected 
(Foucault, 2007, p. 118-21).
In his examination of these issues, Foucault indicates that in the judgement of neo-
liberals, market is not only just about the principle for economic policy, but signifi-
cantly for social policy or Gesellschaftspolitik. This underlying assumption is predicated 
as it is upon “Ordoliberals” model that the state is even entitled to intervene deeply 
into the private sphere of individuals insofar as they are economically sound and not 
perilous. After all, social policy is not by any stretch of the imagination intended to 
disrupt or distort market processes as it is arguably in the welfare states. The inten-
tion broadly speaking is to serve as a corrective intervention and efforts of the state 
which must be made to work in conformity with the market. In other words, in more 
respects than one, German neoliberals’ social policy was to cushion citizens against 
severe sociological pathologies of capitalism (Rüstow, 2005, p.365) by cultivating 
opportunism that pervades the entire the social strata.
The above critical examination by Foucault of the “social policy” conundrum 
proposed by German neoliberals in my view should be read as an analysis of bio-
politics extraordinaire given the fact that neoliberal proposals imply interventions 
with important consequences for governing everything but the economy: including 
the population, its conditions of life and social surroundings” (Gudmand-Høyer & 
Hjorth, 2009, p.118). This, in essence is what German neoliberals call Vitalpolitik 
(politics of life): “a politics to secure the vitality of workers as self-responsible entre-
preneurs of labour power” (Behrent, 2009). As should be sufficiently clear by now, 
Foucault’s “account marks out some important shifts that distinguish German neo-
liberalism from the preceding classical form especially when it comes to the principle 
of laissez-faire and the extension of the associated biopolitics” (Foucault, 2008; Gud-
mand Høyer & Hjorth, 2009, p.117).
But perhaps to fully appreciate the political implications of this novel neoliberal 
governmentality and to ascertain why it was so attractive and appealing, it may be 
highly instructive to peruse Foucault’s reconstruction of the acute political context 
within which it emerged and flourished. Foucault rightly argues that experientially as 
well as historically speaking, the specific problems faced by “Ordoliberals” economists 
with the excessive state power of Nazism: the political turmoil and economic crises, 
as well as the different “material” they have to contend with namely, intellectual, insti-
tutional and cultural, have important ramifications in reversing the discursive thread 
with which their problematisation took (Biebricher, 2011). This point is absolutely 
critical, given that out of the space of problematisation posed by the Post-war German 
“Ordoliberals” (Weidner, 2013), they were faced with the herculean task of build-
ing a new state completely different in its understanding and approach of the market 
from that of classical liberal conceptualisation (Biebricher, 2015). Indeed what is at 
stake here and this expressly finds highlights in Foucault’s argument as well, is the 
way and manner “Ordoliberals” economists view the National Socialist regime. Con-
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comitantly what concerns the “Ordoliberals” predominantly as Foucault understands 
it was that state intervention in the form of protectionism, state aid, central planning, 
and hegemonic Keynesian developmentalism undermine both the economy and the 
state (Akbulu et al., 2015f ). At the time of writing, such an assessment turns out to 
be most difficult to justify as this phenomenon was not peculiar to the Nazi era per 
se. Indeed it was a cancer that was notoriously noticeable in its different variants in 
the development of European societies in the 19th century. As I read it, there was a 
general outrage as to how to rethink and refashion the role of the state and this was 
effectively among other things that “Ordoliberals” sought to carry out by provoking 
and heating up a new debate about the issue. My argument here is that not only is 
Foucault’s approach at least implicitly or explicitly simplistic and blatantly one way 
analysis, but rather, important aspects of the Nazi regime are ignored or neglected in 
a panicked attempt to confirm a predetermined position. This is in part because con-
spicuously disregarded in Foucault’s account was the fact that at least retrospectively 
speaking, “Ordoliberals” tradition problem with National Socialism also stemmed 
apparently from “personal experience and not only in the theoretical reconstruction, 
and this was in fact very critical in the development of the Freiburg School” (Gold-
schmitt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2007, p.9).
Perhaps even more controversially, what pressingly worried “Ordoliberals” as far as 
Nazism was concerned, was not necessarily about the interventionist heresies of the 
state in the economy, but as they argue, it chiefly sets the stage to sacrifice freedom 
on the altar of market which is at the heart of government. They posited the phenom-
enon of Nazism as Foucault reveals, as representing an “anti-liberal invariant” (Fou-
cault, 2008, p.111). This confirms that Foucault thus agrees with “Ordoliberals” that 
there is chaos when the state appropriates the economy and prevents it from operat-
ing freely. It is perfectly reasonable to infer from this that like Foucault, “Ordoliber-
als” present economic practices of Nazism as a harbinger of anti-liberalism. Presenting 
Nazism as a veritable sauce of anti-liberalism does surely, imply that as soon as one 
succumbs to any form of state intervention, one unwittingly slips toward totalitarian-
ism. And of course this impressive and attractive example is flagrantly reminiscent of 
Hayek’s critique of socialism in his book, The Road to Serfdom (1944) where he force-
fully argued that any form of state intervention is interpreted as a slippery slope to 
totalitarian (Hayek, 1994, p.17; Caldwell, 1997).
This is not the case, however, because central planning does not irretrievably cul-
minate in totalitarianism. It is rather that planning inadvertently involves some kind 
of errors which call for more control but not totalitarianism. And this is the same 
obfuscation that Foucault (perhaps unwitting) also inexcusably perpetuates. I have no 
interest in absolving the Nazi regime from blame. What interests me of course is that 
to claim that central planning, state intervention —to name but a few— necessarily 
lead to totalitarianism is a flawed and convoluted logic. To be sure, my fundamental 
discontent with this persistent, widespread and risible mischaracterisation is that it 
provides historical and intellectual context for the proponents of the neoliberal creed 
to make a general case against any form of state intervention as unwarranted, otiose 
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and misleading in promoting free market. It should be noted that there are at least 
two issues which in fact remain central for this supposed invariant truth of Nazism 
argument. On one level, it provides a perfect arsenal to the neoliberal ideologues to 
simplistically and fervently advance their state phobia views that the only function or 
relevance and basis of legitimacy of the state is to promote a free market and nothing 
more, for example. By contrast, the second issue this raises is more disturbingly wor-
rying: the exorcism of the ghost of the cold monster state sufficiently supplies them 
with plentiful opportunities to simultaneously present a new basis for the state and 
in doing so, ideally consign the state and its so called excessive power to the museum 
of history: “the state under the supervision of the market rather than a market super-
vised by the state” (Foucault, 2008, p.116).
From Foucault for instance, one could discern very significant conclusions from 
“Ordoliberals” transpositions which apparently verges on the analysis of neoliberal-
ism. He stresses that “Ordoliberals” tradition efface and differ considerably from the 
earlier liberal political rationality of the market/competition and state/government 
obfuscation and binary as entirely different and irrevocably delimited axes without 
leading to laissez faire. Increasingly, Foucault demonstrates that the constructivist and 
anti-naturalistic thrust of “Ordoliberals” logic must be viewed against the background 
of the acute historical situation in post-War Germany and this in his reading con-
tributed in no small measure to the fundamental transformation in liberal thought 
(Lemke, 2001, p.196).
It is suggested here that “Ordoliberals” transpositions of the theoretical problematic 
tellingly construe the economy not in naturalistic but it is steeped in constructivist 
terms (Kangas, 2014, p.2). What the market constructivist politics of German neolib-
eralism for example, entails is a radically new perspective of the market which reart-
iculates, reinserts and re-inscribes liberal governmentality by means of a strong state 
as the political form of market liberty, of competition, of entrepreneurialism, and 
of individual self-responsibility (Bonefeld, 2015; Foucault, 2008; Mirowski, 2009). 
In striking contrast to the liberal presumption of the ontological givenness or quasi-
natural phenomenon of market rationality which serves as a limit to the state when 
best left to its own devices, “Ordoliberals” claim is that the state has a crucial role to 
play in fostering and redefining that market rationality (Kangas, 2014; Ptak, 2009). 
By this token the state’s legitimacy as Foucault concisely notes, is therefore produc-
tively indexed from its market constructivism which must be created, produced and 
reproduced by dint of benign political interventions and orchestration.
The typical dominant line of reasoning of neoliberalism uncritically pathologised 
by the left or the anti-globalisation movement: as retreat of the state or “anarcho-cap-
italism” which was reflected in the characteristically pro-market neoliberal reforms as 
crystallised in adjustment programmes of the 1980s – rationalised by the Fund and 
also proselytised by the Bank (Adaman & Mandra, 2014). As we have seen, this is 
surely at odds with German neoliberals formulations which is forthrightly inspired 
by the necessity for more markets, but heavily influenced by the market not been con-
trolled by the State. The Ghanaian case compellingly shows how in fact adjustment 
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programmes evident in this study are typical neoliberal (liberalisation, deregulation, 
etc.). My claim is that they per chance came into being through political decisions 
from the IMF and the World Bank due largely to the debt crisis. Indeed the crux of 
the matter is that these programmes did not simply emerge ex nihilo but came into 
being because of the ruling power of the economy: they were chiefly a product of pro-
found strategic cum politico-economic decisions: the debt crisis and the necessity to 
solve those problems purportedly occurred by reason of the predatory, paternalistic, 
vampire and rent seeking behaviour of the state to put it somewhat bluntly, is danger-
ously beside the point and grossly misunderstood. Rather, the neoliberal market was 
constructed and cultivated by neoliberal governmentality through the policies of the 
IMF and the World Bank qua the reconfiguration of the state and its functions to 
surreptitiously govern its subjects through market-like incentives rather than direct 
coercion (Foucault, 2007b, p. 20 & 71-72; Read, 2009). I want to argue that neo-
liberal economic policies are increasingly perceived as no longer naively restricted to 
economic issues (it is the case that this assertion has theoretically been deconstructed 
and publicly undone. In fact the fundamental rationale underpinning the basic princi-
ple of neoliberal governmentality is not “power of economy”, but “economy of power” 
(Lemke, 2008, p.73) a development which clearly describes the extent to which the 
economy has been de-and re-territorialised and subsequently nationalised.
Now on this backdrop, it seems to me that “Ordoliberals” re-articulation and 
rephrasing of the relation between the market and the state challenges our traditional 
view of how to govern that appear to characterise our contemporary times. Truthfully, 
“this is the comprehensive biopolitical and neo-liberal governmentality that is formu-
lated in Germany, and it is this German model, not the “Bismarckian state socialism, 
Nazi autarchic planification, or Keynesian interventionism which is being diffused, 
debated, and forms part of our actuality” (Foucault, 2008, p.192). The upshot is quite 
curious. Indeed to the extent that Foucauldians are showing a surging interest in 
“Ordoliberalism” as a political rationality potentially signals a renaissance of “Ordo-
liberalism” in many guises —or so the story goes. Similarly, in an interesting twist 
of irony, the Bretton Woods Institutions have begun to re-position, re-politicise, re-
embed and re-Christianise the State as a new biopolitical logic of governmentality 
(Foucault, 2008; Burchell, et al., 1991; Donzelot, 2008; Lemke, 2002) in the face of 
the now largely discredited “Washington Consensus” (policy reforms based on the 
uncritical faith in market) without assertively invoking it as “Ordoliberal” (Biebriche, 
2014, my emphasis).
But more decisively, at issue, in fact — is that for me — and contrary to the popu-
lists and simplified readings that in the neoliberal States there is a turn away from the 
States and towards markets, a stronger consensus emerges that it is something that 
can only ever be a myth or chimera within the modern governmental logic. Succinctly 
put, free market needless to say, indispensably needs the protection of strong States. 
It needs their powers of enforcement in our modern view on politics as government. 
Apart from anything else, the minimalist State, I presume, is hopelessly utopian, it 
exists nowhere in space (Fougner, 2008). For Foucault, the State in the contemporary 
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times – that is, for our present –is subjected to an increasing ‘governmentalisation’ of 
power mechanisms as the role of the State (Foucault, 2007, p.109) has been defused 
and radically reconstituted into different circumstances (Dean, 1999,p.102-111). As 
Foucault puts it,
The governmentalisation of the state has nonetheless been what has allowed 
the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is pre-
cisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time both external and 
internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the contin-
ual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what 
is public and what is private, what is and is not within the state’s competence, 
and so on. (Foucault, 2007, p.109)
According to Rose and Miller, “the state can be seen as a specific way in which the 
problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a ‘political sphere’, 
with its particular characteristics of rule, from other, ‘non-political spheres’ to which 
it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a 
temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with 
one another” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.176-177; Lascoumes, 2004).
In these senses, Foucault’s concept of governmentality provides us with an analyti-
cal axis which makes it possible to effectively decode the neoliberal programmes of 
a “retreat of the state” as a technique of governance. By all accounts, Foucault more 
than any one person must posthumously be rewarded for positively recognising and 
rediscovering “Ordoliberals” record: by alerting us that our modern idea of market 
has become increasingly denaturalised, a factor which tends to remain heavily under-
appreciated but potentially significant. And finally, the flipside of the coin is that per-
haps, it becomes all the more urgent and intensely pertinent to investigate whether 
or not this approach at all articulates and provokes a genuine alternative that prob-
lematises the epistemic of economisation and ontologises the neoliberal project in an 
exceedingly compelling way.
4.3.2 American Neoliberalism (”Anarcho-Liberalism”)
Liberalism in America is a whole way of being. It is a type of relation between the 
governors and the governed much more than a technique of governors with regard 
to the governed (Foucault, 2008, p.218-224).
The second case study Foucault develops in his in The Birth of Biopolitics, is that of 
American neoliberalism a. k. a “Anarcho-liberalism” (broadly Chicago school). In 
putting the German neoliberalism in its proper context, Foucault sharply contrasts 
it with the Chicago-style economics school to show how their work also reverses 
the logic of classical liberals where the state is regulated by unencumbered market 
economy (Lemke, 2001). Foucault here mostly refers to the work of Chicago School 
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economists such as Simons, Schultz, Friedman, and Stigler, but most notably Becker. 
American version of neoliberalism emerged in a context that is quite strikingly similar 
and yet distinct in many ways to that of German neoliberalism. Referring most vividly 
to Henry Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire, (Foucault, 2008, p.216) Fou-
cault was fascinated and intrigued with the unprecedented fashion with which Amer-
ican neoliberals pushed this formula to the extremes which invariably bordered on 
an invertebrate aversion for Keynesianism, state interventionism and dirigism quite 
similar to that of “Ordoliberals” (Kiersey & Weidner, 2009, p.356; Oskala, 2013, my 
emphasis). Thus, Foucault acknowledges that “both schools were linked from the 
start to classical liberalism insofar as they were forms of “critical governmental rea-
son, “or political rationality that theorized government as immanently self-limiting by 
virtue of its primary responsibility for supporting the economy” (Trent, 2009, p.41). 
Regardless of this, Foucault suggests that unlike Germany and France, liberalism has 
been at the heart of political debate in US for centuries and therefore has had a long 
history of acute allergy and antagonistic aspirations toward the hegemony of the 
Keynesian welfare state (Feher, 2009, p.37).
What becomes apparently clear is that compared to its German variant of neolib-
eralism Foucault consistently insists, American neoliberalism is increasingly pervasive 
and much more radical in nature and structure: as it extends radically to every sphere 
of “subjectivity, affectivity, and intimacy” (Sven-Olov, 2013, p.27) and “the relation-
ship it envisages between markets and society” (Flew, 2012b, p.29). It is in line with 
this thought that it explicitly seeks the radical extension of the economic analysis 
both to previously unexplored economic domains (e.g., the theory of human capital), 
and to domains which were not exclusively or not primarily economic (the family and 
the birth rate, for example, or delinquency and penal policy” (Foucault, 2008, p.323): 
thus eliding any difference between the economy and the social.
To a very large extent this tendency as Foucault observes, is prevailingly character-
ised by an “unlimited generalization” of the market form (Foucault, 2008, p.243). Fou-
cault’s point in other words, is that it turns the whole idea of the economic rationality 
of the market into a general “grid of intelligibility” (p.243) “as well as a principle of 
decipherment for social relationships and individual behavior” (Oskala, 2012, p.67) 
far beyond its ordinary economic context. As such, market understood as the grid of 
intelligibility decisively makes it possible not only for epistemologically understand-
ing human action: but at the same time, for understanding non-economic processes, 
relations and behaviour of a number of formal and intelligible relations (Oskala, 2012, 
p. 67). In this vein, Foucault concisely notes with good reason that American neolib-
eralism far from seeking to cushion the counterweight of the market rather sought 
to “generalise the economic form of the market throughout the social body, includ-
ing relationships that were not conducted, and therefore not usually analysed through 
monetary exchanges” (Foucault, 2008, p.243). Put very simply, Foucault’s analysis 
shows how American neoliberals radically extend the market into a universal frame of 
government. For whereas “Ordoliberals” thought is characterised by governing soci-
ety in the name of the economy, American neoliberals by contrast comprehensively 
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generalised the scope of the economy to the extent that social relations and individual 
behaviour can be discerned by using economic criteria and within economic terms 
of its intelligibility. Foucault’s central point is that while classic liberalism had called 
on government to respect the form of the market, in neoliberal approach, the mar-
ket is no longer the principle of self-delimitation by the government, but instead, the 
principle against which it rubs, or “a kind of permanent economic tribunal”, Foucault 
summarily concludes (Foucault, 2008, p.247).
Foucault described illustratively these claims through neoliberal analysis of the 
conception of “human capital” which takes its cue from a critique of the treatment 
of the problem of labour within economic theory. The theory of “human capital” was 
developed by neoliberal theorists of the Chicago School associated with the Journal 
of Political Economy most prominently Gary Becker, Theodore Schultz, Jacob Mincer 
among others in the 1960s and early 1970s, (Oskala, 2013, p.67; Flew, 2012b; Gerten-
bach, 2010, p.113-114). Whilst intriguingly, the inherently technical understanding 
of “human capital theory seems to bear some striking commonalities with the work 
of Marx, Foucault insists that these authors “practically never argued with Marx for 
reasons that we may think are to do with economic snobbery”, however (Foucault, 
2008, p.220). And yet the commonalities in their works far outweigh the differences. 
At any rate, despite this theoretical ignorance, it is not too difficult to grasp how they 
relate to Marx (Flew, 2012b).
But of course, “the distinctive mark of the notion of “human capital”, Theodore 
W. Schultz clearly writes in 1961, “is that it is a part of man. It is human because 
it is embodied in man, and it is capital because it is a source of future satisfactions, 
or of future earnings, or of both” (quoted in Foucault, 2008). Here it is the biopo-
litical implications of what we might call the “economisation” of quotidian life that 
are the key concern that draws Foucault’s attention. Put more radically, the kernel of 
the theory of “human capital” was to reconfigure and recast the contours of labour in 
terms of human capital by “focusing on economic principles of rationality for deter-
mining decision-making processes and action” (Trent, 2009, p.42). The first crucial 
step Foucault identifies is that classical economic theory dismally failed to radically 
think labour to any significant degree.
To this end, Foucault explores how American neoliberalism instead, suggest how 
labour ought to be rethought in terms of an enterprise of himself: “the individual 
deploys his or her human capital in the prospects of earning a profit upon it”. Labour 
understood in this way, crucially corresponds with wages as income earned from the 
expenditure of “human capital” (p.42-43). Because “human capital” theory substan-
tially transforms labour into a truly economic category, the labourer in Foucault’s 
thought thoroughly becomes a uniquely economic subject. It is irrevocably excluded 
and effaced from being human to an economic man. The idea is that this tendency 
on the part of neoliberals to radically recast, rearticulate and reconceive labour as 
an economic agent significantly implies varied ways of governing individual subjects 
(Gertenbach, 2010, p.137). This is exactly what invokes and especially shows the gov-
ernmental meaning of neoliberalism. Coolly and objectively, neoliberal concept of 
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human capital to say the least, progressively and qualitatively interpellates individuals 
as a rational and calculative monad in every sphere of life (Gertenbach, 2010, p.117; 
Mandra & O¨zselcuk, 2010, my emphasis). As Foucault aptly summarises, the recon-
figuration of the neoliberal subject, understood in this way, undeniably amount to “an 
inversion of the relationships of the social to the economic” (2008, p.240).
This lends itself quite nicely and epitomises the central idea of what Foucault 
appropriately reads as the return of new form of “homo economicus” or entrepreneur-
ial subject (Foucault, 2008, p.243). What shines through Foucault’s analysis is what 
forms a key distinction in neoliberal governmentality: where the economic man is 
now no longer merely someone who engages in exchange as in the case of classical 
liberalism but characterised as “an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself…. being 
for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the 
source of (his) earnings” (Foucault, 2008, p.226) “who is in need of being set free to 
freely compete” (Gudmand-Høyer & Hjorth, 2009, p.120). It follows, for me, that 
the option for agency and autonomy simply imply an individualised understanding of 
social bonds which subsequently repudiates and refabricates the alleged social solidar-
ity, ethics and aesthetics (Pühl, 2008, p.107, my emphasis). This forms an important 
tool in Foucault’s attempt to radically rethink “the conception of the individual’s cul-
ture as a form of capital, and the individual’s body as involving genetic capital, the 
object of a new biopolitics” (Gane, 2009, p.360).
On the one hand, the concept of the economic agent “as someone who pursues 
his or her own interest” and “who must be left alone” (p.270) became the “grid” of 
intelligibility (Ibid) through which governments began to organise social life— social 
life becomes individualised in the typical neoliberal logic. But on the other hand: 
if we read Foucault’s genealogy of “homo economicus” not as a representation of 
the anthropological truth of the social subject but rather as the “grid of intelligibil-
ity” — “the surface of contact between the individual and the power exercised on 
him”(Foucault, 2008, p.252-53) — of the biopolitical mode of governmentality: 
then this forcefully suggests that the state of the subject cannot merely be deduced to 
the notion of an entity who is “eminently governable” (p.270): that understands and 
responds only to the language of economic incentives, but also functions as a concep-
tual component of a decentralized framework for the “the restriction, self- limitation, 
and frugality of government” (p.271).
The figure of the celebrated “homo economicus” is in fact the bedrock assumption 
of all neoliberal analysis which is intrinsically and originally tied to what Foucault 
referred to as rational-choice theory (Feher, 2009, p.32). The decisive fact is that it 
would appear that Foucault’s “work takes up exactly what writers on neoliberalism 
find to be so vexing: the manner in which neoliberalism is not just a manner of gov-
erning states or economies, but is intimately tied to the government of the individual, 
to a particular manner of living”(Read, 2009, p.27). Underlying this aim is to dem-
onstrate how the neoliberal model constitutes “a new regime of truth, a new mode of 
“governmentality” a manner, or a mentality, in which people are governed and govern 
themselves— a new way in which people are made subjects”(p.28-29). Apparently, as 
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Dillion and Reid (2009,p.25) suggest, what essentially characterises the central con-
ception of governmentality in Foucault’s accounts “was less with class and the tele-
ology of history, which occupied traditional Marxists, than with the emergence of 
a novel problematization of rule, and a new form of governance whose organizing 
principle was that of political economy”. This perspective thus presupposes that eco-
nomic theory regrettably failed to squarely situate the radical encoding of the social 
as economic within the horizon of the reconfiguration of the neoliberal subject as an 
entrepreneur of him/herself in charge of optimising the use of their “human capital” 
and ultimately to make sense of it (Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001; Read, 2009, my 
emphasis). To be clear, Foucault’s “analytic of the new problematic of governing posed 
by the introduction of political economy” (Dillion & Reid, 2009, p.27) unquestion-
ably highlights the ways in which the Chicago school economists thinking of govern-
ment is no longer located within economic imperialism, but rather the production 
of a suitably responsible subjects through a series of techniques by partaking in the 
constitution of her own subjectivity. The bottom line is that neoliberal subject as a 
disembodied “Homo economicus” in a precise sense is the subject which biopolitics 
relentlessly seeks to create, individuate, targets, control and reproduce. Exemplary of 
this logic of thinking underlies the typical policies of International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank neoliberal conditionality contained in structural adjustment poli-
cies: which include but certainly not limited to the reductions of government spend-
ing; removing of subsidies; removing tariffs, general deregulation of the economy; 
market liberalisation; privatisation that states like Ghana were “ill-advised” to pursue 
in order to become globally competitive (Heywood, 2011, p.371, my emphasis). And 
indeed, the overarching objective in this respect was inspired by radical economic 
individualism, responsibilisation and self-conduct based precisely on the understand-
ing that individuals are calculative and calculable (Adaman & Mandra, 2014; Joseph, 
2010b) – which in turn presumably, also limit the state’s influence on its population.
To quickly sum up the foregoing, although “Ordoliberalism” and the Chicago 
school adopt different approaches to neoliberalism, the substantial differences among 
them notwithstanding, they all have certain implicit affinities for market. Thus, mar-
ket rationality in the Chicago school is markedly similar to that of “Ordoliberalism” 
constructivist idea of the market. Or, in other words, they all share a mutual aversion 
in this respect in vilifying “state-controlled economy, planning, and state interven-
tionism on (…) those overall quantities to which Keynes attached such (…) impor-
tance” (Foucault, 2010, p.79). The way Becker fiercely and persuasively extends the 
economic grid to theorise the rational behaviour of the labourer, of individuals trying 
to accumulate human capital by rationally allocating means to ends, such as educa-
tion to children (Adaman & Mandra, 2010) incontrovertibly amounts to a form of 
market constructivism. The underlying implications of this transformation are pro-
found. It has been my contention that applying cost-benefit calculus aggressively and 
exhaustively to labour and human capital, but also to fertility, marriage, allows for 
reformatting and reshaping all problems of social and personal life through market 
logic (Ibid). clearly then, all aspects of thought and activity that were formerly not 
82 | Amo-Agyemang: Understanding Neoliberalism as Governmentality
seen as such have become the universal model of all social behaviour - or, more pre-
cisely, in configuring the subject herself into an object of her calculations and choices 
regardless of the ubiquitous constraints.
However, the differences between Chicago school and “Ordoliberalism” should be 
explicitly acknowledged. It is claimed that American neoliberals have a more radically 
grounded conception of the market compared to its German predecessor. More spe-
cifically, they understand market constructivism in a starkly different way. “Ordoliber-
als”, on one hand, primarily relies on a reciprocal tolerance understanding of market 
according to which market is not reducible to the state because it must form its con-
stitutive condition: American “Anarcho-liberalsm understanding on the other hand, 
radically reconstructs virtually every form of non- economic phenomenon using the 
market grid of intelligibility.
As signalled above, by pinpointing how in American neoliberalism the market has 
been transformed into a grid of economic intelligibility for understanding non-eco-
nomic behaviour, Foucault’s analysis thus potentially leaves open the field of possibil-
ity and visibility that set neoliberalism apart from the modern liberal view. Yet for 
Foucault—the anti-naturalistic and constructivist view of the market must specifically 
be understood as a distinctively “new art of government” (Foucault, 2008, p.176). I 
thus suggest after Foucault that neoliberalism has to be read as a signature technique 
of governing in which rational economic action is suffused and remarkably orches-
trated through the subject’s conduct toward him or herself — a biopolitical object 
of governmentality (Oskala, 2013). Unlike those who have epistemologically inter-
preted the works of Becker as economics imperialism (Fine & Milonakis, 2009), I 
would argue that for Foucault, the most dramatic consequence of this de-essential-
isation and denaturalisation notion of market is not primarily epistemological but 
quintessentially governmental.
It is thus my submission that using Foucault (2008), if we want to understand 
the specific forms that the extended application of the market frame takes in con-
temporary times then certainly, we need a careful analysis of the new ways in which 
the social world is governed and becomes governable. By such an analysis, Foucault 
exposes the shifts in the relation between the market and how it rearticulates, rein-
stall and re-ensemble our governmentalities. In classical liberalism, the power of the 
market lies precisely in the fact that it explicitly presented a limit to what govern-
ment does and do. In neoliberal governmentality, the market becomes a concurrential 
mechanism through which the governing practice of government can be rationalised 
(Cotoi, 2011, p.113). Close to Foucault’s heart, which is germane to my analysis is 
that in neoliberal art of government the market rather than providing a panoptic 
view, “becomes a sort of permanent economic tribunal that claims to assess govern-
ment action in strictly economic and market terms” (Foucault, 2010, p.247). All of 
these developments accurately reflect what Foucault meticulously identified as the 
crux of the liberal governmentality which circulates and permeates within the state 
and its agencies.
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Thus far, the claim here is that Foucault’s close and not unsympathetic reading of 
neoliberalism intellectual evolution is terribly important in addressing the utter con-
fusion associated with the popular representations encountered in the intellectual 
history of neoliberalism. Yet, a caveat is called for here: On the face of it, Foucault 
unfortunately appears to re-echo the common understanding that run right from 
Freiburg through to Chicago by way of hyperbolic exaggeration of Mont Pèlerin 
Society. But the way he appropriates this idea is crucially different, however. Whereas 
Foucault presented a picture that draws out “Ordoliberals” connection, he does not 
depict the intellectual history of neoliberalism seamlessly, unproblematically and 
unprecedentedly as one long march. Thus, Foucault does fundamentally depart from 
the too obvious biographical connections between Freiburg and its most comprehen-
sive version in the Chicago: instead he rather analytically denotes the two approaches 
as an expression of distinctively similar governmental patterns. Even though he gives 
a persuasive and a systematic account of how the two schools share a tendency for 
the primacy for market constructivism, his account makes it visible to understand in 
all its complexities, its underlying discontinuities, its promises and its contradictions. 
Neoliberalism he unsurprisingly argues is not simply describable as one of ideologi-
cally wedded philosophy, an economic theory or a bundle of policies but rather, it is 
firmly rooted in a fundamental question gestured toward “novel problematisation of 
rule” (Dillion & Reid, 2009, p.25) which I contend is unmistakably cast in the mould 
of West German and an American one, whose political-historical development served 
as examples for Foucault. Let me conclude by making it explicitly clear that Foucault’s 
analysis transparently helps in disentangling and demystifying the more simplistic, 
parochial and bourgeois perspectives of neoliberalism as class or non-class agenda 
(Duménil & Lévy, 2004; 2011; Harvey, 2005; 2009; Castree, 2009; Koechlin, 2006). 
And so while Foucault’s genealogy to reiterate the Foucauldian mantra is refreshing in 
its attempt to bring critical perspectives to the debate on neoliberal reasoning and its 
technologies of power: it is my impression that it still remains an open and a matter 
of dispute if indeed Foucault’s unflinching position towards what he enthusiastically 
characterised as neoliberalism could wholly be applied to the uniquely changing con-
ditions that confront us in our historical present (Behrent, 2009, my emphasis) — 
admittedly, I cannot conclusively settle here—that certainly would be another project 
in its own right
4.3.3 Governmentality and Development in International Relations
After presenting basic points about the notion of governmentality, I now consider 
the analytical power of Foucauldian forms of governmentality pertaining to devel-
opment discourse and practices. In recent years the applicability and utility of Fou-
cault-inspired theorising in International Relations (IR) has been heavily criticised, 
especially concerning ‘the question of the concept global scalability”(Kiersey, 2017, 
p.1). A number of scholars are skeptical as to whether Michel Foucault‘s overwhelm-
ing interest in power - that is, governmental power concerned with shaping the 
‘conduct of conduct”and turning human beings into subjects - is compatible with 
84 | Amo-Agyemang: Understanding Neoliberalism as Governmentality
International Relations (Albert & Lenco, 2008, p.256; Chandler, 2009; 2010; Joseph, 
2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Selby, 2007). Some critics such as James Ferguson (2010) 
speak of the specific problems that are inexorably prone to arise when the concept 
of governmentality is applied in non- western contexts such as Africa. Despite the 
fact that policy measures such as structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s, as a technology of 
government were set out to foster self-regulated subjects, he argues they merely reflect 
“an old-style laissez-faire liberalism in the service of imperial capital” (Ferguson, 
2010,p.173). In particular, that Foucault was —a theorist whose focus was primarily 
the “domestic‘social arena”(Selby, 2007, p.325) ‘and therefore cannot be “scaled”up to 
address the international domain ( Joseph, 2009, p.414) with any analytical precision 
(Kiersey, 2015). This notwithstanding, in the past few years, IR scholars have made 
attempts to explain international development in developing countries like Africa 
through Foucauldian governmentality.
 Although Ferguson is critical of the applicability of governmentality analytics in 
African situation, yet his work has been influential for the exploration of govern-
mental rationalities and practices inherent in development in Africa and the impact 
this has had upon international regimes of governance. For instance, Ferguson and 
Gupta throughtout their works have been concerned with a specific articulation of 
the changing understandings of the relations between the state and population in 
Africa. This transformation is conceptualised by Ferguson and Gupta as transna-
tional governmentality which denotes “modes of government that are being set up 
on a global scale’ (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p.990). The general point of Ferguson 
and Gupta is the claim that the sovereignty, state borders and the formal political 
power of many African states have been globalised, diffused or are disolved. Their cen-
tral claim is that with “transfer of economic sovereignty” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, 
p.992) a new a rationality of government was engineered, which allows international 
governing institutions such as the IMF to impose their repressive policies. Analysing 
global governmentality and other complex networks of international governmental 
and non-governmental organisations, they show how it operates at multiple scales, 
which provides a chance to reflect upon many ways of exploring and situating the 
shifts and competing rationalities in virtually every field of government. This way ‘glo-
balizing governmentality’ (Frazer, 2003, p.169) provides an ideal lens that force us to 
drastically reevaluate and reconsider the shifting boundaries of the state by viewing it 
necessarily as the expression of increasingly globalising of liberal forms of rule; high-
lighting complex dynamics of dispersed, flexible and autonomous networks of global 
forces and institutions (Ibid).
Theorists like Jonathan Joseph drawing adeptly on the Foucauldian governmen-
tality analytic as a critical theory (2012, p.6) argues that contemporary forms of 
governances and dominant rationalities of governance are expressions of neoliberal 
governmentality (p.132). Joseph arguments are illustrated with an analysis of cases 
that engage with the modes of governance of organisations like the EU and the World 
Bank. Joseph analysis seeks to develop a theoretically informed critical approach to 
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international relations, and in so doing shows how social ideas are influential in the-
ory and in practice. By extending Foucauldian governmentality studies to the disci-
pline of international relations, he critically presents a useful way of understanding 
global governance in critical IR theory while criticising the confusingly and imprecise 
usage of the concept. Governmentality, “… is notoriously unclear in Foucault´s own 
work” (p.16). Apart from the clear and thoughtful exposition of these theoretical 
notions, what distinguishes Joseph work is the very insightful application of these spe-
cific ideas to practical approaches to neoliberal practices of global governance in the 
developing strategies of international institutions and donor countries, World Bank 
or the IMF to the EU into the developing programmes in Africa countries (p.183-4). 
Jonathan Joseph tries to develop an understanding of the nature of the international 
and considers whether sociological ideas developed in the West can be applied in very 
different global contexts.
Theories of global governance and the increasing emergence of non-state actors 
such as NGOs and civil society organisations far from providing useful conceptual 
tools for understanding our contemporary world order, they nevertheless tend to 
effectively align with different political rationalities and technologies of governmen-
tal practice, and thereby unwittingly legitimise and reinforce the very phenomena 
they analyse (p.92-5 & p.262-5); and second, key tenets of these theories particularly 
become manifest and constituted as areas for governmental intervention in the gover-
nance practices and discourses of international organisations like the European Union 
(EU) and the World Bank, albeit with different effects. 
In fact, while neoliberal forms of governmentality aim at rational, responsible, 
free, entrepreneurial conduct and the well-being of populations in those areas that 
might be characterised as having an advanced form of liberalism (2010, p.224), in 
the developing countries targeted by the World Bank Joseph suggests, are shaped 
to a large degree by cruder “disciplinary” forms of neoliberalism without genuinely 
advancing the desires and aspiration of the population ( Joseph, 2012, p.251). Against 
this idea, Joseph believes that more ‘meaningful’ and reflective engagement with 
Foucault approach can be dealt with adequately if we, first and foremost, focus on a 
specifically neoliberal rather than function as an overall explanatory grid for govern-
mentality (p.29); and that governmentality accounts ought to be placed within the 
dynamics of ‘broader structures’ and social relations of capitalist (re)production and 
geopolitics that together dominate and shape our contemporary social and political 
reality(p.60-1). Approaching governmentality from this angle can clarify the how, but 
not the why’ (p.15) of power and governance.
Thus Foucaudian ideas of governmentality and the role of discourses should be 
situated within more critical, Marxian-inspired analyses (p.14). With such an appre-
ciation of governmentality in mind, we can better illuminate various ways that capi-
talist valorisation and regulation, as well as changing hegemonic projects, post-war 
historic blocs, and the unevenness of socio-economic development shape our political 
present (Ibid). Related to this is the idea that the rise of neoliberal governmentalities 
(including rationalities and techniques of empowerment, partnership, local owner-
86 | Amo-Agyemang: Understanding Neoliberalism as Governmentality
ship, benchmarking and others within the World Bank discourses, are necessary make 
up and are deep-rooted neoliberal political strategies that influentially act upon the 
reality to make market liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that have helped 
to unravel the welfarist-Keynesian post-war that emerged in the 1980s (p.258).
Many social and international theories insights regarding globalisation, networks, 
global governance or risk society as the fundamental dynamics of late modernity, as 
Joseph explains, have been notoriously obscured by their argument regarding ‘logic 
of capital’ (p.263) and ‘power politics’. The apparently relentless march of global gov-
ernance, in the view of Joseph, inverts actual historical developments as it is irreduc-
ible to the changing nature of capitalist (re)production and control, sublimated into 
the incentivising and individualising strategies of neoliberal governmentality (p.258): 
“global governance … rather than a powerful empirical reality … is a rationality guided 
by the power of global capitalism that filters down to … the micro level of everyday 
practices’ (p.97). 
 Joseph insists that it is particularly through certain state-sanctioned institutions 
and Western-dominated international organisations that neoliberal governmental-
ity strategies are refracted, reinforced and reproduced. He thinks that contrary to 
approaches that may perceive State and the States system as increasingly circum-
scribed, what is in fact occurring is the governmentalisation of the state and its dif-
ferent practices of governing (p.215). A more decentralised way of governing through 
different networks of power institutions; one mostly concerned with the States and 
its political apparatuses as the constitutive basis upon which power relations are codi-
fied through new governmental projects and modes of calculation ( Jessop, p.150). 
Joseph claims that new forms of governmentality deconstruct and re-shape the mean-
ing and modes of operation of the State, yet this is not simply Western domination of 
a passive State. He argues, and I agree, that States rather than its alleged populations 
themselves) are also the main objects of targets of critical evaluations and monitor-
ing performance, made in reference to a standard—i.e. benchmarking for assessing 
the socio-economic condition of the population, neoliberal governmentality in the 
global South (p.260-1). The deployment of such techniques by the State dominated 
international organisations within the context of contemporary international aid rela-
tionships are what Michael Merlingen calls “the international conduct of the conduct 
of countries”. In other words, international governmentality as Joseph (2010, p.46) 
has demonstrated elsewhere targets States but is deeply underpinned by “the claim to 
be concerned with the health, wealth and well-being of the local population”. Global 
governmentality is, in this fundamental sense, “a complex ensemble of institutions, 
procedures, analysis and tactics that has the state as its target, and a political economy 
of poor populations as its main form of knowledge” (p.48).
As the work of Joseph shows, the post-Washington consensus rather than “build-
ing institutions for markets” were deeply embedded in the principles and policies of 
neoliberal capitalism which entails getting countries to open up to global capital, and 
accordingly implement market friendly policies aimed at governmentalising the State 
from a distance while encouraging local participation and responsibility (p.259-60). 
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With all global governance theorists claim that government is no longer the sole actor 
of governance in the contemporary structure of the societal system, Joseph suggests 
that organisations like the World Bank and the IMF can only operate with a signifi-
cant degree of freedom of autonomy from the State. 
A forceful case is made that that civil-society involvement, partnerships and Peer 
Review initiatives in post-colonial Africa driving the rationality behind new forms of 
global governance, externally imposed by the most influential international organisa-
tions, are doomed to failure, and therefore better seen as window dressing for coercive 
and exploitative North–South relationships vis-à-vis the EU governance discourse 
(p.249). Put differently and more generally, the success and/or failure of governmen-
tal practices and techniques on the ground in developing countries could sometimes 
not be found just parts of it.
Best (2007) and Abrahamsen (2004) analysis, too, bring an important dimension 
on the discussion on post-Washington Consensus by focusing on the increasing use of 
non-juridical tools. Specifically they highlight how benchmarking, metric indicators, 
monitoring systems, etc., are deeply implicated within post-Washington Consensus 
in producing and perpetuating compliance from poor countries with international 
norms through the promotion of an ethos of self-responsibility has drawn upon the 
work of Michel Foucault, especially his notion of governmentality. Similarly, Ansell et 
al., (2012) focus on Malawi with specific reference to the youth policy as a case study. 
Drawing on the analytical framework of governmentality to elucidate the emerging 
modes of intervention in the lives of citizens in developing countries, they explore 
how the youth policy in Malawi seeks to produce suitable neoliberal subjects.
In thinking particularly about international interventionist policies and practices 
in the expansion of liberal policies and liberal practices of government, a number of 
International Relations scholars have extended the concept of governmentality to the 
‘international’. This has entail attempts to construct ‘governance states’ that was con-
ducive to promote regulatory and liberal project’ beyond ‘the West’ (Harrison, 2004). 
These studies, quite tellingly, reflect on how various World Bank’s development inter-
ventions and ‘good governance’ practices in the developing countries– through state- 
and civil society initiatives – have aimed to shape liberal interventions in Africa in the 
course of the years. By and large, these studies pay attention to how and under what 
kinds of conditions the decisive shift within these international governing organisa-
tions have enabled them to incorporate African related issues into their policy man-
dates in the way they did.
In The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: Liberalism, 
Governance and Sovereignty Williams David sought to analyse how liberal under-
standing of social and economic transformative agenda and the nature of contempo-
rary forms of governance are firmly rooted in the shifting development discourse and 
practices of the World Bank (Williams, 2008). This transformative liberal interven-
tion and assistance Williams argues, necessitated a change in the World Bank’s policy, 
practices, attitudes and beliefs in the 1990s and took the radical position that the 
“wicked problems” of festering poverty and governance become seemingly coexten-
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sive: and that strengthening governance is an essential precondition for improving the 
lives of the poor (World Bank, 2002, p.271). In fact, however, these crucial elements 
are important not only to understand contemporary forms of governance: rather as 
he argues, it is to apprehend their connection with projects and programmes that seek 
to improve and shape the social, political, and economic life of borrower countries as 
they become progressively accepted as a key mechanism of the World Bank’s policies 
and practices for the management of the problems and threats that are thought to 
emerge from developing countries (Williams, 2008, p.69). In that spirit, and as a basis 
for such exposure and engagement, Williams raises the question: why the World Bank 
came to see discourse on ‘good governance’ as an effective instrument of global gover-
nance. To answer the question, he evaluates what the World Bank is doing to improve 
the governance of poorest States.
In reflecting on, and considering the changing World Bank’s development policy 
and practices since the late 1970s, he teases out a concern with ‘good governance’ 
agenda as having originated out of the problems it experienced over the reified, 
mystified and unerring structural adjustment lending conditionality, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa (p.8 & 48). Whilst providing an account of the early years of the 
World Bank through to the 1990s, he also systematically relates the policies and prac-
tices as constructing a liberal political imaginary of the State as evidenced through 
‘good governance’ phenomenon (p.8). 
In dealing with the World Bank therefore especially in it lending to Ghana which 
became the dominant mode of relationship between external institutions of global 
governance and recipient States, he highlightes what the attempt to improve gov-
ernance and their associated rationalities look like in practice (p.12). These debates 
are inherently related to how Ghana became the explicit target of a huge variety of 
development programmes in World Bank’s policies (p.97). Thus, 1980s for example, 
neoliberal programmes of structural adjustment policies were designed by the World 
Bank as a response to the economic precariousness of many developing countries; a 
reality further exacerbated by the stresses and strains of neoliberal development and 
modalities (p.48). Ascribing the origins of the World Bank’s thinking in the noto-
rious Berg’s Report of 1981 report on the economic development crisis in African 
countries, Williams claims that its development is securely strapped to the landmark 
report on the crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. For Williams, the contradicted and the hal-
lucinatory effects of structural adjustment thoroughly animated the Bank’s concern 
with issues of global governance (1989). This in important ways was reflected in the 
increased role of non-state institutions as doubts on the pernicious reign of condi-
tional lending became evident. In its essential points Williams thesis is that the rise 
to prominence of the ‘good governance’ phenomenon introduced by the World Bank 
according to the Washington Consensus during the 1990s, was proposed as a pur-
ported panacea for underdevelopment and poverty. From the early 1990s, Williams 
observes, the liberal approach to social transformative agenda has increasingly shaped 
a new discourse of governance and aroused interest in the World Bank’s approach to 
global governance perspectives (p.6, 8, 15, 15, 47). But out of these very concerns and 
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tendencies, Williams shows that the more engaged state–economy interactions, was 
no longer analysed solely in terms of structural reform: “the good governance agenda 
... requires the construction of an intricate institutional framework to govern and 
encourage market-based economic transactions” (p.87). 
Williams also invoked the concept of civil society to illustrate the ways in which 
they have become key agencies in the context of reshaped, shifting forms, mechanisms 
and discourses of ‘global governance regime’ (p.19). In this reasoning, civil society as 
an expression of characteristically liberal political thought was socially engineered to 
hold the State accountable, democratic, scrutinise errant governments, and ultimately 
pressure the State to pursue economic development (p.18 &19). Civil society organ-
isations and institutions, we are continually informed, would also be a cohesive force 
for reconstructing and integrating the attitudes and behaviour of subjects within 
institutions and structures of transnational or external institutions of global gover-
nance as an important part of the more ambitious interventionist liberal project in 
the post- colonial world (Ibid). 
Using Ghana as an exemplary point of reference, Williams provides an exhaustive 
analysis of how the World Bank’s approach to neoliberal social transformation works 
out in practice; and how these are intimately connected with concrete forms of gov-
ernmental logics, rationalities, and technologies aimed to improve governance in the 
country. His analyses have been influential and also have explanatory power regard-
ing the dominant policy framing of interventionist agendas of the World Bank’s in 
respect of Ghana (and this applies reasonably to other developing countries). A par-
ticularly critical development has been the way various cases of World Bank’s inter-
ventions and bundle of practices aimed to improve governance have been foisted on 
the Ghanaian state to pursue certain policies and specific development models. And, 
to a large degree, these governmental interventions and policy prescriptions have 
been promoted by the construction of a variety of “institutional frameworks, regu-
latory practices, and imposition of brutal forms of economic discipline, accepted as 
international best practices” (p.119). In the case of Ghana, these are related to the 
privatisation and commercialisation of state-owned enterprises, public finance man-
agement, land administration, decentralisation and local government development, 
institutional development in the financial sector, development of micro and small 
enterprises, and civil-society building through community water and sanitation proj-
ects, rural development projects and literacy and functional skills projects. And in 
fact, when seen through the lens of governance tools and discourses, these kinds of 
programmes are not at all unique to Ghana— but they do illustrate how the more 
regulatory external interventionist approaches have become institutionalised and 
ligitimated and routinised part of contemporary international development to such 
an extent that “there is now not very much left of the idea of a sphere of “internal 
affairs” over which (these) governments have sole authority” (Williams, 2000, p.573). 
As Williams goes on to show, this has led to a hollowed out version of sovereignty in 
which the “IFIs are prepared to intervene in almost all aspects of economic, politi-
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cal, and social life... many governments are now no longer in effective control of the 
national economic project”(Ibid).
Williams’s analysis increasingly sketches the importance of the pervasiveness of 
World Bank activities as well as their intention to construct or reconstruct some form 
of supranational geopolitical imaginary of the State: the economy, civil society and the 
behaviour of individual citizens in Ghana as an expression of interventionist global 
liberal governance agenda (Sörensen, 2012). Most obviously, Williams’s findings inex-
orably point to the fact that the World Bank’s emphasis on liberal frameworks of gov-
ernance has trumped the sovereignty of post-colonial African states (p.32) so much so 
that one can hardly speak of these countries possessing de-facto independence in any 
meaningful sense. 
Sovereignty, in the liberal sense, is nothing more than the “freedom for the nation 
or society to pursue its ends without external control or intervention” (p.36). Wil-
liams conclusion with the World Bank’s interventions in the case study of Ghana 
addresses the question of exactly how it has produced “a wholesale disregard for the 
idea that there is a realm of internal affairs over which the government should be con-
sidered sovereign, and over which external agents, as a matter of principle and a mat-
ter of practice, should not have any authority. Sovereignty has lost its significance as 
an institution that structures relations between states like Ghana and outside agen-
cies…It is clear that sovereignty is no longer a guiding or constitutive norm in contem-
porary international politics, at least for a significant number of states (p.118). 
From a different perspective David Plank reaches similar conclusions to Williams 
regarding how ’‘increasingly overt and extensive intrusions by outside agencies into 
what had been viewed as the extensive purview of sovereign governments … (had) 
… thoroughly discredited traditional notions of sovereignty in many parts of Africa” 
(1993, p.407-30). In a similar vein to David Plank, Whitfield and Fraser build upon 
this, suggesting that sovereignty defines “a realm of political action free from foreign 
influence” (p.7).
What is most apparent is that the World Bank’s undisguised intrusiveness has 
ensured that government intervention even under crucial circumstances was outlawed. 
And so it is within this emerging global governance regime that William asserts that 
since 1990s, there has been normative shift in the way the territorial sovereignty of 
the world’s poorest states has been unnecessarily circumscribed, defied and severely 
compromised—as a political institution for which powerful western states and devel-
opment agencies are deeply implicated— and what’s more further simply erode the 
capacity of governments to enact and implement policy effectively. From this perspec-
tive, he stridently criticises the recent attempts to reform governance in developing 
countries and further suggests that they represent “the seemingly boundless arrogance 
of Western agencies who believe themselves to be in possession of truth about social 
life for everyone” (p.123). 
Graham Harrison’s The World Bank and Africa in making a fascinating contribu-
tion to this debate respectively argues that since the so-called African “crisis” or the 
African tragedy, virtually development practices in relation to the interventions of 
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external forces like the World Bank have demanded the rearrangement of the entire 
social body of post-colonial African states. Involved in the second phase of struc-
tural adjustment was a radical shift from promoting a “reduction in the scope of 
state action’ to an emphasis upon the ‘nature of state action” (Harrison, 2004, p.18). 
As Harrison mentions, constructing the state as an “embedding agent” and sover-
eign frontier’ (p.67) rather than a territorial trap is particularly relevant and useful 
for understanding the strategy and policy practices of an increasingly wide range of 
powerful international financial institutions as legitimising a global political economy 
with its own designs, various mechanisms and institutional arrangements for fixing 
the various development challenges posed by the African region. He reminds us that 
“governance states represent a manifestation of a grander and profoundly historical 
problematic: the politics of the encounter between the institutions of global capital-
ism and African nation-states” (p.6).
 Of greater concern is the way that “the concept of sovereignty necessarily posits 
a state of self-containment or inviolateness that exists before intervention…” (p.25). 
Harrison’s claim is that sovereignty is “…empirically too provisional and theoretically 
too contested’ to be of use in analysing Africa” (p.24-5). He supports the assertion 
that broad frameworks of development intervention by the World Bank incredibly 
blurs the distinction between state economy and state society boundaries to rearrange 
the entire social body between state and society, and society itself (Harrison, 2010, 
p.32): typical of liberal forms of governmentality. In this framing, Harrison clari-
fies that “external-national distinctions become less useful” (Harrison, 2001, p.657). 
The nature of the World Bank’s intricate, intrusive and detailed interventions in the 
sovereign frontier – appears to reveal much about the on-going attempts to instil a 
vastly expanded new global governance regime, discursive intervention, political and 
economic reforms, conditioned and routinely characterised by liberal norms and dis-
courses of government. For Harrison, as for Chang, “these days, there is virtually no 
area on which the Bank and the Fund do not have (often very strong) influence – 
democracy, judicial reform, corporate governance, health, education, and what not” 
(2006, p.24). 
It would seem that lurking in the background of this vision of the World Bank 
has been a never-ending list of “new” reforms, “benchmarks” and performance cri-
teria which amounts to a transformation of states (via “governance states”) and soci-
eties (through social engineering as “embedding neoliberalism”) into an “ideal” and 
stable type conforming the basic fantasies and values of neoliberal ideology in gen-
eral and the World Bank’s current development model in particular (Harrison, 2004, 
p.128). The argument is that the new intimate relationship is a product of the “ascen-
dance, or victory, of neoliberal fundamentals” (p.22) led by the World Bank’s proj-
ect to embed… neoliberal interventions in the sovereign frontier” (p.66). The result 
has been ‘internalised neoliberal reform’ (p.75). The implication, as a consequence of 
this is that we are left with the impression that such a project, initiatives, programmes 
and techniques necessarily lead to the presentation of “success stories” in a continent 
associated with belligerent regulatory reform failure. If anything, the history of devel-
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opment policy is replete with initiatives and programmes, which turned out to have 
several ambiguous or simply bad implications. Or it might be more accurate to say has 
led to obviously bad outcomes. In fact, as shown by Harrison, Mozambique, Uganda 
and Tanzania, who have become “star pupils” in the World Bank’s new good gover-
nance aid fad, have today shown signs of governance deterioration.
In Sub-Saharan Africa the upshot has been interventions by the World Bank 
that responds robustly and consistently to the more complex and diverse context 
of regional government structures. He pushed the argument further, arguing that 
“donor influence is certainly a reality, but it does not necessarily work against a state, 
and the state itself does not necessarily have any distinct opposition”. Moreover, in 
line with the problematic assertion that aid, as a particular form of external influence, 
affect policy autonomy of poor African States, Harrison makes the following state-
ment: “the donor-state relation is too intimate and interrelated to be understood as 
a dichotomy. Donors do not just impose conditionalities; they also work in a routin-
ized fashion at the centre of policy-making” (Harrison, 2001, p.670-671). 
The illuminating way with which Graham captures the complexity and the diver-
sity of the debate that situates recent interventions by the World Bank in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa within the context of regional government structures and patterns prompts 
consideration of the role of liberal techniques and rationalities and forms of govern-
ment within the international arena. As Neumann and Sending put it, “the mean-
ing and role of sovereignty are largely defined by governmental rationalities that now 
increasingly operate on the global level” (Neumann & Sending, 2010, p.6). What 
this analysis of ‘governance states’ in Africa by Graham Harrison productively does 
then is that it unmistakably provides some of the most robust critiques which in turn 
is intimately linked to the shaping of a new terrain of very visible and undisguised 
development intervention by the World Bank that has most evidently been informed 
by the emerging global governance regime. Hinging critically on ‘a profound global 
project of socio-political engineering’ and micro-management (2004, p.3), his case 
study on Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique, may insightfully serve as a fertile 
ground to probe the technocratic state institution building approach of an array of 
powerful external actors with the final objective of ensuring that agency of trans-
formation within various state ministries, departments and agencies ‘internalise’ the 
reform agenda (p.89 & 93). In this account, Graham’s key point is to claim that “aid 
technicians and high-level civil servants have articulated the language of international 
development into their own policymaking and discussions with external agency rep-
resentatives” (p.111). 
Importantly, however, critical perspectives while sympathetic to liberal interven-
tions in Africa points of challenging disagreement, differences, and varying empha-
sises. Whitfield and Fraser for instance pointed out that “even whilst arguing that 
sovereignty has been ‘lost’ claim ‘African governments almost always have a degree of 
choice over whether or not to accept aid from a particular source at a particular time” 
(p.27–44). Thus, like Whitefield and Fraser, Brown and Harman (2013) suggest that 
liberal rationalities of governing do rely upon and even foster various forms of African 
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agency; such a rationality of governing draws attention to active and even leading role 
of States. In the same manner, Brown strenuously rejects the predominant assump-
tion that African states sovereignty and self-governance have been unduly curtailed 
by development assistance, and strikingly reaches the conclusion that States are not 
only the central constitutive subjects of the international realm (Brown, 2013, p.3) 
but are also increasingly heavily endow with the autonomy with which to contest and 
engage in negotiations over the terms of aid relationships (Ibid). All in all, an impor-
tant consequence of the emergence of the so-called ‘governance states’ and the new 
emphasis on ‘governance with government’ has been an increasing intensification of 
deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of global politics: in that the discourse 
and practices of development have deproblematised, relegitimised and normalised the 
ever increasing interventions of a plethora of external actors in terms of addressing the 
development problems of aid-recipient countries through ambitious projects of social 
and political engineering. 
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored the theoretical “toolkit” and the conceptual key that 
will help to think through structural adjustment discourse as a form of a new ratio-
nality of governance. I have shown that while neoliberal narratives represent itself as 
an omnipresent, omnipotent, all-encompassing, or dominant ideological rhetoric, 
admittedly, justifiable to some degree in analysing international economic relations 
and global governance, it can be viewed as imprecise and ineffective as exemplified by 
Hayekian economic rationalism and “Freidmanaic” monetarism. Foucault’s rendition 
of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality distinctly differ from most prevalent 
conceptualisations that merely reduce neoliberalism to a set of a radically free markets 
policies or to the eulogists of the Marxian tradition readings that define it as a class 
or hegemonic project (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; 2011; Harvey, 2005; 2009; Castree, 
2009, my emphasis). These referents inadvertently failed to capture the political ratio-
nality that both undergirds these policies and reaches beyond the market. And so, it 
seems entirely plausible to assert that not only is neoliberalism through the lens of 
Foucault complex, nuanced and innovative and so too is it that it powerfully offers a 
point of departure which has emerged as transmutations of liberalism in our contem-
porary times.
I have dealt with one of the crucial elements of Foucault’s analytics of governmen-
tality, namely the ways in which governmentality functions as a specific form of power 
and how we cannot isolate power relations from the resistant and contestations ele-
ments that incessantly saturate them. I have clarified how a governmentality approach 
contributes to understanding regulatory, technologies, object-subject formation more 
classically conceived as crystallised and rearticulated in a historically different matrix 
of governmental rationalities and strategies. And yet simultaneously reproduce con-
testable, seemingly heterogeneous and unstable forms of power. Here my preoccupa-
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tion however, is on Foucault’s analysis of manifestations of power relations working 
through technologies of the self and the processes of subjectification this involves 
rather than techniques of domination (Foucault, 1994, p.340-345; 1991, p.261-266).
Foucault’s analysis of power proves particularly helpful in appreciating the tech-
nologies of power at play in international economic governance which regulate these 
relationships. Going beyond Foucault’s allegedly Eurocentric analysis of inter-states 
governmentalities, I propose how we could examine the realm of supranational insti-
tutions where political power at the international and inter-state forms have deeply 
enmeshed and tangled up with each other to structure the policies that are con-
structed and implemented by these institutions — the Bank and Fund (not discussed 
by Foucault). I intend to show by empirical analysis how Ghanaian Structural Adjust-
ment Policies were resisted, subverted and countered not by being explicitly “against” 
(Helle, 2012) but on the logics of “ownership” through simulation of home grown 
policies, so to say (Ibid). Or put slightly differently, at a point where technologies of 
the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination. At its best as Fou-
cault (1997, p. 45) shows, “the art of not being governed quite so much”. Yet I do not 
in the least deny that the repressive and dominant forms of power incarnated by SAPs 
were completely absent. Quite the contrary.
I have a paid particular attention to American “Anarcho-liberalism” and German 
neoliberalism through a thorough recasting and reconstruction of Foucault’s concept 
of biopolitics and crucially, how they chime with many contemporary global gover-
nance concerns that involve us. It seems to me that this analysis has several insights 
which bring into sharp focus new ways of critically rethinking about exercise of gov-
ernment. Above all else, as we will see in the coming chapters, I will utilise neolib-
eralism as governmentality to maximum effect to interrogate the emergence of the 
ideologically arrogant policy measures that were undemocratically forced on African 
debtor states in the 1980s and early 1990s by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank incarnated by structural adjustment policies (the emergence of the 
doctrine of conditionality) which functions as a regulatory instrument — how it was 
developed, deployed and articulated as a neoliberal governmental technology of eco-
nomic governance to structure, restructure, code and recode the behaviour of African 
debtor states: through the production of a market willing, self-regulating, competi-
tive and entrepreneurial form of subjectivities (Weidner, 2013) by shaping its aspira-
tions and promoting specific norms of conduct and explicit policy-related techniques 
(Li, 2007, my emphasis). And indeed, it is within this context that I take a profound 
exception to Ferguson’s (2010, p.273) insistence that “neo-liberalism-as-rationality” 
does not apply to Africa as not only grossly misconceived but also profoundly unac-
ceptable and manifestly not borne out of reality: the coming chapters however, exam-
ine to what extent this claim holds.
I have attempted to demonstrate how the appropriation of Michel Foucault’s 
thoughts on governmentality has had considerable imprint on the opening and criti-
cal reinterpretation of IR theory by presenting a selection of rich contributions to the 
discipline that has been inspired by his scholarship. Of particular interest, for this 
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project is the impact of these contributions on policy intervention and problematic 
forms of governance agenda of the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s, 
aimed at developing the situation in Ghana: those of liberal ‘governmentality’ and 
of liberal ‘biopolitics’. My approach will help to critically map out the fact that gov-
ernmental technologies and rationalities emerging from structural adjustment regime 
proselytised and operationalised by the IMF and the World Bank in the case of Ghana 
in fact, neatly fit the prevalent understandings of neoliberal modes of governance.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Neoliberalism:  
The Emergence of a Dominant Paradigm?
5.1 Introduction
What I hope to do in this part of the thesis is to first present and discuss thoroughly 
a set of political and economic ideas commonly called neoliberalism. The linchpin 
of the neoliberal dogmatic theology is the idea that basically recommends that the 
market mechanism should primarily be allowed to make major social and political 
decisions —the belief that the involvement of the state in the economy should and 
must voluntarily “roll-back”, ostensibly to ensure individual freedom or economic 
efficiency—and some of the pronounced confusions and remarkable disagreements 
which have become emblematic with the definition of neoliberalism. While recent 
scholarship has sufficiently provided sound starting point to approach neoliberalism 
as theoretically and conceptually elusive, I am a bit hesitant and ill at ease to blin-
dingly join the bandwagon or this tradition. My main point is that inasmuch as I rec-
ognise the polycentric and multiscalar nature of neoliberalism, the simple fact of the 
matter is that it is fruitless to engage in polemics surrounding neoliberalism for the 
same reason, before I try to make some sense of the popular narratives about neoliber-
alism. This does not in any way mean that it is not worth pursuing. However, central 
to the analysis of this thesis is a shift from the existing critical literature that frames 
neoliberalism through it’s “homeostatic” (Reid, 2013, p.108-109) narratives which as 
I see it is overwritten and stale.
 Following on from the above, I will try to present some more detailed outlines of 
neoliberalism’s rise and changing context and to be more specific, how it has been 
effected and legitimated in spite of its apparent incongruence. Ultimately, I argue that 
locating neoliberalism within its crisis of legitimacy will conceivably make it easily 
distinguishable and powerfully enable us to critically consider how the project that 
was discursively supposed to represent an extremely progressive agenda for change has 
conversely become utterly retrogressive in its disciplinary force.
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5.2 The Concept of Neoliberalism
In recent years, neoliberalism has commonly been conceived as an alternative label 
which has come to irreversibly alter the uncanny relations between market and the 
state. Broadly speaking then, it is typically viewed as a policy agenda, mode of gov-
ernance or ideology that favours the market over the state (Steger & Roy, 2010). Or, 
to put it another way, it has become a byword where market has been highly patron-
ised against the state (Plehwe, Walpen; & Neunhöffer, 2005). More specifically, it is 
basically saying how market has infiltrated politics and government as the be-all and 
end-all and in its wake has immensely displaced the state and to borrow a wonderful 
phrase by Bourdieu (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009), has become the “pensée unique” of 
our times (Bourdieu, 1998) which is apparently not in dispute. Ong (2006), states 
that it has become a project of an economic tsunamic market reforms and class rule. 
Rachel Turner shows how “markets for neo-liberals, have become “sacrosanct to the 
functioning of the economy” and is now “part of the natural spontaneous order of 
civilised values and mutual cooperation that sustains capitalism” (Turner, 2008, p.24).
Rachel Turner (2008, p.26), further explains:
Neo-liberals advocate that the liberal state should be strong but minimal: it 
should embody political authority but at the same time be constitutionally lim-
ited. Its roles and responsibilities should be determined by the public interest. 
Neo-liberalism has modified the principles of pure laissez-faire so as to afford 
the state the primary responsibilities of securing law and order, providing pub-
lic goods and preserving the constitutional rules that safeguard the market 
order.
Preston (1997, p.256), concurs when he states that:
Their central claim is that the free-market capitalist system is maximally effec-
tive in producing and equitably distributing the economic, social, political and 
intellectual necessities of life in a developed society. The free market comprises 
of atomistic rational individuals who know their needs and wants and who 
contract with other individuals through the mechanism of the marketplace to 
satisfy those needs and wants. Based on classical methodological individualist 
notions, neo-liberal theorists argue that these needs and wants motivate self-
interested actions. Consequently, self-interested individuals active on a free 
market within and beyond their national boundaries become the most com-
petent agents of development because the free market is able to enhance their 
economic status and that of their nations as a whole. The state must therefore 
retreat from management of the economy. Its legitimate role is only to provide 
a basic legal and security system to underpin the individual contractual pursuit 
of private goals. According to this school, this model represents the essential 
character of all human economic activity in society. (Preston, 1997, p.256)
98 | Amo-Agyemang: Understanding Neoliberalism as Governmentality
Similarly, Stallings provides a wonderful rationalisation of the shifting remits of the 
state thus:
Two major policy measures were advocated in furtherance of the retreat of the 
state. The first concerns reducing the state’s role in the economy. To achieve 
this deregulation and privatisation of state assets were prescribed. This required 
the liberalisation of the market typified by reduction in government planning 
and regulation of economy, and the abolition of tariff regimes, a more hospi-
table approach to foreign investment regulations and curbing of trade unions. 
The second measure was the achievement of macroeconomic stability. This 
required a state reducing its fiscal deficits, and this could be done by the abo-
lition of various subsidies, restriction of government spending especially on 
social services. (1995, p.12). 
Fundamentally, neoliberalism holds that government interference is a total waste and 
misuse of resources (Edwards, 2002, p.38, 42, 43, 45, 78; Hill, 1996, p.98). More 
putatively, the term neoliberalism has come to represent in the view of some politi-
cal theorists “a lamentable spread of global capitalism and consumerism, as well as 
an equally deplorable demolition of the proactive welfare state in Western Europe, 
and most prominently, the political theories used to justify these changes” (Bourdieu, 
1998; 1998a; 2001; Chomsky, 1999; Touraine 2001; Harvey, 2005; Hermansen, 
2005; Saad Filho & Johnston, 2005; Hagen, 2006; Plehwe et al., 2006; Garbo, 2008; 
Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Steger & Roy, 2010; Nilsen & Smedshaug, 2011).
5.3 Neoliberalism: An Incongruent Concept?
Paradoxically, it is somewhat difficult to disengage neoliberalism if indeed one 
wants to know the reification of the politics of market in the contemporary political 
thought. Consequently, practically it also seems quite inevitable to refer to neoliberal-
ism without getting bogged down or mired in the deepening labyrinth of an unneces-
sary and avoidable controversy and arguments (Moslet, 1984; Fogh Rasmussen, 1993; 
Norberg & Bejke, 1994; Norberg, 2001; 2003; Hartwich, 2009). The reason is not 
far-fetched. Neoliberalism has proven to be both conceptually and theoretically elu-
sive and ambiguous in terms of its definition (Hartwich, 2009; Turner, 2008). Peck 
(2010, p.13), in describing how contradictory, overloaded and elusive neoliberalism 
has become writes:
Crisply unambiguous, essentialist definitions of neoliberalism have proved to 
be incredibly elusive. … It would be (wrong) to reduce neoliberalism to some 
singular essence… (because) it is contradictory and polymorphic.
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Rachel. S. Turner (2008, p. 2), has advanced similar arguments thus “neo-liberalism 
is a term that has come to be used with a lack of precision in contemporary politi-
cal debates. What it stands for and what it explains is both confused and confusing” 
(Turner, 2008). Jessop (2001), has also equally weighed in on the question of the 
unwieldy nature of neoliberalism, building upon the idea that “neoliberalism” itself 
has become an “increasingly popular but confusingly polyvalent concept”. Strident 
critics such as (Mudge, 2008), describes it as “an oft-invoked but ill- defined con-
cept”. In the view of Brenner et al., (2009, p.2), neoliberalism seriously suffers from 
“a perplexing mix of overreach and underspecification”. Even though neoliberalism 
has become “omnipresent and promiscuous” (Clarke, 2008) and yet it’s meaning and 
understanding “seems to alter its shape from paper to paper” (Castree, 2006). The first 
step in addressing these dilemmas is to acknowledge that “the process of neoliberaliza-
tion . . .is neither monolithic in form nor universal in effect”(Peck & Tickell, 2002, 
p.384).
As Reid (2013, p.108-109) quite rightly emphasises, neoliberalism “is not a homo-
geneous nor are its particular forms of dogmatism homoestatic”. That is to say, neolib-
eralism has no monolithic pattern and it is an ill-defined concept or more precisely, it 
cannot be defined in an unequivocal way. McCarthy and Prudham, (2004) corrobo-
rate this line of argument by asserting that neoliberalism is too nebulous and fuzzy 
to determine and further maintain that it is very difficult if not impossible to define. 
Ha-Joon Chang describes neoliberalism as “born out of an unholy alliance between 
neoclassical economics and the Austrian-Libertarian tradition” (Chang, 2003, p.47), 
while James Ferguson describes how: “perhaps in the strictest sense, neoliberalism 
refers to a macroeconomic doctrine” (Ferguson, 2010, p.170). Accordingly, in many 
contexts it is left literally undefined, assuming that the audience knows what it entails 
(Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). For instance, some accounts of neoliberalism such as 
those put forward by Susan Watkins and David Harvey present it as an all-encom-
passing hegemonic ideology, without specifically defining what the term “neo-liberal-
ism” really stands for (Susan, 2004; Harvey, 2005). Also, regardless of the voluminous 
scholarship on neoliberalism, the problems related to understanding what we mean 
by neoliberalism have hardly been resolved —at least not in a way that would be com-
monly agreed by the scholars involved.
The matter is not helped, either, as for instance, more recently, anthropologists 
Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff Maskovsky in their review (2008, p.123), cynically, 
confessed a temptation “to abandon the term altogether “and they are not alone. Bar-
nett (2010) also holds the same unfortunate view when he notes that there is no such 
thing as neoliberalism. In any event, apart from neoliberal incoherence and contradic-
tions, what is even more than problematic is that it is conflated and deployed under 
different phenomena within a common rubric. Equally, James Ferguson (2010, p.170) 
maintains that “there is (now) huge variation in the way the word “neoliberalism” is 
used in contemporary scholarship”. And yet, perhaps curiously, despite the fact that 
neoliberalism is polysemous and has myriad referents, there is a fairly consistent man-
ner in which academic analysts at least commonly agreed on one key element which 
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gives it distinctive character; that is how overwhelmingly the state’s sovereignty has 
surrendered—which invariably means that differences among academic analysts in 
finding a proper semantic content and structure for neoliberalism seems to me is a 
matter of degree and not nature.
Indeed, as Rachel Turner notes:
However, regardless of these differences in interpretation and “lack of consen-
sus in defining neoliberalism” (Springer, 2012, p.135), two themes emerge: the 
importance of guiding policy by a clear and credible set of rules determined 
by the market order, and the importance of keeping in check monopolistic, 
regulatory and bureaucratic forces which hamper the spontaneous order of the 
market and economic growth. These two themes are at the core of the neo-lib-
eral ideology espoused by Ludwig von Mises, F. A. Hayek and others”. (Turner, 
2008, p.116)
It can thus be said that these strikingly different patterns of definitions are pertinent 
in understanding how “homoeostatic” (Reid, 2013, p.108-109) neoliberalism has 
become, theoretically and conceptually. To be clear as possible, my intention here is 
not to take issues with the already existing popular narratives on neoliberalism in an 
attempt to proffer a grand alternative definition or argument that addresses its elu-
siveness, ambiguities and complexities or to dabble in sterile speculation which is 
quite certainly overdue and moot and may amount to a futile endeavour as “pure” 
neoliberalism does not exist and that to attempt a grand narrative is pointless: neolib-
eralism’s development throughout the last few decades of the twentieth century has 
been fraught with theoretical tensions arising from conflicting schools of thought and 
practical tensions resulting from its implementation in a variety of contexts, making it 
a “complex and varied ideology”(Turner, 2007, p.5). And I am not also by this I has-
ten to add, in the least suggesting that there cannot be a priori definition for neolib-
eralism. Far from it, but rather to make a case that why neoliberalism seemingly does 
not lend itself to precise definition is to a large extent our poverty to appreciate and 
grasp the distinguishing feature of neoliberalism as constituting at its core, a discur-
sive politics of market which is glaringly missing from the perspectives of the research 
of this tradition. As such, neoliberalism significantly does not readily lend itself to 
any identifiable political ideology, but at best a complex ideological system (Turner, 
2008). Concomitant to this is neoliberalism’s discursive nature as a political project 
(Achterhuis, 2010).
 At a fundamental level, I would argue that one of the obvious way to appreci-
ate and grasp the discursive qualities and elements of neoliberalism is to re-read 
the original text of the key neoliberal theorists which involves extrapolating from 
the text deeper meaning and interpretations and contextualising the circumstances 
under which such ideas tentatively emerged in order to revitalise critical approaches 
(Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) “to counter problematic notions of neoliberalism as an 
unstoppable force”(Springer, 2012, p.135). In this regard, by surveying the histori-
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cal conjecture, trajectories and contours of neoliberalism through the works of key 
neoliberal theorists its “polysemous”, “homeostatic” and “polyvalent” nature could be 
somewhat rendered understandable, knowable and simplified. The second and the 
most important would be to see neoliberalism as coherently articulating discursively 
a new grander vision of government. My task in this thesis is to show how Foucault’s 
philosophical account of neoliberalism is useful in deciphering the discursive politics 
of market in what he terms a dramatically new political rationality. Foucault’s notion 
on governmentality, I contend without any equivocation, is key and distinctive in 
deciphering the so-called challenge posed by neoliberalism. Foucault’s thoughts on 
governmentality I claim again is apt, instrumental and offers a matured understanding 
in helping to elucidate, re-evaluate, explicate and reconceptualise neoliberalism, the 
philosophy consistently extol by the Washington-based institutions as the best alter-
native to economic development.
5.4 Neoliberalism: Standard Narratives 
As I have already alluded to above, until now it is difficult to discern a clear and easy 
definition for neoliberalism despite the flurry of academic interest it has generated, 
provoked and a lot of seminal work done by many academic heavy weights. Put very 
differently, as dominant as the concept of neoliberalism has become for classical polit-
ical thought, public intellectuals and for policy makers more generally, it is intrigu-
ingly somewhat difficult to define. “There almost appears to be an inverse relationship 
between the volume of scholarship produced on neoliberalism and the agreement 
over exactly what it means” (Ward & England, 2007). However, following the eco-
nomic sociologist Stephanie Mudge (2008), I am compelled to ask “what is neoliber-
alism” for there are a lot of compelling reasons to reconsider and rethink the relevance 
of the term neoliberalism, rather than to leave it behind (Mains, 2012; Kipnis, 2007; 
Goldstein, 2012).
Over the past 30 years or so, neoliberalism has been defined in a variety of dif-
ferent ways and from different perspectives. David Harvey in his touchstone book, 
A Brief History of Neoliberalism, offers an elegant and an all-encompassing defini-
tion of neoliberalism. Harvey’s definition presents a concise and precise synthesis of 
all the explanatory theories of neoliberalism and simultaneously gives an overview of 
all the salient features investigated. David Harvey agrees that neoliberalism is heavily 
inflected with class politics, and offers the following touchstone definition: 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political-economic practices 
that propose that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating indi-
vidual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The 
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropri-
ate for such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and 
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integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal 
structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guar-
antee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if 
markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social 
security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created by state action 
if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State inter-
ventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, 
according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information 
to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups 
will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) 
for their own benefit .(2005, p.2)
Four distinctly yet overlapping features emerge from Harvey’s definition: privatisation, 
financialisation, the management and manipulation of crisis, and state redistributions. 
The underlying assumption is that public assets are to be corporatised, commoditised 
and privatised within the orbit of neoliberal project. Public utilities such as water, 
telecommunications, transportation), social welfare provisions (social housing, educa-
tion, health care, pensions), public institutions (such as universities, research laborato-
ries, prisons) and even warfare have all been privatised to some degree throughout the 
capitalist world (p.44).
According to Mitchell:
As a political philosophy of governance, neoliberalism is an on-going forma-
tion with different moments and sites in its evolutionary trajectory. Although 
it is articulated and implemented in different ways depending on the context, 
most scholars across disciplines concur that it is a philosophy premised on a 
mantra of market rationality and on the active encouragement of laissez-faire 
economic systems worldwide. (2004, p. 389)
Palley argues just as Mitchell that “contemporary Neoliberalism…emphasises the effi-
ciency of market competition, the role of individuals in determining economic out-
comes, and distortions associated with government intervention and regulation of 
markets” (2005, p.20). Sewpaul and Holscher observe it is:
an increasingly undisputed primacy of economic over other forms of rational-
ity, where complex political, social and cultural constellations seem to have 
been reduced to economic issues, where policy decisions appear to make very 
little sense unless they make economic sense, and where the concept of welfare 
seems to have been reduced to the limited version of economic welfare. (2004, 
p.3-4)
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Neoliberalism as explained by Saad-Filho and Johnston further elaborates more fully 
the above outlined definitions by identifying neoliberalism as “part of a hegemonic 
project concentrating power and wealth in elite groups around the world, benefit-
ing especially the financial interests within each country, and US capital internation-
ally”(2005, p.1). To them, neoliberalism is an ideological project for the restoration of 
naked class power (2005) and a mechanism “which has evolved to protect capital(ism) 
and to reduce the power of labour” (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005, p.3) and also add 
that “it is not difficult to recognize the beast when it trespasses into new territories, 
tramples upon the poor, undermines rights and entitlements, and defeats resistance 
through a combination of domestic political, economic, legal, ideological and media 
pressures, backed up by international blackmail and military force if necessary”(2005, 
p.2). In this context, Saad-Filho and Johnston largely see neoliberalism as a project of 
authoritarian capital.
In their attempt to define neoliberalism, Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007) 
define neoliberalism from four overlapping vantage points; viz, neoliberalism (1) as 
an ideological hegemonic project, (2) as policy and program, (3) as a state form, and 
(4) as governmentality:
the places and the peoples behind its origins that are involved in its apparent 
uptake in geographically discrete but socially connected parts of the world. In 
this work political (and indeed cultural) dominance is exercised through the 
formation of class-based alliances — elite actors, institutions, and other repre-
sentatives of capital — at a variety of spatial scales, who produce and circulate a 
coherent program of ideas and images about the world, its problems, informed 
by gendered and racialised power hierarchies. (England & Ward, 2007, p.11)
Firstly, the central idea is that neoliberalism as a hegemonic ideology drives particu-
lar forms of programmes which are collusively rationalised, proselytised and operation-
alised by elite actors and dominant groups organized around transnational class-based 
alliances in which states are unwilling accomplices. Second, the understanding of neo-
liberalism as a policy and programmes means the transfer of ownership from public 
to the private sector through privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation (Brenner 
& Theodore, 2002; Klepeis & Vance, 2003; Martinez & Garcia, 2000). The policy 
discourse uses the freedom of the market, public choice, competition, and efficient 
management as the logic underpinning policy change. To this end, both national and 
international policy actors are intimately involved in espousing the policy shift to neo-
liberalism (England & Ward, 2007). Third, neoliberalism as a state form means the 
emasculation of the state in terms of it economic role, where there is a reformulation, 
construction and reconstruction — indeed, the “redrawing the boundary between 
civil society, market, and state” (p.12) where “economic management systems, and 
invasive social agendas centered on urban order, surveillance, immigration issues, and 
policing”(Simon, 2012, p.137) are effectively “rolled out” (Peck, 2001; Peck & Tick-
ell, 2002).
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The fourth dimension of neoliberalism is a mode of governance what Michel 
Foucault tellingly refers to as governmentalities which articulate a new grander 
vision of government rooted firmly in entrepreneurial values where the individual is 
responsibilised,(re)imagined, (re)interpreted and (re)assembled to influence forms of 
knowledge through the conduct of conduct (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996; Brown, 
2003; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Larner, 2003; Lemke, 2002) or to manage his or her 
affairs with minimal state interference. Corollary to this is Bob Jessop (2002a) expla-
nation of neoliberalism as the hegemonic ideology at the global level. According to 
Jessop,
The resurgence of liberalism in the form of neoliberalism is often attributed 
to a successful hegemonic project voicing the interests of financial and/or 
transnational capital. Its recent hegemony in neoliberal regimes undoubtedly 
depends on the successful exercise of political, intellectual, and moral leader-
ship in response to the crisis of Atlantic Fordism– a crisis that the rise of neo-
liberalism and neoliberal policies has exacerbated. ( Jessop, 2002a, p.455)
Globally neoliberalism as a hegemony has enabled powerful multinational corpo-
rations say International Monetary Fund and the world Bank and other influential 
policy institutions like Cato institute to rationalise and proselyte neoliberal agenda in 
the form of adjustments policies among others since 1990s ( Jessop, 2002a). Jessop’s 
explanation significantly accentuates the Marxian-inspired literature by situating neo-
colonial domination and dependency appropriately within the international rather 
than internal analytical frame given that market reforms across the globe are associ-
ated with the external imposition by powerful global actors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Peet, 2003).
Similarly, Martinez and Garcia (2000), poignantly showcase neoliberalism as: a 
set of economic policies that have become widespread during the last 25 years or so. 
Although the word is rarely heard in the United States, you can clearly see the effects 
of neoliberalism here as the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer ... Around 
the world, neoliberalism has been imposed by powerful financial institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank ... The capitalist crisis over the last 25 years, with its shrinking profit 
rates, inspired the corporate elite to revive economic liberalism. That’s what makes it 
“neo” or new (cited in Ross & Gibson, 2007, p.12).
Prechel and Harms in their seminal study (2007) beautifully identify five processes 
of neoliberalism: ... expand markets by eliminating government policies interfering 
with markets, cut taxes to simultaneously reduce the resources of inefficient govern-
ment and channel them to private investors for capital formation, privatize by selling 
public properties to private economic actors, commodify things that were not origi-
nally produced to be exchanged in the market (e.g., health, education, pollution), and 
eliminate social programs to establish personal responsibility (p.5).
Farahamandpur (2005), succinctly define neoliberalism as:
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a corporate domination of society that supports state enforcement of the unreg-
ulated market, engages in the oppression of nonmarket forces and anti-market 
policies, guts free public services, eliminates social subsidies, offers limitless 
concessions to transnational corporations, enthrones a neo-mercantilist public 
policy agenda, establishes the market as the patron of educational reform, and 
permits private interests to control most of social life in the pursuit of profits 
for the few ... It is undeniably one of the most dangerous politics that we face 
today. (as cited in Kumar, 2009, p.146)
Dean (1999), no less sees neoliberalism as:
problematization of the welfare state and its features of bureaucracy, rigidity 
and dependency formation. They recommend the reform of the individual and 
institutional conduct so that it becomes more competitive and efficient. They 
seek to affect this reform by the extension of market rationality to all spheres, 
by the focus on choices of individuals and collectives and by the establishment 
of a culture of enterprises and responsible autonomy. (p.268)
As Dean writes, under neo-liberalism, the role of the state to provide welfare services 
has been grossly insignificant and limited while the market now forms the basis for 
regulating the economic and social activity.
5.5 The Meteoric Rise of Neoliberalism as Development Orthodoxy
In order to appreciate neoliberalism as a dominant ideological construct, it requires a 
critical appraisal of its recent developments within the broader contemporary politi-
cal discourse. Over the last three decades, the rise of neoliberalism has been steady 
and its monumental impact can readily be observed in every fabric of our social 
endervour. The neoliberal theorists choice for economic liberalism is that this is the 
only surest way to ensure efficiency, sustained growth and human freedom as people 
are able to engage in transactions voluntarily and in their own interest without any 
let or hindrance (Bell & Head, 1997, p.34; Foldvary, 1998, p.145, Harvey, 2005, p.2; 
Hodgson, 2005, p.548; Slaughter, 2005, p.35 & 39; Friedman, 1962; Bauer, 1981; 
Lal, 1983; Layard, 2005). Milton Friedman (1990) states:
In a free world, as in a free market economy in any one country, transactions 
take place among private entities—individuals, business enterprises, charitable 
organisations. The terms at which any transactions take place are agreed on by 
all parties to that transaction. The transaction will not take place until all par-
ties believe benefit from it. As a result, the interests of the various parties are 
harmonized. Co-operation, not conflict is the rule. (p.51)
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Neoliberal economic thought and its attendant modes of governance gained promi-
nence and momentum in the 1980s as a reaction to the crisis of the welfare state and 
post-war Keynesian Consensus on the goals of macroeconomic policy (primarily full 
employment and has since come to dominate the global economic system (Gamble, 
2006, p.22; Harvey, 2005, p.20-21). It was first put forth and popularised by the right 
wing economists who took their inspiration from classical liberal political economy 
scholars such as Adam smith. It is worth highlighting that neoliberalism triumphed 
largely because of the economic crisis that resulted from the adoption of Keynesian 
developmentalism in the aftermath of World War two. In other words, the widespread 
problems associated with Keynesian fiscal policy of nineteenth century marks the 
resurgence of liberal thought as the guiding rationality for governing (Hartwick & 
Peet). The Keynesian model was essentially a model of the management of the national 
economy by the state (Amin & Malmberg, 1994, p.242). Keynesianism profoundly 
emphasised the interventionist role of the state in the macroeconomic management 
of the national economy (Eatwell et al., 1987, p.47; Quiggin, 1997, p.9). Although 
the Keynesian model to a certain extent succeeded in achieving some macroeconomic 
stability through increases in aggregate demand and public sector led employment 
generation, this however, was ephemeral. The oil crisis of the 1970s created economic 
shocks that worsened the macroeconomic positions of most countries both the global 
North and South respectively (Castell & Henderson, 2005, p.29; Slaughter, 2005, 
p.27; Turner, 2006, p.96).
The neoliberal agenda was given its first experiment in 1973 as a mode of gover-
nance in the small Southeast Asian country of Cambodia. Indeed, the infamous 
military putsch of dictator General Augusto Pinochet that ousted the leftist demo-
cratically elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973 was reprehensibly orches-
trasted by the United States backed troops (Davidson Hardson & Schugurnsky, 
2009; Klein, 2007). The overthrow of Salvador Allende was followed by a variety of 
market friendly measures, such as the deregulation and liberalisation of markets or 
the privatisation of formerly state run introduced by General Pinochet through the 
recommendations of the “Chicago trained boys” with unquestioned loyalty to Mil-
ton Friedman and his disciples, who “equated free market with social and political 
freedom” (Klein, 2007). These unfettered marketisation policies recommended by the 
“Chicago trained boys” were implemented literally at the point of gun (Harvey, 2005; 
Davidson Hardson & Schugurnsky, 2009, p.13; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb; 2002; 
Klein, 2007; Valdés, 1995). As Boas and Gans-Morse (2009, p.150), elegantly put it: 
“Pinochet’s 1973 coup emerges as something of a watershed in usage of neoliberal-
ism”, “as the United States Department, several large American corporations, and the 
Ford Foundation introduced varying degrees of neoliberal academic programmes in 
Latin America, such as the “Chile Project “ which effectively helped to train Chilean 
economic students strictly in line with free market principles (Steger & Roy, 2010, 
p.100). And this was to be the pattern throughout Latin America. The Argentina 
military junta that illegally captured power from the democratically elected govern-
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ment in 1976, just like the Chilean example, also maintained a close alliance with the 
“Chicago Boys” (Valdes, 1995).
The fall of the military regime and subsequent economic changes provoked a new 
form of neoliberal economic policies such as deregulation measures in order to pro-
mote trade and privatise the state owned industries — the national oil company, the 
post office, and public utilities, for example (ibid). Market oriented ideology received 
its boost and boom in Southeast Asia, in the early 1990s where Deng Xiaoping, the 
Chinese President, had already taken realistic and pragmatic steps to liberalise the 
communist-ruled economy in 1978 (Harvey, 2005; Oksala, 2013). He offered an eco-
nomic paradigm shift, state socialism cum-market, leading to efficiency, productivity 
and competitiveness. At the heart of Deng’s regime was privatisation of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and dramatic economic restructuring. Hence, the gap between 
urban and rural workers increased steadily in China as a result of massive economic 
restructuring. Exchange rates were liberalised whilst State Owned Enterprises were 
open up to foreign ownership “in order to increase the competitiveness of its global 
exports” (Steger & Roy, 2010, p.87).
Among other things, the election of Britain‘s Margaret Thatcher and America‘s 
Ronald Reagan in 1979 and 1981 respectively changed the face of international rela-
tions vis-à-vis the role of the state as these leaders were neoliberal ideologues (Rick, 
2009; Elmar, 2009) whose ascendency to power culminated in the adoption of aus-
terity measures and severe market economic and liberal political reforms (Harvey, 
2007). These conservative governments “dismantled their welfare states in response to 
the global economic crisis of the 1970’s, the rising costs of labor in Europe and USA, 
and the rapid development of capitalism in newly industrialised countries (NICs) of 
Asia that led to increased competition, reduced profit rate, and the crises of overpro-
duction” (Ekanade Olumide, 2014, p.15). For instance, Margaret Thatcher, the then 
Prime Minister of Britain justified this on “there is no alternative” (TINA) to neolib-
eral reforms mantra. In her quest (Thatcher) to solve the stagflation that has charac-
terised the British economy she sought refuge in neoliberal development project in 
line with Hayek and Friedman’s political and economic discourse (Friedman, 2000, 
p.104-105; Harvey, 2005, p.22).
Indeed Thatcher was adept in brutally promoting what Harvey terms a “seductive 
possessive individualism” which “forged consent through the cultivation of a middle 
class that relished the joys of homeownership, private property, individualism, and the 
liberation of entrepreneurial opportunities” (Harvey, 2005, p.21). Roberts and Peters 
(2008, p.14), argue that Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1981), placed heavy emphasis 
on economic policies based on “free” trade and established the “open” market during 
1980s. However, Kotz, notes that in as much as these measures might have largely 
“helped to bring back some stability into the British and American economies; they 
also caused serious fundamental shifts in the structure of these economies as well as 
class relations in the various societies” (Kotz, 2010, p.10). For example, “one of the 
fallouts of those (neo-liberal) reforms was the preference of financialisation over man-
ufacturing” (p.11).
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Moreover, the assumption of power of these ideologues particularly in their unre-
pentant pursuit of monetarism characteristically marked the consequential dominant 
outlook of the former Keynes’s twins: the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank as these two key institutions unabashedly shed their Keynesian toga and cosily 
embraced monetarist principles (Nwoke, 1994).
As well, in the 1980s and 1990s, economic reforms packages were blindly imposed 
by the triumvirate of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United 
States Treasury through sdtructural adjustment processes upon an unwilling and 
vulnerable “Third World” in the naïve belief that it is the most efficient way of solv-
ing global economic problems (Kawachi & Wamala, 2007, p.6; Harvey, 2005, p.93). 
Thus, the involvement of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
was deemed “ as conspiratorial centers and quasi universal, thought police” for the 
propagation and enforcement of ” (Oskala, 2013, p.56, my emphasis) “free market 
fundamentalism” and “neoliberal orthodoxy” (Harvey, 2005, p.21) — “forms of ide-
ology with highly questionable scientific rigor”. This unprecedented involvement of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in world economy marked 
the beginning of suffocating loan conditions which excercabated the economic situa-
tion of developing counties .Thus, the rallying cry which was presupposed to improve 
the developing countries access to global finance capital was to free the market from 
unnecessary governmental interventions. To ensure economic growth and develop-
ment, the basic neoliberal policy must religiously be followed by rich and poor coun-
tries alike. The indiscriminate and blanket imposition of privatisation and structural 
adjustment agenda across the globe whether in Africa, Asia, Latin America or post-
communist Europe have led to declining economic activity and social dislocation on a 
massive scale unbeknown in the history of the world (Klein, 2007).
As Shamsul Haque (1999, p.197-218), interestingly shows, these neoliberal ideas 
face intractable problems and have abysmally failed to live up to expectation. Neolib-
eral cult policies have ineluctably plunged counties into havoc and depression with 
calamitous consequences in the face of crunching misery and abject poverty in the 
poor countries with it attendant gaping gulf between the rich and poor in the rich 
countries (Klein, 2007). These developments adumbrated above, not least have been 
ascribed a significant role and rightly so in serving as a backdrop to the spectacular 
rise of neoliberalism and neoliberalisation process as a catalyst to free market funda-
mentalism in our contemporary times.
5.6 Concluding remarks
In my exposition of this chapter, I begun by presenting a set of ideas commonly called 
neoliberalism. I try to highlight how quite apart from the fact that neoliberalism is a 
reification of the politics of the market, its rise and application have had the most dev-
astating and profound impact on the state. In it, I describe how right from the get go, 
neoliberalism has been statist phobia and was akin to the criticism of the state. Under 
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the shadows of the epithet of “more markets, less state account of neoliberalism, the 
decisive turnaround to the market has implicitly been the thoroughgoing withering 
away of the nanny state’s power and legitimacy which has been replaced by a more 
conventional, “night-watchman states” and subsequently made it utterly irrelevant 
however conceived. As noted from the preceding discussion, it should be abundantly 
clear by now that there is no definite meaning to the concept of neoliberalism. In 
fact the basic and the simplest definition anyone can offer as far as the definition of 
neoliberalism is concerned almost invariably calls for additional conditions as the case 
may be. To be sure, standard narratives as discussed barely ever provide a glossary defi-
nition of neoliberalism and even if it does, on a closer inspection, is at best imprecise 
and at worse convoluted at describing the defining constituent elements of the con-
cept. Again, as we saw, the various popular narratives of neoliberalism share one thing 
in common; they all recognise how the power of the market has unmistakably “rolled 
back” the role of the state.
At the same time however, there are a number of striking distinguishable pat-
terns and quite considerable overlaps that neatly run through these definitions. These 
apparent contrasts manifest themselves in the way neoliberalism at every different 
turn may be defined as a policy, hegemonic ideology or a mode of governance. At this 
conjuncture, one may wonder then by asking what neoliberalism is as I have deliber-
ately avoided in offering any tentative definition of my own like a bubonic plaque as 
one needs to tread cautiously here. At the risk of sounding blasé or indifferent then, 
the most principled answer is that following Julian Reid (2013), there is what one 
may possibly say, neoliberalism is, “homeostatic” and therefore there is no unequivo-
cal or definite meaning to neoliberalism. The discursive turnaround of neoliberalism 
occurred against the backdrop of a profound historical and economic twist and turn 
in the 1970s that triumphantly heralded the end of the epoch of an embedded liberal-
ism which doubtlessly required a new political outlook — indeed, the articulation of 
new political rationality (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010). In the 
first place, it appears to me that neoliberal cult policies of free market as it turns out, 
despite the entire blitz, the razzmatazz and clamour that ushered in with its inaugura-
tions, has visibly not inured to the benefit of the society. In sharp contrast, to a very 
large extent and strictly speaking, brought nothing but havoc, ruin disaster and sense-
less avoidable human suffering (Klein, 2007).
Unfortunately, virtually every serious account of neoliberalism today unfortunately 
(Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010) contains appendices of the intimate association of neo-
liberalism with atrocious authoritarian regimes. This notion is found prominently in 
Naomi Klein’s (2007) excellent book, The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capital-
ism, which is quite instructive. In this fascinating book, Klein, in her moving account, 
elaborates the idea of how neoliberal fundamentalism has led to the complete destruc-
tion of the democratic state. The upshot of Klein’s account is that there are potpourris 
of example as far as the self-destruct and vicious tendencies of neoliberalism are con-
cerned. She does so by inserting how the fanciful neoliberal reforms introduced by 
General Pinochet’s dictatorial regime—which became the political vanguard of neo-
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liberalism and Milton Friedman’s devious personal involvement are a text book refer-
ence. Equally, one could easily points at the neoliberalism of China’s or Singapore’s 
authoritarian regimes (Harvey, 2005) or the neoliberalism of then Mubarak’s Egypt 
and even today (Mitchell, 2004). The list is endless and could be extended to include 
post-Apartheid South-Africa, Iraq, Palestine, Israel, the Gulf and Africa or South 
America (Khalidi & Samour, 2011; Klein, 2007; Nitzan & Bichler, 2002; Peet, 2002; 
Whyte, 2007). In Brown as well as Harvey’s view, in the United States, the political 
space created by neoliberalism opened up the state to authoritarian moral politics of 
neo-conservatism.
Still now, more than ever before, we have many reasons to doubt the efficacy of 
neoliberalism. If anything thing at all, the economic policies it prescribes are at best 
palliatives. Under neoliberal game, irony of ironies, instead of promoting human good 
at least in the weak sense among all and sundry, we have far more losers than win-
ners which dangerously threaten the survival of all species (Susan, 1999; Tabb, 2005, 
p.50; Stiglitz, 2002; Gill, 2003). On the whole, it is high time we invoked the pro-
phetic message of Polanyi which graphically depicts the dangerous agenda the world 
has signed on to which has ominously become the common sense way of how people 
interpret and understand the world (Harvey, 2005, p.3). To wit, “to allow the market 
mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environ-
ment... would result in the demolition of society”(Polanyi, 1945, p.73). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Neoliberal Discursive Formations:  
of Regimes of Knowledge, Subjectivity, Technologies,  
and Techniques of Good Governance in Ghana
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is motivated by a Foucauldian discourse analytic to examine key dis-
courses, power-knowledge dynamics and production of subjectivities as packaged in 
the neoliberal ‘good governance’ development paradigm supervised by the officials of 
Bretton Wood institutions. More specifically, the chapter examines the ‘good gover-
nance’ effervescence as an exemplar of a particular, neoliberal form of governmental-
ity. This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I begin the chapter discussing the politics of 
‘good governance’ within the broader problematique of orthodox structural adjust-
ment. In this section I point out that the development critique on the failure of 
structural adjustment reforms to bring development at the end of the 1980s is closely 
related to the surfacing of contemporary notion of the ‘good governance’ fad. Second, 
I argue that we must look to policy texts to make visible key statements that cohere 
around discursive practices such as ‘good governance’, and in so doing, explore the 
(dis)connection of regimes of knowledge, subjectivities, technologies, and techniques 
that make these statements visible in the first place to think through how neoliberal 
development paradigm seems to have a particularly illuminating instance of Fou-
cauldian governmentality perspective. Subsequently, the following section examines 
‘good governance’ within the Ghanaian context. I argue that ‘good governance’ can 
be understood as a form of governance and to suggest how it constructs a domain of 
unassailable knowledge regimes, technologies and techniques coagulate under neo-
liberal subjectivation (Springer, 2010). And last, I further seek to develop and give an 
indication, of how narratives of resistance are imbued within discourses. Such indica-
tion, I argue, is not to exude another totalising objective portrayal of problematising 
and contesting dominant discursive and oppressive apparatuses of power and create 
space for subjugated knowledges; but rather it is also I believe, and not incidentally, 
aligns with what Foucault (1990) aptly calls —”reverse discourse” and— “tactical 
polyvalence”. In doing so, I closely attend to the ruptures and recapitulations within 
policy and practice to elucidate and encapsulate the conditions and conditioning of 
the possibilities that policies create; how they evoke an important shift in the configu-
ration of the examples of neoliberal policies and rationalities.
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6.2  ‘Good Governance’ Discourse and the Problem of Structural 
Adjustment
In this section I trace the historical provenance and consolidation of ‘good gover-
nance’ discourse as prioritised issues of the international development agenda to the 
dismal implementation of structural adjustment. The main thrust of this section is to 
show the complex contradictions and discontinuities within the continuity particu-
larly in relation to narratives and discourses of development and ‘good governance’ 
embraced by agents of neoliberal hegemony (Ruckert, 2006) and lay bare its essen-
tially neoliberal agenda. In other words, I resist the characteristic focus of much of 
the previous critical scholarship to quantify the effectiveness of ‘good governance’ 
agenda (Aryee, 2008; Grindle, 2008; Hulme et al., 2014; Jomo Kwame & Anis, 2011; 
Melissa Thomas, 2010; Okwechime, 2015); rather, this section offers a reading of 
postcolonial African development “crisis” or “tragedy” as been characterised by com-
peting ideas integral to governance discourse of ‘global development regime’.
Defined in simplest terms, ‘good governance’ discourse to development is imbued 
with the proposition that institutional, political and administrative apparatuses do 
matter in policy matters as a precondition to enhance the competitiveness of the sub-
Saharan African state in the global market place. Nevertheless this account is overly 
narrow without an understanding of the politico-economic and ideological context 
that shaped the conditions for the rise of ‘good governance’ discourse within the para-
phernalia of development thinking and practice. More succinctly, the reform propos-
als that precipitated the evolution of ‘good governance’ paradigm in the contemporary 
development discourse become clearly discernible in the drastic re-conceptualisation 
of the “Washington Consensus” ideals under the aegis of International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Leftwich, 1993, p.607; Rodrik, 2006).
Quite clearly, the growing concerns among the apostles of market-friendly poli-
cies to establish an elaborate connection between structural adjustment and gov-
ernance was largely driven by the desire to reverse the despair, disillusionment and 
Africa’s development haemorrhage represented by politics of adjustment (Olukoshi, 
1998; Stein, 2009a, 2009b). Good governance agenda historically speaking can be 
linked to two broad interconnected momentous developments: one intellectual and 
other explicitly linked to the fortuitous demise of the Cold War structure. ‘Good 
governance’ at stance of the World Bank and donor communities at global level was 
decidedly influenced by these auspicious moments. Within the intellectual context, 
organisations operating majorly within the political economy/public choice theoreti-
cal approach emerged in the period from the second half of the 1980s heavily criti-
cised the neoliberal structural adjustment agenda which set the tone for much of the 
early debate on structural adjustment. Furthermore, the continuing unremitting stag-
nation and deterioration of free market reforms received growing international con-
cern typically epitomised by the pioneering work of UNICEF in 1987 with the plea 
for adjustment with human face (Cornia et al., 1987).
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Thus the major claim I advance is that during the structural adjustment regime, 
the critical question of the political economy and issues of governance or the partici-
pation of its citizens were complacently overlooked by the major world powers and 
international agencies— such as the IMF and the Bank. This is highly hypocritical 
and puzzling because when placed under critical scrutiny, because adjustment model 
has its own specific political-ideological baggage that serves to preserve and maintain 
the power and privilege of some authoritarian African political elites by the officials 
of the multilateral financial institutions to stave off any resistance to the adjustment 
agenda. However, the Bank’s concern with “good governance” agenda, a condition 
deemed to be the panacea to address the sluggish development in Africa begun in 
earnest with the end of the Cold War geopolitics; well over a decade after the imple-
mentation of market-based reforms (World Bank, 1989).
Initially, the Bank officials and neoliberal political economists in responding to 
criticisms about the failure of the magical forces of the market-led reforms to stem 
Africa predicament, refused to fall from their ideological pedestal as supervising 
experts and dismissed the difficulties that persist as temporary (Zeleza, 2010). Sim-
ply stated, as the corrosive effects of structural adjustment became more evident, the 
blame was shifted to African governments for making some very ill-intentioned eco-
nomic choices and policies deriving from the necessities of postcolonial nation-build-
ing; or because of the supposedly “corrupt”, “rent-seeking” African politicians who 
were allegedly reluctant to reform and give up their “illicit” privileges accumulated 
under the excessively interventionist model of development (Ibid). For such reasons 
(unfortunately accepted as major impediments to development) that the common 
sense notion of ‘good governance’ which is the antithesis of ‘bad governance’ was seen 
as a magic bullet solution (deus ex machina) and fad du jour to bringing about neolib-
eral development.
6.3  Considering Foucault: World Bank and ‘Good Governance’ Reform 
Agenda
Grimly faced with the wobbly and recurring decimal failure of its structural adjust-
ment programmes, the authoritative 1989 World Bank report proclaimed that a 
‘crisis of governance’ underlies ‘the litany of Africa’s development problems’ (World 
Bank, 1989, p. 60). Consequently, in 1989, the Bank became a leading votary of 
‘good governance’ discourse whereupon “structurally adjusting its own programme of 
structural adjustment” (Green, 1993, p.61). As far as the Bank is concerned gover-
nance is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992, p.1). 
In dealing with the authoritative report for the establishment of the neoliberal ‘good 
governance’ agenda, the data are drawn from the 1989 World Bank report on Sub-
Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, its prominent 1992 document on 
‘good governance’ entitled Governance and Development, 1997 The State in a Chang-
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ing World and 2002 Building Institutions for Markets reports. This section builds on 
these empirical materials and makes an argument for a Foucauldian discourse analy-
sis. As the most powerful, indeed influential global development agency, while also 
being the preeminent single actor in the “development industry” (Ferguson, 1990), 
the World Bank serves as a significant empirical grounding to study how contempo-
rary notions of and logic of the discourses surrounding development are articulated 
and animated. My ambition is to carefully identify the Bank’s discursive practices and 
array of representations to elicit the enunciative modalities from which the discourses 
derive; inscribing a regime of production of truth(s) and set up consensual conditions 
recurrently evinced within Africa in general. The analysis is also informed by archae-
ology to ascertain which particular knowledges are privileged by ‘good governance’ 
proponents and which subject positions are subsequently constructed in order to map 
out alternatives that challenge the conventional neutral-free proposition of neoliberal 
‘good governance’ reforms. As illustrations, this section is developed around eight sets 
of discursive objects which underpin the World Bank’s conception of ‘good gover-
nance’ agenda. These are discussed below.
6.3.1  The ‘truth’ of a crisis-prone Sub-Saharan Africa that must be managed for the 
sake of markets
By representing the underdevelopment situation of Africa as a ‘crisis’ of ‘governance’ 
requiring “political renewal” (World Bank, 1989, p.60), the Bank’s report marked the 
inclusion of the political sphere into the realm of development interventions. Since 
then, argues Nanda (2006, p.269), ‘good governance’ reforms set the discursive con-
tours within which the Bank construct regime of truth through the reproduction and 
incitement of state of “crisis” to first and foremost, pathologise Africa’s situation as 
requiring special social, political, and economic structures to solve her “developmen-
tal problems”. As we read:
The failure of public institutions is “a root cause” of Africa’s weak economic 
performance. The quality of government has deteriorated with bureaucratic 
obstruction, pervasive rent seeking, weak judicial systems, and arbitrary deci-
sion-making”. Red tape and corruption impose heavy costs on the private 
sector, undercutting its international competitiveness. The breakdown of the 
judicial system scares off foreign investors who fear that contracts cannot be 
enforced. Such an environment cannot readily support a “dynamic economy”. 
“A deep political malaise stymies action in most countries”. (1989, p. xii, 3, 22, 
30, 60-62, 192)
According to Schmitz (1995, p.68) “governance” in developing countries at least from 
the perspective of the World Bank was considered “as the primary source of the prob-
lem (explaining the lack of success of past benevolence), and as the basis for solu-
tion (justifying new conditions and limitations on this benevolence”). As observed by 
Schmitz (1995, p.67-68), ‘good governance’ model has been shown to be largely con-
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structs by and for the purpose of starving off attention away from the ailing neolib-
eral project and their reification through critical discourse. Often then, the neoliberal 
paradigm instead of promoting long-term development, is overshadowed by shifting 
attention from systemic international capitalist order, namely that of “adverse condi-
tions, unfair markets or inappropriate economic reforms,” to the local “lack of proper 
institutional capacity to manage the necessary processes of adjustment” (Schmitz, 
1995, p.67-68).
The prevalent discursive practices that imbue the Bank’s text are about what kind of 
institutions are ‘best’ suited for crisis-prone Africa (Ganahl, 2013; Williamson, 1989). 
The report claims that the predatory politics, ‘bad governance’, ‘corruption’ and other 
evils are causes of continuing troubles (and failures) in Africa societies. In the end, 
the Bank’s economic rationale regards ‘good governance’ as “an essential complement 
to sound economic policies” (World Bank, 1992, p.1). Good governance in the view 
of the Bank aims to “establish the rules that make markets work efficiently and (…) 
correct market failure” (Ibid). This type of grand narrative depicts institutional gover-
nance infrastructure of the Bank as contemporary kernel of truth-knowledge and are 
in fact universally-accepted norms to cure the continent’s ills; and closes off possible 
alternatives discursive space in producing, reproducing, legitimising and maintaining 
good governance model as the best or perhaps the only available alternative to SSA 
predicament. The result is a reconceptualising of political categories to fit economic 
forms of understanding evinced within the Bank’s policy document. Both economic 
and political spheres seem to have been characterised by the pre-eminence of a certain 
interventionist approach, rather than by other characteristics. “Thus, ‘administrations’, 
‘institutions’ and even ‘governments’ become non-political and open for intervention 
as soon as they are connected with ‘efficiency’, ‘development’ and especially ‘structural 
adjustment and economic reform” (Polzer, 2001, p.11).
6.3.2 The will to construct political legitimacy for SAPs
It is important to point out that the Bank’s obsession in controlling ‘good governance’ 
discourse is to fictitiously conjure a technocratic consensus-oriented approach (Bøås, 
2001; Beckham, 1990) in which information may legitimately contribute toward 
finding the “truth” and opens the way for a wider portfolio of policy options” (Fine, 
2001, p.11); to concomitantly perpetuate and reinforce the status quo. As the report 
explains, “whatever the political vantage point, there is a broad understanding”. The 
remaining problems in the Bank’s own account are essentially “technical” which “pro-
fessionals will continue to debate” without in any way diminishing the “broad con-
sensus on objectives” and that “there is no place for fundamentalism” (World Bank, 
1989, p.185). This approach presupposes to project a picture of “political consensus” 
(p.193) around the idea of the liberal market model of development, where disagree-
ments are seen as purely technical; which in the end seek to conceal the ideological 
and political arbitrariness of the report in enforcing SAPs in the face of intellectual 
and growing popular discontent.
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The flipside of this argument is that “presenting these shifts as vaunted consensus is 
vital for legitimating them as the new source of expertise for governance in Africa and 
the third world in general” (Sheppard & Leitner 2010, p.187); and in turn, impose 
unobtrusively their own “will to truth” which is inexorably linked with the discur-
sive power dynamics that beget, disseminate, sustain, and concomitantly are evinced 
within the discursive construction of ‘reality’. From a Foucauldian perspective, it 
appears that certain enunciative modalities and formations (i.e., the Bretton Woods 
institutions) have been privileged to speak authoritatively on the “truths” about devel-
opment) while others such as those explicitly expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action 
(OAU, 1980) and the Abuja and Khartoum Declarations (ECA, 1988) it is claimed, 
have been displaced, discredited, refuted and silenced altogether. Of course, an aspect 
of every discourse is how it can “limit the scope and forms of expressibility: “what is it 
possible to speak of ? What has been constituted as the domain of discourse...? What 
has been designated as the subject; what has one wished to make a descriptive science 
of ” (Foucault, 1978, p. 14-15).
In yet another respect, speaking from these privileged enunciative modalities, the 
Bank is allowed, through discursive practice to develop influential concepts to system-
atically shape public policies— in the process introducing new forms of governmen-
tality. Meanwhile, African leaders’ modalities to repeat, continued to be discursively 
disregarded, demonised and framed as threats to the developmental well-being of their 
people (Gathii, 1999). When Foucault talks of the positioning of the subject in the 
suppressive discursive impositions in which they are increasingly dislodged and mar-
ginalised, he lends further credence to my point. What is argued here is that the post-
colonial State has become subject of the discourse informing what can be thought, 
said or done (Foucault, 1972) by reproducing these “truths” — and not others.
6.3.3 The politics of blame
Responsibility is a central theme running through the Bank’s report and arguments. 
As a scapegoat and excuse to particularly blame the victim for the failure of their pro-
grammes to live up to its promises, the Bank’s report seemingly assumes that state-led, 
nationalist development ideology has been the principal enemy to the development 
thinking in Africa since independence. Africa’s independence political elites, says the 
Bank, uncritically embraced “inappropriate”, “foreign models” (World Bank, 1989, p. 
3). Most governments drew up “comprehensive five-year plans” and invested in “large, 
state-run core industries” (World Bank, 1989, p.16, 37-38). This claim is hugely over-
stated. This overstatement finds ample evidence in the attenuated attempts of the 
Bank to re-construct and reshape the relationships between the ‘irrational’, ‘inane’ and 
politically ‘inert’ African States and the neoliberal market economy (Isoe & Keraro, 
2015, my emphasis).
Painfully frustrated by the “hesitation and procrastination” to wholeheartedly 
“internalise” (World Bank, 1989, p.62, 192-3) the proclaimed supremacy of the SAPs 
and market reforms, the Bank was inclined in this report to variously represent post-
colonial States and its political elites as ‘weak’, ‘kleptocratic’, ‘vassal’, ‘vampire’, ‘receiver’, 
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‘prostrate’, ‘fictitious’, ‘collapsed’, ‘predatory’, ‘parasitic’, ‘neopatrimonial’, ‘lame levia-
than’, ‘rentier’ , and so on and so forth (Olukoshi, 1995, p.14; Kelsall & Booth, 2010, 
p.3). Within such discursive representations, “the vested interests that profit from the 
present distorted incentives and controls” (World Bank, 1989, p.192) are positioned 
as “narrow”, and “selfish” who appropriated the machinery of government to serve 
their own interests” (p.192). This problematisation of Africa leaders’ as “narrow”, “self-
ish” and incompetent is implicitly ingrained in the contention that self-serving incor-
rigibly corrupt African elites, cynically enough lack knowledge about values necessary 
for ensuring progress in their well-being and therefore should be whipped into to line, 
through an array of “rationalised” technologies of power evasively imposed on them. 
Interestingly enough, however, what is never questioned is the Bank’s own religious 
fidelity to the fundamentalist ideology of the market (Ghaaal, 2013). In the same 
tenor, Robert Wade (1996, p.34–35) points out that “the Bank’s legitimacy depends 
upon the authority of its views; like the Vatican, and for similar reasons, it cannot 
admit fallibility”. Likewise, the inexorable impact of Cold War and the location of the 
continent in the fringes of the international capitalist order seem to have largely faded 
away altogether in the Bank’s report. Or better yet, the historical, contextual, politi-
cal, and economic roots to the “African crisis” are largely absent, underestimated and 
neutralised. My impression is that the simplistic stereotypes, exaggerated images and 
derogatory epithets of postcolonial State (Gathii, 1999) cynically deployed and repre-
sented in ‘good governance’ debates, as Foucault argues in a different context, perhaps 
lurk beneath the unstated aim to pre-empt and delegitimise any form of popular resis-
tance in the short to medium term to neoliberal prescriptions (Beckman, 1990); and 
to subtly present the postcolonial State as inherently “ineffective” and “illegitimate”.
6.3.4 The restructuring of the postcolonial Africa State
Interestingly, one other prominent discourse that is most “celebrated” in World Bank 
1989 report is based on the romantic idea to redimension with the aim of creating 
what could be viewed as a smart or ‘modernised’ postcolonial African state. This 
aspect of ‘good governance’ discourse is clearly profoundly connected to the Bank’s 
own reshaped strategies and sanitised accounts that SAPs cannot work without a 
“better”, “effective” and “efficient” State. The Bank states that “the fundamental weak-
ness in these programs is the lack of local capacity, both private and public, in their 
design and execution” (World Bank, 1989, p.62). In order to deal with this con-
straints, the Bank suggests that there is the need “not just less but better government” 
—government that concentrates its efforts less on direct interventions and more on 
enabling others to be productive” (p.5). Thinking along these lines, the postcolonial 
State according to the Bank must be institutionally empowered, putting in place an 
“enabling environment that fosters private investment” (p.15). For this purpose, post-
colonial States have to conform to the ‘best-practices’ and inner logics of the Bank 
— operating seamlessly under the contextual “truth regime”; and thus contingently 
come to be part of what is aspired to. This discursive logic deems States without such 
universally accepted institutional prescriptions as “corrupt and inefficient” (Gathii, 
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1999, p.77) by deliberately neglecting the analysis of the very mechanisms that pro-
duce such results, for example. Several questions arise: what does it mean to have a 
“better” State? Are there States that are “better” and others that are not? In any event, 
better for whom? An obvious discursive reality is related to the fact that private sector 
and market-competitive governance must be regarded as a universally efficient tool 
for planning and regulating every economic activity (Rose & Miller, 2010).
Flowing from this, the Bank’s discourse emphasises a “public service that is effi-
cient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its 
public”. In doing so, the Bank sought to ‘professionalise’ civil service by encouraging 
public sector management (PSM) and this was given further impetus as well as con-
text in the Governance and Development publication. The rationale underpinning the 
Bank’s agenda in this regard is that “when the capacity of the public sector to man-
age the economy and deliver public sectors is weak, the prospects for development 
are poor” (World Bank, 1992, p.12). Recasting or reframing the role of the State 
moreover, means that it will generally contribute to well-functioning political and 
socio-economic institutions. Crucially, what is very important to state is that such 
a discursive switch is not simply about a plea for a return to the Keynesian-oriented 
paradigm in development economics (Haque, 2001a; Johnston & Callender, 1999) 
— a prior development approach— paradoxically, supported by the Bank in the 
19960s. Quite the contrary, such pious proclamations to include the State is amply 
illustrated by configurations of unassailable knowledge production and power rela-
tions— which, one way or another, have been inscribed into the rationality which 
has come to encompass ‘good governance’ fad. How then, can this cynical reorien-
tation be explained, especially in the light of the Bank’s new policy imperatives? It 
needs noting that this supposed reconfigurations of the State— and ultimately of the 
subjectivities— present rationales and rationalities pertaining to making them most 
attractive to the largely neoliberally inspired constructed global marketplace; a prop-
osition once foreclosed and considered unimportant for achieving sustainable eco-
nomic growth (Tamatea, 2005).
Once more, I do want to emphasise yet again that this discourse, in the same spirit, 
reflexively reinforces and fertilises the arguments that the State in an idealised neo-
liberal ‘good governance’ schematic of governing the economic in pursuit of develop-
ment must intensively assume an active role. The rationale the Bank suggests (1989, 
p. xii, 1, 4, 55, 59) is to “release private energies and encourage initiatives at every 
level”. The Bank also warns that— African States should abide by rather than resist 
“the world-wide trend towards privatisation” (p.5). The practices of governance 
inscribed within the Bank’s report elaborately give consideration to the presupposi-
tions for shaping the corresponding political-economic rationalities in postcolonial 
African States (institutionally and nationally). Interestingly, the central objective is 
to steer the State away from being an entrepreneur so that market can become the 
central organising and regulative principle underlying the State. In these statements, a 
Foucauldian analysis indicates that African States are constructed as conduit or pur-
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veyors to propel, reinforce and legitimise the neoliberal rationalities of Adam Smith’s 
free hand of the market place.
6.3.5 Governance and state capacity
Within the structural adjustment regime, state intervention in the free-market reforms 
was actively discouraged because it was deemed to be synonymous with oppressive 
bureaucracy and predatory intentions of the state apparatus. In other words, to the 
extent that the post-colonial African state by its nature and definition is predatory, 
the IFIs warn that its involvement in developmental agenda must be discoraged. 
While the old Washington consensus overly relied on market forces with its emphasis 
on anti-state discourses, evolving post-Washington consensus from mid-90s onwards, 
signalled a policy shift towards institutional reform and ‘good governance’ (World 
Bank, 1997). Conceptually, this involved recognition that the state institutionas had 
a major role to play in economic development and poverty reduction. Much of the 
new post-Washington consensus recommends restoring confidence and transform-
ing public sector institutions capable of implementing public policies. In the words 
of the World Bank, “market driven development could not succeed without a strong 
social and institutional infrastructure, including a strong state” (World Bank, 2000a, 
p.38). By implication the shortcomings attributed to governance, can be related to 
fundamental institutional weaknesses combined with inappropriate policies and un-
enforced legal frameworks as opposed to market failure. 
 This recent rethinking was expressed in the Bank’s 1997 World Development 
Report (WDR) titled The State in a Changing World. World Development Report 1997 
suddenly became the vanguard for state-interventionist policies as a desideratum for 
sustaining market reforms and a marked stepping-stone in the mainstreaming of good 
governance. 1997 World Development Report can be seen as a device to ensure growing 
recognition of the importance of the State in the policy-making process of poor coun-
tries. It argues against rolling back the State and recommended the need for strength-
ening State and its institution’s in LDCs — without which economic, social and 
sustainable development is impossible. The report correctly points out that a “strong” 
state, not only a “minimal” one, is needed to economic and social development, but 
more as partner and facilitator than as director (p.18). Given the challenge, the report 
asks “ how some states have been more effective than others at playing a catalytic and 
sustainable role in economic development and the eradication of poverty”. 
 The report was largely “devoted to the role and effectiveness of the state: what 
the state should do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly chang-
ing world”. The report emphasised on the one hand, the importance of state capabil-
ity defining it as “the ability to undertake and promote collective actions efficiently” 
(p.3); and, on the other, it suggests ways to improve the state’s capability by re-invig-
orating public institutions. To argue, as World Development Report 1997 does, that 
improving the administrative and the chronic lack of state capacity simply because 
it will enable the African State to initiate and implement market-based economic 
reforms as an essential element of the quest for good governance. Such a mode of gov-
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ernment inevitably operates within the logic that reformulates the role of government 
not as a locomotive of “development”, but rather to create the enabling environment 
and provide policies whereby development becomes possible. 
This shift, in the new post-Washington consensus was, however, a critical element 
of laying a basis for re-conceptualisation of the orthodox, structural adjustment or 
neoliberal reform. The concern here is with efficiency-enhancing, market-compatible 
policy now endlessly asserted as prerequisite for institutional reform (Williamson, 
1999; Naím, 2000). The presumption in all these is the thinking that governance and 
institutional reform are best served by reliance on market mechanisms as the ‘engine’ 
of economic development. To be sure, according to the post-Washington consensuses 
rhetoric, sound macroeconomic fundamentals will inevitably address the endemic 
poverty and pervasive underdevelopment of the region. In this context, the trend 
toward macroeconomic stabilisation policies is perceived as offering a huge potential 
for greater sustainable development. A salient point that should be emphasised here 
is that while “first generation” reforms or orthodox, structural adjustment policies, 
designed by the Bretton Woods institutions and subsequently the Washington Con-
sensus aim at rolling back of the state from the involvement in the economy activ-
ity (Harrison, 2010, p.81; Naím, 1995), the “second generation” economic reforms, 
insisting on reforming the state spin out narratives concerned with the nature of state 
action (Harrison, 2004). The effect is to turn this to the promise and hope that insti-
tutional capacity building, finance management, technical assistance and a whole 
range of policy imperatives under the good governance regime are an antidote to the 
restrictions of government regulation in the economy (Harrison, 2004, p. 18-20, my 
emphasis). 
”What the state should do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly 
changing world” is increasingly recognised in explaining economic performance in 
Africa. This is a lofty idea. No one would disagree. In fact, I insist fully on this. What 
is telling is that in consistent with most analysis on the State, the report does not 
ask the obvious and most essential question. That is to say the report in its diagnosis 
seems relatively unaffected by what does not work rather than what works, and in 
themselves fail to recommend on the “what” rather than the “how”. The implication 
is that while there is oft-stated commitment on institutional reform in the interest 
of promoting markets, World Development Report 1997 given its ideological position 
fatally failed to explicitly problematise and or question the underlying assumptions 
underpinning free markets theology as threats to its market reform ( Joseph, 2010). 
In African context, many of problems have less to do with its disengagement than 
its historical and contemporary integration into the global economy. The economic 
reforms packages imposed by the IMF and the World Bnk through structural adjust-
ment policies for instance was chiefly pre-occupied with delegating some tasks of 
the State to the market thereby further undermining the institutional capacities of 
these States. This is precisely because the old consensus patently failed to “infuse itself 
into the state as the founding logic of public action; it also generated destabilising 
effects on African societies’, the IFIs therefore became key agents in a larger ‘global 
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regime of crisis management’ that has emerged in response to the African crisis, such 
that they now concern themselves with ‘institutional capacity building; civil service 
(or more broadly public service) reform; the introduction of new forms of informa-
tion technology, finance management and human resource management; technical 
assistance and the facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, evalua-
tion and the facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, evaluation and 
development”(Harrison, 2004, p.4 & 18).The result has been more emphatically the 
demand for external intervention to maintain a sufficient level of sovereign gover-
nance over this chronic instability, undertaken through the construction of the ‘gov-
ernance state’(Harrison, 2004). 
As with the new consensus recognition for a more institutional approach to devel-
opment often assumed to be embodied in good governance agenda, Joseph Jonathan 
(2010) draws attention to the fact that it should be understood as legitimating and 
perpetuating neoliberal reform project. In other words, the exclusive obsession for 
‘institutional and easy technical fixes’ provide the legitimising principle for what gov-
ernmentality theorists already understand as reinvention of the neoliberal develop-
ment agenda (Ibid). Quite obviously, the new aid architecture appears to consolidate 
and perpetuate an erroneous form of thinking that tends to transform the political 
and contested nature of reform into “technical or scientific aspects of policymaking” 
(Harrison, 2010, p.24). It is increasingly asserted that such thinking depoliticises 
development discourse through the shaping of state institutions and the re-conceptu-
alisation of complex and political-economic problems into non-political, neutral and 
technical, which leads to a much more jaundiced view of the role of the State in the 
economy. This is a perspective informed by the belief that the new aid architecture 
disavows the problematic and contentious conception of policy which involves heady 
mix of divergent interests, continually competing visions, priorities; and policies on 
how best to organise society for specific social projects ( Joseph, 2010). As argued 
by Joseph Jonathan, this is characteristic of governmentality and compatible with a 
technocratic understanding of policymaking with its concern regarding “the health, 
wealth and well-being of the local population” (p.46).
6.3.6 The logic of institutions-building and markets imperatives
World Bank governance discourse in post-colonial Africa has evolved from a clear 
set of economic policies primarily concerned with market deregulation agenda remi-
niscent of the old Washington Consensus to an increased focus on building sound, 
capable and strong institutions for poverty reduction and development. In line with 
this the World Bank’s sustained engagement with institutional building efforts has 
been underpinned by the belief that “weak market-supporting institutions can hurt 
the poor disproportionately” (World Bank, 2002, p.9). The Bank’s works in this area 
was traditionally predicated on the assumption that a key element in the African cri-
sis is the absence of effective institutions to promote market-led reforms. Given this, 
strong institutions are critical to carefully manage market through sound policies and 
government policy making (Chandler, 2010, p.147). Indeed, the World Development 
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Report 2002 of the World Bank was titled: Building Institutions for Markets. It sets out 
the challenges of improving institutional governance in the emerging global economy 
by providing “a diagnostic framework for understanding how institutions support 
market activity” (p.4). The report also “ provides guidance on how to build new insti-
tutions, modify existing ones, and create the forces for change” (p.26). In this context, 
Building Institutions for Markets report (2002) addressed the issue in a more direct 
fashion. According to the World Bank, market-supporting institutions do much to 
promote growth and reduce poverty. The 1997 WDR builds on past reports, espe-
cially World Development Reports 2000/2001, which called attention to how “effec-
tive market supporting institution” (p.4) with it emphasis on promoting growth as 
well as providing economic means for poor people and the underprivileged. In other 
words, it signifies a significant shift in policy thinking from the perspective of “getting 
prices right”. In concrete terms, getting prices right suggests that market order will 
emerge spontaneously or endogenously (Hayek, 1945). However in the World Devel-
opment Report 2002, there is an alternative view which considers the role of complex 
set of institutions which will ultimately support the functioning of markets. 
World Development Report 2002 focuses on what institutional, political and eco-
nomic reforms do to promote and facilitate market development that provides ben-
efits for all—”inclusive and integrated markets” (World Bank, 2002, p.5)—markets 
that provide equal opportunity, that reduce risk, and that enable investment in 
higher-return activities “by suggesting how to build effective institutions”(p.4). The 
reports maintains that “understanding what they do is the first step in building effec-
tive institutions” (p.8). The report builds on this policy frame by arguing that “good 
policies are not enough, rather “ institution building matter for growth and poverty 
reduction” (p.4). Therefore, building effective and strong institutions to “support 
growth and poverty reduction—often referred to as good governance—are essential 
to development” (p.115). Also there was the claim that “ provision of a regulatory 
regime that works with the market to promote competition” (p.99) as competition is 
an “important force bringing about economic development” (p.144). This therefore 
places emphasis on “the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a sta-
ble environment for market activity” (p.99). World Development Report 2002 tried to 
rigorously show that “income from participating in the market is the key to boosting 
economic growth for nations and to reducing poverty for individuals” (p.3). 
What is on the contrary most important is that the subject of wide-ranging insti-
tutional building and reform in post-colonial African economies has generally been 
neglected in the practice and economic reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Expressed differently, the Washington consensus misguided policies during the 1970s 
and 1980s repeatedly disregarded the analysis of institutions and failed to assess how 
state institutions can be reformed effectively to make public policies more respon-
sive to poor countries and particularly poor people’s needs. Obviously the anti-statist 
stance of the development paradigm under the aegis of the Washington Consensus 
in the 1990s by and beyond was post-colonial African states with considerably poor, 
with relatively weakened institutional capacity and credibility. I suggest that utopian 
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policy prescriptions for institutional building reform and state capacity, so prevalent 
in the contemporary policy-oriented literature, therefore needs to be viewed from 
the broader perspective of ambitiously interventionist agendas of the Bretton Woods 
institutions in promoting new forms of governance in post-colonial African states. 
As Harrison (2004, p. 128) argues in the case of World Bank’s governance agenda in 
Africa, the substantive economic reforms, benchmarking, performance indicators and 
target-setting in many ways amounts to a transformation of states (via ‘governance 
states’) and societies (through social engineering as ‘embedding neoliberalism’) into 
an ‘ideal’ and stable type conforming the basic fantasies and values of neoliberal ideol-
ogy in general and the World Bank’s current development model in particular 
Crucially, the report addressed some basic priorities such as the securing of prop-
erty rights, on regulation aimed at promoting competition, the effect of macro-eco-
nomic policies for stimulating market activity, and on the fight against corruption as 
tasks of a well governed state (p.99). While in some respects the report simply helped 
revive interest in the ideas associated with basic needs and sustainable development, it 
almost reduced the festering challenge in fighting poverty to a micro-economic issue: 
it would simply involve creating opportunities and incentives for poor people to 
make use of markets “and enabling poor and rich people to make the best use of their 
assets” (p.9).this incredibly reveals a problematic lack of understanding of the causal 
relationship between development and structural changes. What is proposed here is 
that development and structural changes though of great importance, are only part 
of the issues for poverty elimination. To assess the impact of development on pov-
erty reduction, if feasible at all, would then require a radical structural transformation 
of the society’s economy. Broadly, I conclude by stating that the shift in perspective 
from market reform to commitment of market development entails an urgent need to 
redress the major gaps “ inhibiting market development or leading to certain market 
outcomes” (p.10).
6.3.7 The cross-over between State and civil society
More and more, in broadening the evolving process on ‘good governance’ discourse in 
post-colonial African societies also inclined towards the neoliberal strategy of “rolling 
back” the State to ‘liberating civil society and empowering the people’, since, accord-
ing to the ‘good governance’ debate, viable civil society constitutes key agencies to 
counter-balance governmental power (Beckman, 1991; Chabal, 1992; Rothchild & 
Chazan, 1994; Lewis, 2009). As the Bank emphatically states:
Ultimately, better governance requires political renewal. This means a con-
certed attack on corruption from the highest to the lowest levels. This can be 
done by setting a good example, by strengthening accountability, by encour-
aging public debate, and by nurturing a free press. It also means empowering 
women and the poor by fostering grassroots and non-governmental organiza-
tions, such as farmers associations, cooperatives and women’s groups. (World 
Bank, 1989, p .6)
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Governance and Development publication for instance, describes ‘civil society’ organ-
isations as new relays in the governance tissue with the vibrancy to make up for the 
excesses of the neo-patrimonial State in determining economic growth and develop-
ment (World Bank, 1992). In this context, support for civil societal actors has been 
presented as a radical shift from and an improvement upon the conventional develop-
ment practices and discourses of the World Bank (Chabal, 1992; Rothchild & Cha-
zan, 1994). However, the underlying concern here lies in ‘strengthening institutions 
of civil society’ to stimulate reforms which will make African States governable in cer-
tain ways.
In the World Development Report 2002, NGOs and civil society organisations were 
ascribed an important role in the intractable ascendance of good governance agenda. 
NGOs and civil society organisations, together with market mechanisms and the pri-
vate sector, are seen as one of the providers of provision to complement the State’s role. 
However, like the State, NGOs and civil society organisations also embody contradic-
tory tendencies and processes which its uncritical equation with democracy conceals. 
The point here is that World Development Report 2002 for the most part, overlooks 
the fact that ‘neoliberal civil society’ (Harrison, 2010, p.52) also exhibits anti-dem-
ocratic proclivities and the tendency to oppose it to the state in the wholesale, one 
sided manner hardly helps to deepen our insights into the ways which the two inter-
penetrate. It must be noted that the mere existence of NGOs and civil society organ-
isations independent of the State does not ipso facto imply that it will be supportive of 
good governance in Africa. I stress that there has been massive research output, which 
includes numerous empirically-based studies on the politics of diverse and highly het-
erogeneous constellation of NGOs and civil society organisations in various African 
countries which suggest, in fact, that they could, and can be parochial, contradictory, 
and exclusionary in character. This is not simply to suggest that all NGOs and civil 
society organisations are problematic but it is also worth critiquing how such powerful 
yet non-transparent, unaccountable and unelected members should come to occupy 
such a crucial place within the contemporary development discourse.
6.3.8 Good Governance within the new “feel-good rhetoric”
The key strategic thrusts in the policy rationales of the Bank’s governance and devel-
opment agenda evoke norms seductively wrapped in appealing discourses: mecha-
nisms of state capacity building, local ownership, beneficiary participation etc. 
(World Bank, 1989; 1992). Within this regime of rationality, ‘capacity building’ 
needs and in fact requires to be pursued at every level of government (World Bank, 
1989, p. xii, 5, 15, 54-59). The governance position espoused by the Bank implicitly 
presume that capacity building is but another “missing link” in addressing the crisis 
of African development (Olukoshi, 1991). This way, the key stakeholders led by the 
Bank, zealously had to devote a substantial proportion of their time and resources in 
expert training programmes and projects aimed at promoting various forms of capac-
ity and capabilities on the continent. This was accompanied by the establishment of 
Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) in Harare, Zimbabwe. Capacity build-
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ing (simply small or efficient state) repeatedly evinced in the Bank’s ‘good governance’ 
project is preoccupied with the necessity of a highly competent African bureaucracy 
(referring to administrative and technical competencies), presumably seen unprob-
lematically as promoting ‘good governance’ in South Sahara Africa. In contrast, capac-
ity building is genuinely and fervently envisioned as neoliberal technology to provide 
a framework within which market-oriented governance, as opposed to public man-
agement of the economy can be promoted: thereby obscuring the discursive reality 
germane to the historical imperatives of ‘capacity building’. An associated objective of 
‘capacity building’— is in line with or is the necessary complement to the promotion 
of local ‘ownership’ of neoliberal reforms of structural adjustment.
In Governance and Development, beneficiary participation was understood to gen-
erate “voice”(World Bank, 1992, p.26) which is tied to attempts at restructuring the 
State as well as human agency, particularly that of consulting “the poor” (Easterly, 
2007, p.144). 
In apparent response to the criticisms that development programmes and proj-
ects have become irresponsive to the needs of recipient governmntes and people, the 
World Bank made ‘participation’ an essential ingredient and good governance devel-
opment the cornerstone of its 2002 World Development Report. But as with the treat-
ment of civil society, World Development Report 2002 seriously re-evaluates the extent 
to which participation serves as a critical constraint on State actions. In order to 
ensure effective policy implementation, ‘participation’ has meant that subjects or tar-
gets of a policy comply with its aims and objectives (Cooke &Kothari, 2001; Mohan 
& Stokke, 2001).
This is equally as elusive as “the poor” concept given the fact that the Washing-
ton Consensus-oriented ‘good governance’ project (Mehmet, 1997), for a variety of 
reasons rhetorically promotes participatory development initiatives only within pre-
ordained and predefined economic programmes to “deliver ‘political sustainability’ 
for neo-liberal policies” (Schmitz, 1995, p.24). Indeed, exhilarating rhetoric such as 
popular participation, local ownership, civil society, new public management and 
capacity-boosting programmes which have been central to the Bank’s governance 
practices, for all intents and purposes, is the attempt to reconstruct an alternative 
political legitimacy and a favourable ambience of acceptance backed by a requisite 
and efficient administrative capacity by distancing itself to avoid taking on the com-
mensurate amount of responsibility for the negative experiences provoked by previous 
Washington Consensus reforms. This, of course, does not ruled out the possibility 
that the seductive language of (participation, local ownership, civil society, capacity-
boosting programmes, etc.) on the face of things, are not potentially beneficial (even 
praiseworthy rhetoric) in making the ‘best’ of the impoverished people’s economic 
situation. That nevertheless, the Bank’s governance programme is in fact socially and 
economically disenfranchising. This is simply because it problematically neglects cul-
tural constructed norms and socio-political particularities in relations to discourse of 
development.
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The widely embraced World Bank’s ‘good governance’ as it is claimed is masquer-
aded under the realm of technicality and dubious “neutrality” with no clarification 
about what is meant by the use of the term. However, as conceptualised, encapsulated 
and envisioned by Foucault, neoliberal rationality of competition and the need for 
African States to become successful is vested with the insignia of responsible neolib-
eral subjects ( Joseph, 2010b); which intimately signifies the perseverance of a discur-
sive economic rationality. My argument on ‘good governance’ relies upon a particular 
reading of the problematic of representation and practices which, could be read as a 
laudable rhetoric (ideologically laden concept, a romantic idea) intended to enhance 
the donor structural adjustment model (Stein, 2009); by essentially depoliticising 
the political nature of development in favour of ostensibly technocratic solutions. A 
Foucauldian analysis indicates that the development challenge persists in this context 
because the Bank propagates the “truth” claim that development can only be defined 
through managerial populism (Brown, 2011) and supreme good governance rhetoric 
(Hindess, 2005).
6.4  Reorienting Development Policies: ‘Good Governance’ in Neoliberal 
Ghana
This section provides an exploration of development changes parallel to a shift in 
the Washington Consensus-informed structural adjustment policies in Ghana. It 
contends that rather than a neutral, novel inclusive-neoliberal development, ‘good 
governance’ reform agenda in Ghana, can be conceived of as a primary legitimising 
embodied discursive product appropriated as a vehicle in building consensus to accept 
the ‘wisdom’ of the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism and the continued admin-
istration of Bretton Woods institutions. In arguing for Foucauldian analysis, I exam-
ine discursive assemblage and knowledge formations to show how power-knowledge 
nexus coagulates under neoliberal subject formation (Kendall & Wickham, 1999) 
have been internalised, legitimised, reproduced and discursively resisted (Ibid).
6.4.1 Fields of visibility
The catalyst for the development of ‘good governance’ agenda grew out in Ghana 
against the background of the spectacular failure of SAPs in the late 1980’s as evi-
denced in devastating, unenviable debt problems, deepening poverty, socioeconomic 
inequalities and unemployment. In response to criticisms of the negative impacts 
of structural adjustment programmes, the Bank argued repeatedly that ‘bad gover-
nance’ is responsible for Ghana’s uncured problems and introduced ‘good governance’ 
reform which contains the following benchmarks aimed to achieve economic growth, 
and thus successful development: Civil Society Organisations (CSOs’) inclusion 
especially Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); accountability; transparency; 
ownership, active participation, decentralising administration; New Public Manage-
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ment; and empowerment (World Bank, 1992; UNDP, 1997b) with a host of mea-
sures to minimalise the role of the State.
Civil Society Organisation inclusion under the ‘good governance’ discourse has 
been widely recognised as an essential element in demanding greater ‘transparency’ 
and ‘accountability’ from public officials. “Aware that they are being monitored by 
citizen groups, public officials know that they may be held accountable for budget 
discrepancies or failure to deliver adequate services” (World Bank, 2006, p.vi). This 
unique position illustrates very well and linked to the Bank’s focus aimed at broaden-
ing decisive participation of civil society in driving policy-making and implementa-
tion. For instance, in 2000 the then World Bank country director in Ghana is quoted 
as saying that CSOs’ are now increasingly viewed as strategically important actors 
in socio-economic policies in local development (Williams & Young, 2009). The 
“Washington consensus” concept of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1990s 
even though was focused on marketisation of the public sector; but it was also linked 
to the fact that it strengthens civil society involvement in the area of new institutional 
economics revolution (Hood & Jackson, 1991, p.5; Rhodes, 2003, p.48). Potential for 
CSOs’ participation in monitoring and promoting development is particularly evi-
dent in the Bank’s support for Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) (World 
Bank, 2000). The Bank whilst developing Country Assistance Strategy report with 
the Government of Ghana elicited the opinions of local organisations to provide the 
means and the impetus for its successful implementation (Whitfield, 2009). To ren-
der inclusion a feasible and achievable goal, the Bank employs NGO liaison officers 
to closely participate in it sponsored Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Ini-
tiative (SAPRI).
At the heart of the notion of ‘accountability’ has been the renewed interest of suc-
cessive governments in consulting citizens and CSOs’ like the Centre for Democratic 
Development (CDD), Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA), Institute of Economic 
Affairs (IEA), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), IMANI Ghana to 
mention but a few, to provide overarching policy framework in considering public 
opinion in the formulation of appropriate policies and decisions for national devel-
opment (Aryee, 2008; Hearn, 1999, p. 6). All recent attempts of ensuring the spirit 
of ‘accountability’ led the Government of Ghana to launch drastic New Public Man-
agement Reform Programme (NPMRP) (Adzroe, 2015; Lawson, 2011) in alignment 
with the Bank’s public sector governance agenda. Typically, New Public Management 
Reform has been key in introducing competitive and market-driven ethos into public 
sector (Lawson, 2011) to “effectively” and “efficiently” deliver public services. And 
relatedly, not only can public management reform improve financial accountability, 
but, included in the process could be, and can be ‘capacity building’, parliamentary 
scrutiny and ‘transparency’ in policy decisions in public sector governance, generally 
(Rhodes, 1997, p. 49). The principle of ‘transparency’ a key element of bureaucratic 
‘accountability’ which entails making available for public scrutiny all audited public 
accounts in the gargantuan fight against ‘corruption’ and administration misconducts 
have left an indelible imprint on the development practices in Ghana.
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Participation, a recurring leitmotif of ‘good governance’ mechanisms draws on an 
idea that when recipients themselves are intimately involved in the decision-making 
and implementation processes, it enhances the effectiveness of doing development 
(Nyendu, 2012). Enhanced ‘participation’ and representation are an acknowledge-
ment of the importance of responding to the needs of the extremely poor and socially 
excluded into the political decision-making and development process at local levels. 
In parallel to popular local ‘participation’ in decision-making, is rooted strongly in 
the ambivalent notion of ‘decentralised’ state with power rested in local communities. 
Decentralisation has become a catalyst to foster continuing interactive interventions 
and interactions forms of governing (Aryee, 2008, p.234; Rhodes, 20003, p.63; World 
Bank, 1989). As Ahwoi rightly points out, “the decentralization policy has neces-
sitated a change in the national planning process from the centralized “top-down” 
system to a decentralized “bottom–up” planning system” (Ahwoi, 1994, p.18). This 
frame of governance principle is primarily a development strategy to promote a sense 
of broader local ‘ownership’ and ‘empowerment’ (self-organisation) by progressively 
transferring authority and responsibility from the central government agencies to 
sub-national government structures (Nyendu, 2012). To achieve this objective Article 
240 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 
462) provide the legal regime for decentralisation of state power in Ghana. Interest in 
combating ‘corruption’ has featured prominently in the public management reform 
efforts in Ghana particularly with reference to quality, inefficiencies and malfeasance. 
This interest has reflected in the progress toward institutionalisation of policies like 
Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), anti-corruption training modules and 
the preparation of a national anticorruption plan and procurement reforms have 
increasingly become the standard policy instrument to overcome the pervasive cul-
ture of political patronage and abrasive ‘corruption’.
6.5 The discursive production of knowledge /truth
Foucault’s governmentality of discourse is premised on the political rationalities and 
technologies at work in regimes of government. It focuses as well as problematises 
power rationales which are assembled and put to work in order to govern different 
aspects of social reality; wherein it asserts practices of truth, legitimation and the 
inextricable connection between power-knowledge couplets dynamically produced 
within the contemporary regimes of government. For here—rather than unearthing 
some teleological narrative—Foucauldian perspective provides a means of ‘diagnos-
ing the present’ by demystifying and disrupting the constructed ‘knowledge’ through 
which good governance agenda emerges in Ghana (Howarth, 2002, p.128, my empha-
sis). Rose (2000, p.27) notes this arguing that, “to govern, one could say, is to be con-
demned to seek an authority for one’s authority”.
Although the mythical mantra of country ‘ownership’ and ‘country-driven’ develop-
ment are substantially built on the basis of altruism and utilitarianism, yet the World 
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Bank establishes and maintains pervasive global discourses of development planning 
to objectify, discipline, normalise and govern its clients governments through codes 
of ethical practice and behaviour (reflected in prescriptive training manuals, various 
training programmes and workshops to improve the management ‘skills’ of bureau-
crats and policy makers). Predictably, the importance of this was accentuated due 
to the Bank re-branding itself as a global Knowledge Bank and ‘expert’ of particu-
lar forms of development economics. This is especially true for a country like Ghana 
whose ministries, municipalities and agencies have insipidly and distressingly come 
under the tutelage and the disciplinary ‘gaze’ of the Bank to meet benchmarked forms 
of governance. Again, it is stressed that armed with specialist ‘knowledge’ and episte-
mological arrogance —the Bank has been naturalised as authoritative centre and par-
agon of moral agenda and enforces normative standards of conduct which like a virus, 
is inherently cultural and privileging. Through further semi-formalised development 
institutions, forms of knowledge, concrete practices are consolidated, normalised and 
constructed around which new “truths” about African development are actually pro-
duced (Abrahamsen, 2000; Fougner, 2004).
The language underpinning the Bank’s discourse is pervasive and powerful, not only 
by words and deed; but it is also impregnated with values and ethics which insinuate 
a dichotomy between the ‘corrupt’ and the ‘good’ state institutions, public servants 
etc. (in this case Ghanaian public servants): and finds resonance with the discursive 
trajectory which lies deep and fundamentally integral to the production and repro-
duction of embodied subjects that constitute, inhabit, and maintain the neoliberal 
‘good governance’. As for such a view, Susan Rose-Ackermanm (1978, p.9) enthuses 
that “normative statements about corruption require a point of view, a standard of 
‘goodness’. Significantly, given the “othering” nature and complexity of corruption 
discourse (Polzer, 2001), it is unsurprising that the Bank exerts individualising con-
trol, extending its tentacles of crusading codes of conduct by taking on authoritative 
position, and championing such claims, articulated as a model of absolute “truth” 
(“good”) that ethically should be replicated, by simplemindedly expressing the irratio-
nality of corrupt systems (Ibid). Euben (1989, p.230) steadfastly challenges this view. 
As he writes, “to call a regime corrupt is to say something about the speaker’s prefer-
ences, not about the regime itself ”. In other words the discourses of corruption are 
assembled and internalised by constructing ‘consensus’ in order to sustain and legiti-
mate the discursive contours by giving corruption a “truth” canopy (Polzer, 2001). 
This in Foucauldian senses is, but another product of a discourse: “by production of 
truth I mean not the production of true utterances but the establishment of domains 
in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent” 
(Foucault, 1981, p.9). It is for this reason that Foucault (2000) suggested that “truth” 
should not be seen as empirical-scientific knowledge or transcendental; but grand 
attempts to make visible the pervasive technologies infused with relations of power 
that constituted “truth” and its subjectivities.
The Bank’s avowed ideological predilections and its hegemonic knowledge as 
‘universal’ epistemology are steeped in its interventionist tactic of a calculating and 
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rationally maximising individual in this discursive game. Despite however, alterna-
tive regimes of “truth”, such as, culture, values and possible knowledges or political 
understandings of corruption, with the aim to offer fresh perspectives are erroneously 
and purposefully considered as naive, specious and indeed useless arguments made by 
parasitic and self-serving corrupt politicians. Appropriately, as echoed by Gadbaw and 
Richards (1997, p.3), “in country after country in all regions and among all major cul-
tures of the world, this cynicism (of cultural relativism in defining corruption) seems 
to have been swept away” by overwhelming “evidence” of the “magnitude and scope” 
of the “problem”. Distinctive form of expert knowledge is to establish “standards” and 
“best practices”. In tandem, to be considered as an expert, encapsulates formalisation of 
rules seen prerequisite to govern the production of true statements within the expert 
field (Foucault, 1972). This in turn potentially opens up new possibilities to enhance 
the ability of this form of ‘expert’ knowledge to render Ghana classifiable and manage-
able and contribute to the construction of a form of “governance” or governmental-
ity, which ultimately, constitutes the technical “know-how” that informs governmental 
practices. What we should ultimately bear in mind is that the political technology of 
‘good governance’ project has been humanised and framed as normatively unobjec-
tionable and desirable thus acknowledging it as a pervasive and immensely influential 
policy imperative for the economic development of peripheral areas.
6.6 Production of subjectivities
The ‘good governance’ project evasively, albeit poignantly, permeates the discursive 
constitution of a specific form of political subject, autonomous self-regulating agent 
that is governable— which by no means can be described as “technologies of the self ” 
(Foucault, 2010). By this, I understand Foucault to mean that political subject is the 
one ready to accept neoliberal “truths”. The rhetorical shift of ‘good governance’ para-
digm of the BWIs has emphasised national ‘ownership’ with significant degree of pol-
icy freedom and self-governance as a means for achieving economic development. The 
main assumption contained in this particular aspect of the recent seeming policy shift 
is the belief that local ‘ownership’ is central to the redefinition and reconfiguration of 
the development policymaking landscape to include non-state actors— and as a cor-
ollary to address the shortcomings of SAPs. In the case of Ghana, this is particularly 
evident in Community Water and Sanitation Projects (CWSP) with a great deal of 
emphasis on the provision of water and sanitation services, community development, 
‘grassroots empowerment’ and ‘capacity enhancement’ in the Bank’s policies (World 
Bank, 2004). This approach provides a rationale which is in sharp contrast to previ-
ous World Bank’s water supply projects which have been of a top-down, hierarchi-
cal ideal that rejects any indigenous ‘participation’ within the radius of development 
(Williams & Young, 2009).
It bears mentioning again that the promotion of ‘partnerships’, ‘participation’, 
‘capacity building’ and local ‘empowerment’, it is alleged will generate and concomi-
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tantly constitute a sine qua non requirement which reveals its productive connection 
with neoliberal policies and programmes associated with Community Based Rural 
Development Project (World Bank, 2004), which the project document indicates, 
improve ‘good governance’; but more importantly in the interest of ‘empowering’ the 
poor by exhorting them to play a pro-active role in issues which affect their economic 
lives (Ibid, p.4-5). Under World Bank-style ‘empowerment’ approach to poverty 
reduction, poor people are not directly managed and controlled, but rather become 
object of development programmes and central agency for development. Or, put 
another way, a decisive move towards the axioms of what some have called “inclusive” 
neoliberal model (Craig & Porter, 2006). The foregoing perspectives are critical in 
understanding neoliberal globalisation in Africa as exceptionally produced through 
a form of governmentality and Ghana does not constitute an exception to the rule.
We need to recognise that it is not only individual subject that is discursively consti-
tuted as entrepreneurial, self-regulating subjects (Medovoi, 2007, p.54); nation-states 
themselves are reciprocally embodied in the rationalities of governmental terrain. 
In fact, nation-states are produced as political subjects that should be driven by the 
market spirit of competitiveness in shaping the policies and the future of the coun-
try. Accordingly, beneficiary countries that are the target of authoritative discourses 
endemic within development programmes under pious rhetorical considerations are 
supported to take ‘ownership’ of their development, and constantly encouraged to be 
prime agents of change. Foucault (2008, p.269), provides a succinct account namely 
that “neoliberal subject is one that is “eminently governable” (p.270) on the basis of 
its “rationality”; “rational conduct (being) any conduct which is sensitive to modifica-
tions in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a non-random 
way, in a systematic way”. Primarily, the neoliberal subject Foucault (2008, p.269) 
argues, is one “who accepts reality”. Understandably, how that socially constructed 
reality emerges, reified and gets widely circulated in a particular form of governance is 
crucial. This line of argument is best evinced and further reinforced by the way they 
primarily function as a form of governmentality thus, inevitably, governing subjects 
and spaces. This is especially true for Ghana whereby government departments, highly 
structured and growing local NGOs presence, are concerned with their commitment 
to “excessive proceduralism”, benchmarks and standardised practices to perpetuate 
‘good governance’ agenda.
In alignment with the above considerations, regimes of government produce and 
disseminated through plural and multiple free subjects constructed and normalised 
under the contextual regimes of “truth” invisibly imposed on them. My argument is 
that subject formation needs not however, apply only to individuals, it extends its 
scope to both state and non-state actors who shape and perform governmental tasks 
(Sending & Neumann, 2006 p.668). Within this framework, a state-centric paradigm 
fails to capture the wider context and encompass a thorough re-appraisal of the con-
stitutive and productive element of power relations. On the one hand, these subjectiv-
ities could find its distinct place within the rational and calculating neoliberal notion 
of “homo economics” (Foucault, 2008) of neoliberal regime and on the other hand, 
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subjectivities such as non-governmental organisations, international organisations, 
civil societies, and other autonomous social institutions which invariably lend support 
to particular governmental rationalities. Norms and practices incessantly embedded 
and embodied in ‘good governance’ (in the Foucauldian sense), serve as an impressive 
example to govern recipient States. This insight as well also poses profound politi-
cal implications for interlocking networks of governing agents and agencies, such as 
quasi-governmental institutions, political actors, NGOs, community partners, and 
even international agencies ( Joseph, 2012b; Neumann & Sending, 2010) within the 
contemporary global governance system. In fact —non-state actors of all kinds—
IMANI Ghana, Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), Centre for Democratic 
Development (CDD), Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA), Third World Network 
Africa (TWN) etc.— have all contributed to this tendency of extensive governance 
structures allegedly outside the State within the Ghanaian body politic.
Central to the new aid partnerships increasingly found in the field of both Interna-
tional Relations (IR) and International Political Economy(IPE) is to internalise norms 
and practices of ‘good governance’, and this ambition is best captured in the values of 
‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ in African policymakers: the inculcation of these 
values have become the dominant frame of reference in Ghana (at least rhetorically) 
whereby the various discourses that overtly or covertly suffuse development policy-
making are evinced and realised. Of crucial importance, therefore, is the “production 
of modern, self-disciplined citizens and States that can be trusted to govern them-
selves according to liberal democratic norms” (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 1454). And so, 
while many hard-nosed critics view the pre-eminent emphasis on the myth of ‘part-
nership’ as actually diminishing African control and agency, ‘partnership’ Abraham-
sen (2000, p.1454) cogently argues, are “techniques of cooperation and inclusion” to 
re-enforce the dominance of the neoliberal market forces. Ultimately, then, attempts 
by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to zealously secure the expansion of 
the neoliberal mode and structures had become necessarily tied to the implementa-
tion of market-friendly policies in return for receiving funds (Mawuko, 2014).
6.7 Technologies and techniques
When the rules that govern discourse are contingently implicated in power relations, 
“truth” and knowledge are born. Regimes or “politics of truth” (Foucault, 1980a) 
however, do not just simply constitute a certain sense of “reality” within the discursive 
mosaic in which they are bolstered and transformed; but rather, it is regarded as being 
discursively implicated within the bodies of the subjects involved. Foucault (1990) 
makes this point when he asserts that bodies are regulated through discourse through 
specific technologies of power or what he refers to as ‘bio-power’. Within these are-
nas, “truth” effect is tinkered with and inflected through a complex proliferation of 
governance by non-state actors which yield to power effect. Thus, it suggests a mode 
of directing the conduct of subjects which in tum, have the potential to restructure 
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and construe new roles for governments (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Indeed, agents 
of change much emphasis on the governmentalisation of global civil society is related 
with market-influenced biopolitical strategies and technologies to structure global 
governance in which development is prioritised (Foucault, 2003c). As far as politi-
cal technology is concerned, it is regarded as juridical code, increasingly formalised 
and productively fit into a “regime of truth” and points toward civil societies subject 
construction and insertion in the biopolitical formulations and concerns (Ripinsky & 
Bossche, 2007).
The catch is that governmentalisation of civil society has been so far entangled in 
aid-dispensing industry and therefore they are able to construct powerful discourses 
and deploy civil society as a political subject and its insertion into mechanisms of gov-
ernance. Within this milieu, best practices and benchmarks are involved in attempts 
to centrally impose prescriptions and mores on states to evasively entrench and insti-
tutionalised ‘participation’ by civil society groups. All of this is to suggest that the 
notion of civil society has seemingly become ubiquitous while at the same time exem-
plifying a form of governing structure within an increasingly deterritorialised global 
society (Nelson & Wright, 1995). Their discourses and practices are institutionally 
sanctioned and have been immensely prominent and pervasive with it moulding 
effect profoundly influencing Ghanaian policymakers regarding development issues. 
As Mohan (2002, p.125) points out: “an active civil society, it was believed, would 
enable choice, scrutinize errant governments, and ultimately lead to regularized, plu-
ral democracy”.
Sheppard and Leitner (2010) whilst acknowledging the neoliberal logics of eco-
nomic government that inform the civil society as catalysts for development, exten-
sively talk about the decided shift and rationalities that set the discursive frame within 
which the “Washington Consensus” of the 1980s and the so-called “Post-Washing-
ton Consensus” of 1990s advocated primarily by Joseph Stiglitz, were inaugurated, 
enacted and pursued. However, despite the shifts regarding the specific policies that 
are regenerated and reconfigured, there exist a number of deep continuities within 
and around the developmentalist agenda in the periphery. Such a construction allows 
for a glimpse into how developmentalist projects are the result of the creation and (re)
production of a spatiality of difference based on a form of binarism by development 
organisations that exert power and impose their own form of mystified knowledge 
and ‘expertise’ produced within the so-called West and the rest. It is in this respect 
that the immense contribution of civil society for neoliberal governmentality gradu-
ally materialised and reconstituted as it is regarded as a potent means to scrutinise and 
sanitise a particular country’s level of development within the global economic order.
Equally important, however, is the fact that the persistence in promoting civil 
society as a pivot of participatory development is circumscribed within the neolib-
eral logic espoused by the World Bank to produce a complex chain of stakehold-
ers in developmental projects— whereby the aim is on increased ‘transparency’ and 
‘accountability’ which are not explicitly interlinked to the necessity to address issues 
considered fundamental to development policy implementation in general. Given this 
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all-encompassing framework, participatory development divulges the covert micro-
technologies of power (Foucault, 1977): one that aims to target political subjects such 
as civil societal agencies, and concomitantly shape the conduct of other subjects—
with the emphasis placed upon countries which are the object of governmental inter-
vention in the form of development. It needs noting however that the role of civil 
society pertaining to neoliberal political can be characterised as a portmanteau and 
overlapping in the sense that while civil society is seen as inherently distinct from the 
state and formal political institutions, it is at the same time seen both as constituted 
by and constitutes the agent of governance. It is important to realise that participa-
tory development and the interplay of power relations that saturate such a discourse, 
can in a way be seen in how the poor are responsibilised through rationalities and 
technologies of what Weidner (2013) calls the development-participation-governance 
stitched together in a paradoxical discursive assemblage (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).
Simultaneously, it will be possible to explicate and expose in what ways power effect 
of the discourse of governance can clearly be seen from a range of political technolo-
gies covertly expressed through the crude New Public Management reform package 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p.20 ; Reinicke, 1998) ; and it is, therefore, power effect 
of this version of the governance discourse which currently constitutes and reflects a 
radical transformation of the public sector from its primordial state into a new realm 
of a more efficient operational structure based on neoliberal practices of commoditi-
sation and corporatisation. The point, here, is that the ‘good governance’ agenda with 
emphasis on country ‘ownership’ and or ‘participation’ can be defined and analysed 
according to wide-range of neoliberal sponsored technologies and rationalities per-
ceived and interpreted to confidently produce eminently responsible, self-governing 
subjects within a biopolitical economic order (Foucault, 2000, p.298-325). It is there-
fore, pertinent here to reiterate Foucault who while studying neoliberal principles of 
government in the works of F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, provides an insightful 
account into neoliberalism: “as a body of knowledge, strategies, and practices of gov-
ernance that seeks to divest the state of paternalistic responsibility by shifting social, 
political and economic “responsibility” to privatised institutions and economically 
rationalised “self-governing individuals” (Nadesan, 2008, p.32). In other words, the 
individualistic gaze is directed according to Foucault at invisibly governing individu-
als (Lemke, 2001 p.201). “By stressing “self-care”, the neoliberal state divulges pater-
nalistic responsibility for its subjects but simultaneously holds its subjects responsible 
for self- governance” (Nadesan, 2008, p.33). All these elements, I argue provide useful 
framework to analyse broader mechanisms of international economic policies pur-
sued by supranational actors —such as International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank which direct us toward a richer understanding of contemporary geometry of 
power through which construction of the subject and the discursive power-knowl-
edge matrix is framed and spotlighted.
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6.8 Politics of resistance: ruptures and recapitulations
This section focuses on the mobilisation of grassroots-based social movements, which 
are engaged in counter-hegemonic subaltern struggles in an attempt to challenge and 
provide an alternative against mundane, quotidian hegemonic neoliberal order (Osei 
kwadwo, 2006, p.85). I draw on the case of Ghana, a country widely considered as the 
“star pupil” of market friendly, neoliberal poloicies in the African region, to reflect 
critically upon the link between the implementation of neoliberal policies, social 
movements activism, and domestic politics. Here I discuss the case of the enforce-
ment of a policy of Value Added Tax (VAT) as part of the neoliberal economic ortho-
doxy. Drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the practices of effective resistance as tactical 
reversal I illuminate the nature of opposition to neoliberal discourses in a country in 
which these discourses have become dominant and hegemonic.
In May 1995, a series of protests and clashes against the imposition of the Value 
Added Tax of 17.5 per cent, externally imposed by agents of neoliberalism, such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund culminated in the anti-adjust-
ment coalition. Within the context of the neoliberal policy agenda, Value Added Tax 
could be seen as one of the cornerstones of the Public Financial Management Reform 
Programme and the ‘good governance’ agenda imposed by the Bretton Woods institu-
tions on Ghana. On 11 May, a group from the anti-adjustment coalition, the Alliance 
for Change (AFC) and existing pressure groups, such as the Trades Union (TUC) 
Congress, the Civil Servants Association(CSA) capitalised on growing popular dis-
content and organised a massive public demonstration in Accra to fiercely resist 
what they considered as crude and ruthless neoliberal restructuring of the economy. 
The demonstration, code-named “Kume Preko” (kill me at once) marked the most 
militantly anti-government march since 1990s. Everywhere, the new tax was deeply 
denounced as anxiety and public anger rose. In short, demonstrations were a defiant 
statement of insurmountable resistance against unbearable hardships precipitated by 
the so-called economic reform package. The government trapped in an uncertainty 
about the long-term consequences of mounting public outcry and discontent, was 
forced to withdraw its implementation at the end of May. Remarkably, in spite of 
VAT’s demise, other forms of widespread resistance also emerged against the econom-
ically repressive orthodox adjustment policies, code named “Sieme Preko” (burry me 
at once) and “Wieme Preko” (finish me at once) held in Kumasi and Takoradi, the 
second and third largest cities respectively.
The governmentality approach helps to explain Foucault’s account of intercon-
nectedness between structure-agency and power-resistance derived from his vision of 
power but in important ways goes beyond these binary oppositions (Cadman, 2010). 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power is best expressed by his notion that “where 
there is power there is a resistance” (Foucault, 1975, p.27). There cannot be power 
relations without critical possibilities of effective resistance over the fact of domina-
tion —indeed— if there are no such conditions and conditioning of possibilities of 
changing “intolerables”, then it is states of domination but not power. Power relations, 
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Foucault tells us, is characterised in the following way: “mobile, reversible, ubiquitous, 
dispersed, flexible, circulating and unstable” (Foucault, 1984, p.292). These character-
istics, Foucault observes, give room for the possibility of resistance as strategic reversal 
to modify it thereby paving way for new power relationships. And so, resistance is 
immanent to power relations and not opposed to them. Such an approach suggests 
that power and resistance are sufficiently dialectical or, perhaps it is better said, are 
mutually constitutive. Foucault says that practices of resistance consistently reflect 
and found forceful expression in local, strategic struggles inescapably conditioned and 
rationalised by techniques and material effects of power in our immediate circum-
stances, rather than being directed towards a vaguely utopian ideal notion of power 
widely (Ibid). For Foucault, it is through acts of resistance that the subject produces 
herself more autonomously than is intended by power itself essentially at the points of 
tension, sudden breaks and ruptures to legitimise a certain rationality of government. 
Foucault’s (Brent Pickett, 1996, p.462) fundamental idea is that it is the “strategic 
codification of common points of resistance” that make radical change and reversals 
possible. The point of such a narrative is to reveal that resistance may assume an affili-
ation not only to the present exercise of power, but also to events which in this case 
are implicated in the production of one’s subjectivity through specific logics, content, 
and manifestation at a given period. This characterisation enables us to analyse the 
model of resistance locally, at points of rupture, struggles and innumerable tensions; 
one that is firmly rooted in the historical conditions that made the present modes of 
resistance possible (Hoy, 2004).
Rather than imagining resistance merely as “antimatter”, Foucault (O’ Malley et al., 
1997, p.505) suggests that it something that is integral to the shaping of power rela-
tions that allows a conception of politics as “relations of contest or struggle which are 
constitutive of government. Thus, on Foucault’s analysis, practices of resistance can 
act as external blockage which frustrate, nullify or counteract, among other things, 
unproblematic and successful implementation of governmental programmes within 
the “fine meshes of power”(Foucault, 1994, p.122). Indeed, the possibility for govern-
mental programmes to fail because of the obstacles and struggles that are put in its way 
I want to suggest here, plays an important role in a radical Foucauldian politics. It is 
vital, Foucault (Stenson, 2008; Li, 2007a; McKee, 2009; Lemke, 2007) has suggested 
to acknowledge the constitutive and integrative role of resistances, contestations, and 
antagonisms as they become increasingly diffused into governmental rationalities and 
technologies. I am suggesting that this is precisely the stuff that Foucauldian resis-
tance is made of, classically conceived here as the “strategic polyvalence” or “revers-
ibility” to which rationalities of neoliberal government are disposed (Binkley, 2009).
Foucault statements on practices of resistance and power as elaborated in his 
Power-Knowledge, History of Sexuality (vol. 1), and The Subject and Power — I want to 
suggest— in Foucauldian terms may have proven particularly helpful for Alliance for 
Change (AFC) to replicate the activism of their counterparts of the 1990s in resisting 
the implementation of market logic of neoliberalism. My own sense is that the notion 
of resistance within the analytic framework of Foucault might have determined the 
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counter “space” and the chemical catalyst in unleashing popular discontent and con-
testation from “below” to Ghanaian adjustment. Moreover, it reveals albeit implicitly, 
the tensions within broader debates on developmentalism which the discursive ethos 
of neoliberalism so to say had subtly and obliquely obscured. If resistance can totally 
reverse, not just modify, a major economic reform measure, as Foucault correctly 
believes it is, then the conditions which foster resistance should be promoted— thus 
concomitantly leading to new forms of subjectivity.
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that the neoliberal ‘good governance’ reform agenda 
by the Bank cannot be properly understood without an adequate understanding of 
the intricately complex socio-politico-economic and historical provenance that gave 
birth to it. I have shown that the development critique on the epic failure of struc-
tural adjustment reforms to bring robust economic growth at the end of the 1980s is 
closely connected to the surfacing of contemporary notion of the ‘good governance’ 
fad. Thus the past two decades of rigorous market logic neoliberal reform provide a 
historical context in which to analyse and evaluate ‘good governance’ in Africa. Far 
from the fervent claim that the rhetorical inclusive-neoliberal development discourse 
represents a shift from the discursive parameters of the market-oriented economic 
policies of structural adjustment, I have suggested that they are largely powerful 
motors to propagate neoliberal reforms inconspicuously imposed and proposed by 
the ‘benevolent’ Western countries on the “others”: whereby postcolonial states are 
“discursively fabricated” as irrational, inefficient, “narrow”, “selfish”, non-modern “oth-
ers” of the West, highly ‘corrupt’, passive receptacles of development and crucially, are 
recognised as being so as to justify their incorporation into the suffocating global eco-
nomic order.
My analysis has clarified that what repetitively emerges from the Bank’s embed-
ded practices of representation on ‘good governance’ is a crisis-ridden south Saharan 
Africa; and, by so doing, shape postcolonial state and its leaders’ subjectivity (Fou-
cault, 1982); one that is increasingly supportive of the entrepreneurial and market-
driven spirit of competitiveness. In fact, I have called into question the material 
effects of the Bank’s discourses which multifariously operate as pervasive technolo-
gies of power that produce and sustain unassailable knowledge and “regimes of truth” 
that are inscribed within it (Foucault, 1977). But, more critical still, these prevalent 
“regime of truths” are indicative of the ways in which development thinking and prac-
tices have been historically and to date significantly predicated on “pathognomonic 
orientation” ( Jordan et al., 1997, p.85). I have empirically approached the so-called 
World Bank’s report - Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to Sustainable Growth, Gover-
nance and Development, WB 1997 The State in a Changing World and 2002 Building 
Institutions for Markets reports governmentally; focusing on the ensemble of knowl-
edge, material practices, presuppositions, statements, rationales, prescriptions, strate-
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gies, objects, subjects that were historically produced and represented such that ‘good 
governance’ discourse emerged as an inevitable and indispensable tonic for aid-receiv-
ing governments.
I have examined how universal code of the ‘good governance’ agenda in the Gha-
naian body politic is littered with laudable rhetoric assemblage of transparency, 
accountability, capacity building, enhanced participation, civil society, ownership, 
empowerment, decentralised power sharing and public sector reforms. This pro-
nounced, yet ambivalent discursive shift as part of the good governance-oriented 
development assistance is materially inscribed in a particular regime of knowledge, 
“truth”, micro-technologies of power and the concomitant constitution of subjec-
tivities that starkly emanate from those who bolster and legitimate these practices 
(Dean, 2007; Curry, 2003). In much the same way the shift in the Bank’s governance 
agenda in Ghana can also similarly be understood as emerged neoliberal forms of 
governmentality.
Last but certainly not least, Foucauldian resistance despite the insights it offers, 
critics still charge is dubiously unable to give normative reasons why resistance is pref-
erable to submission (Fraser, 1981); I feel, on the contrary, that Foucault’s ideas on 
the practices of resistance can provide powerful analytical lens for explaining how 
discontenting grassroots social movements act to resist, reverse and discursively dis-
mantle the neoliberal present (Guma Karakire, 2015). Such is, I believe, an indispens-
able component of forms of agency (Foucault, 1977). At any rate, the ethical-political 
choice, however, is as Foucault (1984, p.256) continually admonishes us, “is to deter-
mine which is the main danger” every day and incessantly struggle against it in an 
urgent and politically progressive ways. This, as fervently envisioned and explicated 
by Foucault spawns and engenders possibilities of insurmountable resistance and 
reversibility in the neoliberal present. I have used this principle in the case study of 
Ghana to explore possible ways in which grassroots social movements have the capac-
ity to counter the negative effects of neoliberal globalisation through disrupting and 
unmasking hierarchical power relations.
As far as I can see, the extent to which pervasive discourses can subjugate actors 
—whether states or individuals—and render them susceptible to the effects of power 
is by itself contingent on how they (actors) envision alternative discursive practices 
from “others” worldview or discursively resist them. It is the contention of this study 
that the pervasive ‘good governance’ agenda more generally, must be examined and 
analysed within a broader discursive space (Taylor 1997, p.25)—only then does 
it make sense to speak of critical space of contested, restricted and often multiple 
confrontations.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Rehabilitating the Centaur State:  
Structural Adjustment as a Disciplinary Technology
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I direct attention towards the examination of the techniques of “disci-
plining” power enacted by disciplinary technologies of structural adjustment regime. 
In the following, I will attempt to present Michel Foucault’s relational, situational and 
‘productive’ conceptualisation of power: that of the production in which considerable 
freedom, possibility and autonomy are exercised by the subject in the practice of his/
her own individual subjectivity. What this chapter seeks to analyse is how the circum-
scription of state regulatory authority in domestic policy space within the structural 
adjustment framework transformed subjects into passive objects as apprehended in 
and highlighted through Foucault’s concepts relating to disciplinary mechanisms. I 
am concerned, however, to note how Ghana became amenable to external policy pre-
scriptions within structural adjustment regime to be constituted into objects to grasp 
how development has been discursively deployed in the discipline of International 
Relations (Mitchell, 1995): arguing, in the Foucauldian vein that structural adjust-
ment regime can be understood as a technique of “normalisation” that shows charac-
teristics of power as “discipline” and as governmentality (Foucault, 1991). In closing, 
and by way of illustration, I will briefly offer ‘non-compliance’ as one possibility into 
what Foucault terms “counter-conducts” or “dissenting conducts” within the context 
of neoliberal governmentality.
7.2 Disciplinary Power of Structural Adjustment
The chief function of the disciplinary power is to ‘train’, rather than to select and 
to levy; or no doubt to train in order to levy and select all the more…The success of 
disciplinary power derives no doubt from the use of simple instruments: hierar-
chical observation, normalizing judgement, and their combination in a procedure 
that is specific to it —the examination —Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish, 
1977).
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This section will pursue the claim that disciplinary mechanisms are a characteristic 
feature of structural adjustment regime and then highlight the ways in which they 
function to normalise neoliberalism in the Ghanaian context. The pernicious struc-
tural adjustment paradigm—in all of its expressions, is a totalitarian boa constrictor 
and a narcissistic project. It repressed where it should have fostered, enervated rather 
than strengthened. There has not been any systematic overview of the predicaments 
of the African continent (particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s) without a look 
into the role of the Bretton Woods institutions. While there are sufficient reasons for 
such critical perspective in their assessment to be negative, they undeniably provide 
an invaluable resource for appreciating how the policies of these institutions have 
increasingly shaped the economic and political behaviours, and implicated themselves 
on the life of the societies in which they operate. It will be suggested that forms and 
mechanisms of interventions are not necessarily limited at the level of the State, but 
it also reverberate at the much lower levels, especially at the level of everyday prac-
tices and experiences where the outcomes of vile macro-economic policies are felt 
(Best, 2007). And as said, it is on this level that higher-level policy interventions 
are reanimated and reinvigorated into practice, domesticated and stabilised in the 
way in which individuals and social groups whose ways of life it assaults with inten-
tions actively strive to reclaim and re-enact everyday life. It would be argue that it 
is the ordinary, the unremarkable, and the mundane encounters within the locus of 
the everyday life, (Springer, 2014, 2015, 2016) that the deeply problematic world of 
structural adjustment regime – at least in its unrefined orthodox versions – that it 
is dangerously ingrained into the non-problematic experiences of everyday reality. In 
Lefebvre’s (1984, p.24) terms—it is the quotidian that on the contrary it is literally 
taken-for-natural, rarely questioned and even cursorily addressed. With the vantage 
point of hindsight, I argue that neoliberal structural adjustment regime by insinuating 
into people’s quotidian life in many ways fosters and feeds on deeply rhetorical eman-
cipatory discourses. 
Today, it is hardly even a provocation to suggest that structural adjustment regime 
has had a perculiar constitutive effect on the social ‘reality’ of post-colonial African 
state; thereby contributing to an ontology that renders the post-colonial African 
state governable in certain ways. There is an overwhelming way whereby its ideas 
seek to ultimately capture, pervade and destabilise realities of everyday life (Barnett, 
2005; Birch, 2015; Lewis, 2009; Ong, 2007). In structural adjustment discourses, 
at stake is the attempt to play on a strongly held yet ambigious view that it is the 
sole source of objective superior scientific knowledge necessary to solve specific set of 
policy problems on our social world — as though there is no counter discourse that 
could appropriately be offered to weaken its edifice (Springer, 2014). I make the case 
that structural adjustment regime can therefore be conceived as a very distinct epis-
temological project: one that enacts, enables and entrenches development aid; and 
unmistakably reinforces the conditions for its reproduction and resonance. Structural 
adjustment as a very distinct epistemological project operates to eargely instil itself in 
legitimising discourses which in a more Freirean (1970, p.29) sense are full of eman-
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cipatory pedagogies bandying around buzz-words; namely, “popular participation”, 
“ownership”, “capacity-building”, “empowerment”, “transparency” and “poverty alle-
viation”. Essentially this was part and parcel of the development-governance adjust-
ment implementation matrix in Ghana. Such seductive discourses in their apparent 
value free posturing some what paradoxically make all forms of criticisms against the 
order of things innocuous. The key point about such emancipatory pedagogies under 
the neoliberal economic structural adjustment project is that they can be grasped and 
reflected upon through rich assemblage of complex, varied and heterogeneous net-
work of practices; practices ultimately constituting a prime motivating force behind a 
massive shift in the regulatory norms of the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund. These practices, it appears increasingly sustains, accompanies and echoes 
in many of the themes of the global biopolitical rationalities of liberal governance 
control over the borrowing target countries.
This is so much so that this neoliberal governmentalising rationalities and impe-
tuses of the adjustment economic reforms were assiduously and enthusiastically 
absorbed by the adjusting states to “transform their environment by their own praxis” 
(Rahman, 1993, p.13). I take the view that the process of token inclusiveness or sterile 
rhetoric of wider participatory policymaking (whatever that may mean), continuously 
invoked by notions of “freedom” rather than direct domination and imposition influ-
entially, and powerfully reshaped the modalities of states’ engagement with the exter-
nal economy (Abrahamsen, 2004). A word of explanation is in order here: actively 
reinstating states arising from self-regulatory principle through subjective freedom in 
discipline manner (Deleuze cited in Dillion & Reid, 2001; Dean, 1999, p.121-2) in 
the territorialised populations plainly enhances and perpetuates the transplantation 
of neoliberal adjustment policies. The concern is not merely with the regulatory dis-
cipline of the doctrine of conditionality, but more crucially through the reproduction 
of omnipresence of a normalising model of adjustment rationalities by the recipient 
counties (or political elites) within its own jurisdiction. Adjustment rationalities are 
concerned with ensuring that State elites internalise (good political practices) and 
thus be made amenable, gradable and calculable to the logic and the imperatives of 
the social and economic policies underwritten and championed by its apostles. The 
underlying fact was to ensure that the coercive apparatus of conditionality and stabili-
sation programmes are complied with (Best, 2007). 
But much more important than this is that the internalisation of policy by the 
political elites of structural adjustment states in all appearances, is exactly what the 
ontology of global governance, inter alia, takes its inspiration and insidiously aims 
to encourage (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Fritschtak, 1994; World Bank, 1994). And of 
course, it is within this orientation that James Rosenau (1992) excellently remarked 
that global neoliberal governance thus very much appears to govern without govern-
ment which informs regimes of governmentality. In fact, remarks like this justify me 
in saying that structural adjustment can be considered as sine qua non of govermen-
talising strategies insofar it is articulated in terms of the neoliberal market-driven 
technologies, where the freedom and autonomy of the governed are encouraged by 
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urgently appealing to the ideas of responsibility, self-awareness and self-regulation 
(Foucault, 2008, p.147).
This thesis seeks to question this moment. A moment which inaugurates, 
entrenches and legitimates an illusion. The illusion in question is Ghana in the con-
text of structural adjustment regime. Let me illustrate this with a concrete example: 
within the neoliberal structural adjustment model, Ghana was not clearly defined as a 
normative or an essential ontological register. In fact, Ghana does not have any sense 
of ontological virtue—it was described as, “a self-contained” (Cruch, 1995, p.14-15) 
and a bounded social entity. What Foucault (1975, p.184) refers to, tellingly enough 
as, “a material artefact of power” versus a, “cheerful illusion” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
1999, p.24). They may be illusions, but they are very powerful and compelling illu-
sions—in proof of which validate the exposure to the discourses that conscript the 
space of external intervention of power (Escobar, 1984-85, p.387). It will be explained 
here that the misguided structural (mal) adjustment policies as an instrument of a 
will to power of neoliberal practices and policy discourses are intimately tied to the 
attempts at constructing ‘reality’ which also creates the institutional frameworks that 
are necessary for its reproduction and resonance. And for that one should aim at 
unpacking and exposing the Orwellian designs and disruptions conceptualised and 
defined through structural adjustment, which seeks to forward alternative epistemo-
logical frameworks. 
Over the years, many attempts have been made at various academic and institu-
tional level in rejecting the infamous “Washington Consensus”, namely economic 
liberalism and ‘good governance’. Unfortunately, these radical intents of the many dif-
ferent approaches framed through the critique of the old “Washington Consensus” 
have either remained sterile or petered out at the level of implementation. I maintain 
that this is so because paradoxically the tactics deployed to fight the neoliberal order 
do no more than reinforce it hierarchies. It thus in some ways appear to impoverishe 
the complex realities in ways which have tended to recoup and reproduce the episte-
mological imperialism through which structural (mal) adjustment insinuates itself in 
people’s everyday life. Its narrow view of the much more international project appears 
increasingly emptied of hegemonic ‘certainties’ which frame and give coherence to 
each one of the elements that are critiqued (Bockman, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011). My 
analysis will focus on the “disciplinarisation” of Ghana with reference to the process 
of “normalisation”. I will therefore, content myself with three levels of analysis viz. the 
reinvention of governable social actors, permanent visibility of the country and the 
rationalisation of knowledge of the country as the key instruments of power.
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7.3  “Normalisation” and the Bretton Woods Institutions: The Foucauldian 
Gaze
From Foucault’s point of view, the very nervous system of biopolitics is normalisa-
tion. The techniques of normalisation and control work in such a way as to make 
social actors internalise norms and willingly (naïvely) comply with directions that 
are imposed on them from outside to regulate their own behaviour. In Discipline and 
Punish Foucault (1977) shows how disciplinary power operates through a process of 
normalisation to produce power-knowledge regime in society. I propose that this is in 
tandem with the structural adjustment programmes as a biopolitical form of govern-
mentality which frames the normalisation process within which the government of 
Ghana wilfully internalise the ‘all seeing gaze’ of Bretton Woods Institutions without 
being aware of it. Foucault’s concept of normalisation is best understood in the way in 
which he forged an irrefutable connection between increasing disciplinary power on 
the one hand, and the figure of Bentham’s panoptic model on the other (Hoffmann, 
2011). Indeed, I argue that one aspect of Foucault’s work which can be more appro-
priately applied to the operation of power of the Bretton Woods institutions is his 
depiction of the Benthamian idea of the panopticon (Foucault, 1995). The exercise 
of power through space and hence, through the spatial shifting of the neoliberal state 
is made possible by the “panoptic” technologies of control (Foucault, 1977, p.200-
208). Foucault’s explication on the importance of the “nornmalising judgement” in 
the function of normalising power does not entail the use of coercion, but through 
the construction of normalised subjects. Of course, “in this ritual, the modern form 
of power and the modern form of knowledge – that of individuals in both cases – are 
brought together in a single technique” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.158). What is 
of interest in this particular context is that inefficient States are placed against an arbi-
trarily constructed notion of normality and by implication, the “normalizing gaze” 
places development practice and thinking “into a complex power-knowledge web in 
which power is exerted over states, whether or not in their (best) interests” (Foucault 
cited in Marshall, 1996, p. 129). Here the normalising gaze ‘opens up a field of vis-
ibility that facilitates the construction of “multiple separations, individualizing dis-
tributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control, and intensification 
and ramification of power” (Debrix & Barder, 2012, p.100). It is here that rituals of 
“truth” are established in which knowledge circulates.
As Ghana’s move to access SAP has extensively been discussed in this thesis, at this 
point, it suffices to say it was bleak and steadily depressing economic conditions and 
political irrationality in the early 1980s which led Ghana to access structural adjust-
ment policies and programmes which has had its own torrent of high-profile criti-
cisms and rebuttals. That said, it is my view that whether overt, covert or unwitting 
it is futile to attempt a top-down analytic optic and the grossly essentialist view of 
structural adjustment policies. In other words, it is no part of the present study argu-
ment to quantify the effectiveness of neoliberal adjustment policies and programmes. 
As reiterated many times throughout thesis, such an approach tends to exaggerate the 
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inevitability and “the unstoppable nature” of neoliberalism ( Joseph, 2012, p.172). My 
attitude is that in order to develop an understanding of the inherently nihilistic and 
totalitarian nature of neoliberal project, the task at hand is to explore the moment 
when Ghana began to be ‘disciplined’.
Disciplinary technology of power takes several forms: incessant regimes of vis-
ibility, the reinvention of governable social actors, and the rationalisation of knowl-
edge on the country—which reinforces certain standards of behaviour of the states 
in question. The importance of these three elements can hardly be overstated: in the 
subsequent sections, I aim to make sense of how these aforementioned elements have 
been bound to the universal framework of the nation-state articulated discursively in 
a specific (modern) technique and technology of power for governing populations 
(Hindess, 2000)—in what can be termed in the Foucauldian insight as the ‘process 
of normalisation’. SAP more than a grand project at correcting structural economic 
imbalances, in all its diverse manifestations is a normalisation project. It is incessant 
regimes of visibility, the reinvention of governable social actors, and the rationalisa-
tion of knowledge as they appear in the country that constitutes the major mecha-
nisms of ‘discipline’ on which a new social reality is constructed and reproduced. It is 
specifically concerned with the legibility of local space for external intervention in a 
wide range of issues such as development et cetera. In Foucault’s language we are deal-
ing with technologies of power which, in this instance, are institutionally framed by 
rationality of SAP.
7.3.1 Reinventing governable social actors: the making of the homo economicus
At independence in 1957 the ideal of public service was variously considered as domi-
nant political ethic in promoting socio-economic development. Public service was 
viewed as the best including its human resources, in terms of capacity far exceeded 
that of the now famous Asian Tigers (Ohemeng, 2014, p.471). For approximately 
eleven years, the Ghanaian public sector was the driving force behind the formula-
tion and implementation of decisions with regard to serving the people. Civil ser-
vants were assigned the role of using their talents to facilitate and accelerate a form 
of development that was intended to be reflective of African values and priorities 
in an attempt to supplant anything lacerated by the ravages of colonialism. In other 
words, the intent unmistakably lays in reconstructing, reordering and remoulding the 
new nation-state towards the communitarian principles of African political culture 
(Cooper & Packard, 1997, p.12) that had been deliberately dislocated by unspeakable 
social malefactions and irreconcilable schisms in the bygone era of colonialism. 
Accordingly, public service administrative superstructure was virtually inculcated 
with nationalist and socialist understanding and consciousness to economic and 
social activity—unencumbered by Adam Smith’s notorious laissez-fair economic 
theorem and policies of individual self-interest (Becker, 1962; Friedman, 1953); and 
of sad legacies of “economic Darwinism” which is characteristically associated with 
“free” enterprise (Ayee, 2008; Lewi, 1998; Chazan et al., 1992, my emphasis).
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Civil servants were urged to cultivate the culture of altruism, honesty, moral tur-
pitude as well as ethical values; they had to respect public goods and seek political 
and not material reward for their efforts. This reinforces and dovetails neatly with 
Dr.Kwame Nkrumah’s aphorism —he was the inimitable Ghana’s first postcolo-
nial president—that “seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall 
be added” (Marais, 1972, p.204). In many respect civil servants were optimistically 
envisaged to be faithful implementers of policies which will bring about accelerated 
and sustainable national development; and usher Ghana unto the plane of effective 
developmental state (Hutchful, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001). Many observers and com-
mentators do pass a certificate of commendation to Kwame Nkrumah-led Conven-
tion Peoples Party government. But to be absolutely candid, such commendation 
was not only conditioned by the adopted ideological leanings, it was identifiable by 
Nkrumah’s brand of nationalism and exquisite political leadership: uncompromis-
ing rejection of ruthless and reprehensible exploitation of majority by the minority 
and moral degeneration which the colonial and imperial apparatus had insidiously 
bequeathed to the country (Ohemeng, 2014, p.474; Botwe-Asamoa, 2005). In fact, 
in all his early political speeches, Dr. Nkrumah passionately argued for humanistic 
values and an egalitarian mode of production to formulate a new socio-economic sys-
tem for post-independence Ghana. One has to understand that it is not so much capi-
talist economic exploitation and oppression with its antagonistic sharp class cleavages 
that worries him; but rather its insidious individualistic ethos which had destroyed 
intrinsic vital values of Africans commitment to communalistic ethos. The character-
istics of such views not only provide the ideological framework and plan of action for 
the Africanisation of the civil service but they were also an indispensable step toward 
developing a new orientation, a sense of mission and urgency to enable them to elimi-
nate all tendencies towards brazen corruption, inefficiency, ineptitude and the politics 
of “scratch my back I scratch your back” (Watson & Hickman, 2012) that had been 
allowed to fester for decades.
Regrettably, however, these positive acclamations notwithstanding, the public 
service ideal was vehemently challenged on many occasions for what Kwame Ninsin 
(1991, p. 220) described as a supposed “creeping dictatorial” tendencies of Nkrumah’s 
CPP seen as the primary intractable obstacle—especially at the heart of quotidian 
everyday life and national affairs. The visionary Kwame Nkrumah’s intent to rid the 
public service of “its ecclesiastical tradition of medieval Europe” (Botwe-Asamoah, 
2005, p. 152-156) was countered as an impetuous and blatant appropriation of the 
civil service. Nkrumah’s regime—critics argue—whether real or merely perceived 
indoctrinated and subjected the civil service to his CPP government as he became 
megalomaniac tyrant. However, my personal impression is that such assertions reek of 
hegemonic project of the neo-colonial conspiracy to implicitly perpetuate, monopo-
lise and to obscure master-servant relationship in a post-independence Ghana.
Needless to say by the end of late 1970s the entire civil service (especially) its top 
echelons became embroiled in widespread dissatisfaction with alienation from gov-
ernment and public institutions (Ohemeng & Anebo, 2012; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2014) 
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after the CIA-backed overthrow of Nkrumah’s regime. According to certain critics, 
the service was bedevilled with the problems of inefficient governmental machinery, a 
steep decline in the social and economic infrastructure, unqualified staff and a corrupt 
establishment. Matters came to a head when Provisional National Defence Council 
led by Jerry John Rawlings with it populist anti-bureaucratic nonsense came to power. 
It is worth emphasising that the ugly days of Jerry John Rawlings’ PNDC regime gave 
rise to profound despair in the public service as an institution. Various factors— inci-
dences of (terror tactics of intimidation, arbitrarily dismissals on political grounds, 
disruptive junior staff militancy, forced retirement, coercion, and brute force)—con-
spired to convulse the public service and so by the time the neoliberal assault began, 
the public service was in the state of comatose and severely demoralised.
In seeking answers to economic crisis in Ghana the predominant explanation to 
emerge among International Financial Institutions is that public service culture is ill-
equipped to manage the postcolonial political economy. This marked a new tenor in 
the run-up to a series of measures aimed at rehabilitating and restructuring the Gha-
naian state and its public service—providing the overarching disciplinary framework 
necessary for the successful implementation of standard “Washington Consensus” 
economic model. Undergirding all these is the view suggesting that the ‘develop-
mentalist’ aspirations of postcolonial States are detrimental to its economic success 
(Mkandawire, 2001). To conclude that State intervention is deleterious to develop-
ment planning is purely simplistic and—in a double sense—seriously flawed. In the 
first sense, such assertion ignored completely complex histories, political economies, 
institutions, challenges and needs of the State that emerged after independence. In 
the second, and at least the final sense, it implies a departure to nullify social protec-
tions which reveal a productive relationship between neoliberalism of the IMF’s and 
World Bank’s economic techniques of governing populations. Following this, public 
sector reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, have focused on a broader set of 
issues: changes in the internal structure of the public service, economic reforms that 
seek to purify the relationship between State and market, reconstitute the relation-
ship between government and citizen usually in the context of shrinking the State. 
All this supposed a strategy to get the economy out of crisis—focusing on neopatri-
monial regimes characterised by rent-seeking clientalistic chasse gardee —and until 
relatively recently ‘transparency’, ‘ownership’, ‘public accountability’ and the rest of it 
that underpinned ‘good governance’ paradigm.
The dilemmas of the market-oriented economic reforms of the type formulated in 
most countries in the continent in the 1980s underlines the need for a new political 
legitimacy for their success. As a matter of fact, encapsulated in SAPs was its own 
‘up-to-date’, ‘genuine’ and ‘ideal’ public service. This radical public service ‘ideal’ how-
ever, was patently a revolt and vengeance against the paternalism of the developmen-
tal welfare state, expressly embodied in euphoric postcolonial years. It is important to 
underscore, however, that this point of departure is actively embedded in and drawn 
ideologically from the reductionism and essentialism of neoliberal political ratio-
nality. By neoliberal political rationality I mean a particular biopolitical subject of 
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power-knowledge as represented in the figure of homo economicus consistent with the 
neoliberal economic theory that Foucault identifies with the Chicago School. Accord-
ingly, this rationality is concerned about the individual rights and freedoms not as 
exchangers in natural markets but as self-entrepreneurs in artificially constructed 
markets (Foucault, 2008; Mirowski, 2009). In this understanding, the accompanying 
ethics to the neoliberal essentialist and reductionist view of human nature effectively 
usurped whatever was left of public sector altruism and rationality with the logics of 
the market and competitive spirit (Odysseos, 2010): and essentially conditioned and 
mediated by setting free the entrepreneurial energies of the public sector in achieving 
the goal of development. Particularly glaring in the SAPs institutional apparatus of 
economic incentives is its meritocratic baggage and entitlements to establish a new 
profile of public service as a norm. Seen in this way, eliciting a construction of a ratio-
nal subject makes it more susceptible to be receptive to the “regime of truth”—repro-
ducing itself or firmly taking root on local context and reality. It is in this context 
that the centrality of Nkrumah’s “new man” in the Ghanaian psychology was rudely 
disrupted and severely curtailed by SAPs Homo consumens universalis (Amin, 1980, 
p.175).
But there are interesting parallels that could be drawn between Nkrumah-CPP 
and Bretton Woods institutions ideal of public service. The first obvious parallel is 
characterised by integrity of the public service for the sake of political goals. There 
are nonetheless good reasons to assume safely that this ideal became merely mobilisa-
tory technique to the institutional context within which both ideologies predomi-
nantly operated. The second parallel is that in stark contrast to the Nkrumah’s “new 
man” who had to choose between the altruism and his natural preservation instinct, 
here the classical rationalist assumptions of the so-called homo economicus: that is, the 
autonomous, self-maximixing, a (radically) opportunistic individual is faced with the 
choice between the literal maximisation of his own benefits, while also being acutely 
aware of the sacrifices which were necessary for “market friendly” conditions. As 
Lemke (2001, p.201) aptly and colourfully points out, liberal governmentality “aspires 
to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they ratio-
nally assess the costs and benefits of a certain sort as opposed to other alternative acts”. 
In this sense, both cases boil down to deep-rooted normative context within which 
social actors operate. In the case of Nkrumah-CPP, the politics of patronage upon 
which the distribution and exercise of power was based opened up possibilities for 
its abuse. And in the case of SAPs, it is structurally linked with existing centrally-
directed; patron-client networks which actually foster corruption as the prevalent or 
viable modes of governance. Structural adjustment agenda in the Ghanaian situation 
for example, created necessary discursive preconditions for the establishment of insti-
tutionalised frameworks for the emergence, legitimation and sedimentation of the 
figure of an “inventive” social actor. Let me highlight two tendencies for these neces-
sary preconditions. The first, primarily subjective, indirectly gives legitimacy and or 
encourages individualism against social demands that are made on social actors. The 
second necessary precondition is structural in the sense that it reverberates with the 
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sermonising discourse of the advocates of neoliberalism to detach the dirigisme State 
from its traditional roles within the framework of disciplinary and normalising forms 
forms of power in order to subject it to a panoptic field of visibility (Foucault, 1995, 
p.202–203).
7.3.2 Visibility of country
Panopticism as a political technology highlights how visibility functions as a central 
disciplinary technique to reproduce power relations. The mode of operation of disci-
plinary power was not deduction, but objectification. Foucault (1977, p.187) evinces 
that “in discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen … it is the fact of being con-
stantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual 
in his subjection”. Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and discipline are visible in his 
emphasis on the panoptical mode of surveillance. Panoptical mode of surveillance 
allows for a greater transparency of postcolonial states which open them up to inten-
sive forms of critical scrutiny. To Foucault, the panopticon induces a sense of “per-
manent visibility that ensures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1977, 
p.201). This phenomenon of ubiquitous pressures of surveillance and self-correction 
hinges on what Foucault understands as “the gaze”. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which 
each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his 
own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, him-
self ” (Foucault, 1980, p.155). In the panopticon, the subject of power, as confirmed 
by Foucault, must be visible from outside and anonymous inside. Foucault argues that 
“he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibil-
ity for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he 
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; 
he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (Foucault, 1977, p.202-3). In many 
ways, techniques and technologies of SAP consist of supervision, examination, stan-
dardisation, hierarchical observation, homogenisation, differentiation, and uniformi-
sation—all geared at making distant States readily visible to the Bank and the Fund to 
bring them in line with a predetermined set of norms. This in short, unveils and con-
tinuously perpetuates the dynamics of wider practices and technologies of discipline 
inherent in structural adjustment framework.
Within the disciplinary discursive practices of SAP include ‘capacity building’ 
‘transparency’ and ‘country ownership’. The rhetoric of ‘capacity building’, ‘country 
ownership’ and ‘calculating metric of ‘transparency’ (Best, 2007, p.102), are recast 
in the seductive terms of development, but, the paradox is that such caricatures of 
humanistic acts of generosity are less in pursuit of rendering the State efficient and 
institutionally functional. In reality, it is powerful discursive restraining instrument 
concerned with the possibility of rendering the country overtly comprehensible and 
intelligible to Bretton Woods institutions (Harrison, 2010) to compare how well 
countries have managed in relation to one another. Little wonder that ‘capacity-build-
ing’ in the words of Mkandawire (2002, p.155) “have more the character of cloning 
than the production of people with hardly critical analytical skills”.
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The root of any SAP is embedded in the economy of numbers—that is to say, 
acquiring the ability to hierarchize, categorise, individualise, calibrate, quantify and 
classify a country in numbers. SAP is only as good as the “political arithmetic” (i.e., 
statistics devices) which allow for the exposure of borrowing countries’ to a visibil-
ity that quantify, classify, categorise, “measure, appraise, and hierarchize” (Foucault, 
1990, p. 144) as governmental rationalities for the purpose of managing the conduct 
of conduct. Statistics as Foucault ingeniously puts it, is “etymologically, the knowl-
edge (connaissance) of the state, the knowledge of forces and resources which charac-
terise a state at a given moment” (Foucault, 2007, p.280). Statistics in this sense serves 
as an apparatus of what Foucault has termed modern “technological knowledges” 
(p.275) that represents a reality—which in turn enables production of knowledge of 
the subject and as sites of intervention (Bennett et al., 2014).
A case in point is Ghana where appeals to the modernisation and transformation 
of ‘credible’ data collection techniques and treatment of statistical data have engen-
dered calculable approaches to ‘development’ and rhythms of development steeped 
in ‘scientific rationality’ according to the one-best-way logic of SAP. In Ghana, as 
many client countries, the considerable premium placed on production and dissemi-
nation of timely, objective, reliable and ‘robust’ statistical data have reduced the real-
ity of these countries to ‘economic calculation’ (Mitchell, 1988, p.33). To stress the 
importance of statistical data as a powerful tool within the regulatory web—since 
the introduction of SAP, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), relevant government 
bureaucracies, departments, municipal districts and agencies (MDAs), policy makers 
and planners, parliament, civil society organisations, otherwise independent experts 
and private sector alike—have all been energetic in its statistical activities. Thus, for 
have half a century or so, Ghana simply has been reduced to data producer, collector, 
collator and disseminator through the sophistication of its statistical measures which 
she voluntarily brings forth in its quantificatory frenzy allowing for the comparison 
and categorisation of the Ghana’s performances. Interestingly, this is how statistics act 
as a tactic of disciplinary power, operating as panopticism. And so, it is not surprising, 
therefore, that the so-called World Bank statistical capacity benchmarks and perfor-
mance indicators have always rated Ghana highly in their ratings.
The logic of quantitatively reducing a country to numerical ‘facts’ which are socially 
ordained (perhaps using make-believe normal distribution curves, graphs, charts etc.) 
is not so much that it focuses on providing the basis of an analytical framework to 
respond adequately to economic challenges. Rather that the aim of the ensuing inter-
vention is techniques of ‘normalisation’ to produce measurable, manageable, gov-
ernable and transformable state (Brivot & Gendron, 2011). Through disciplinary 
mechanisms perpetuated via a hierarchical mode of routine observation and normal-
ising judgement, the Bank and the IMF standardise, ritualised and routinize (Dean, 
1999, p.31) development priorities most emblematic of one-size-fits-all, nomothetic 
policy prescriptions of structural adjustment. This technique of ‘normalisation’ (Fou-
cault, 1977, p.177) uses disciplinary technologies such as internationally-promoted 
‘best practices’ deafly promulgated by accredited development ‘experts’ (Rose, 1999, 
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p.147), whose diagnosis and treatment are outside the domain of political debate 
(Foucault, 1991, p.266-267). Indeed, and as Best (2007, p. 94) expounds, ‘best prac-
tices’, while often presented as neutral and technical, actually involve “defining the 
norm in a given area—judging what is both good and normal”. Thus any minefield 
of contentious issues or debate is technicised, uniformised, depoliticised, disembed-
ded, and neutralised—it is distinctly within the purview of ‘development experts’ also 
firmly rooted in neoliberal governmentality, and by extension its economic rationali-
ties (Rose, 1999, p.152). Ong (2006, p. 3) makes this point best. He argues, and I 
agree, that “neoliberalism can also be conceptualized as a new relationship between 
government and knowledge through which governing activities are recast as nonpo-
litical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions”. The significance of 
this in the Ghanaian context is that problematic technicalisation and depoliticisation 
of issues allow the Bretton Woods twins to blatantly keep their insensitivities and to 
ignore with impunity the herculean needs, pressing problems, specificities and pecu-
liarity of the country into which they intervene.
I posit that nothing does this better than standards rationalised through the 
homogenising quality of numerical data. Statistically numbers are cold, factual, 
unsympathetic, impersonal, insensitive, and hostile and in fact dry—such that they 
do not carry any emotions whatsoever. It is worth mentioning that in this game of 
numbers, when predicaments of vulnerable and disadvantaged people are quantified 
into intimately muddled numeric values—indeed, they become business as usual and 
mostly tokenism—perhaps because what obtains is nothing short of just numbers —
aiming to make life manageable and knowable. The preceding is not to underrate the 
place and relevance of statistical data in policy development. However, what is essen-
tial to remember is that in and of statistics as a mode of disciplinary power, BWIs 
become and remain instrumental in infiltrating everyday social, economic and politi-
cal life (Ferguson, 2006, p.5) in the peripheral State of the global economy “without 
appearing to be intervening, interfering, or imposing” (Harrison, 2001, p.542).
The normalising ‘laws’ of numbers and their associated calculations, I claim, consti-
tute the primary strategic organising principle and ethos of this liberal governmental-
ity; ‘structuring the field of action’ (Foucault, 1991a), creating hierarchical gaze and 
fields of visibility through the establishment of a specific ‘regime of truth’. Another 
twist to the argument is that the supposedly ‘natural-scientific’ method and ‘positiv-
ist’ approach to numbers where everything and anything can be measured and uncer-
tainty apparently eliminated is hardly simply a reflection of complex, nuanced and 
intricate African economic and political realities—the rigid, romantic and obsessive 
investment with parochial calculative practices as an indicator and regulator of eco-
nomic performance, completely obfuscates, mystifies and often belies short-term effi-
ciency for long-term effects by its apologists. The prevalence of data for the purpose 
of surveillance and as disciplinary mechanism have tended to uncritically underrate 
or indeed conveniently fail to recognise other forces at play—as it dubiously assumes 
that only what counts can be counted. But, and perhaps more importantly is the fact 
that countless are the situations where not all that can be counted counts.
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The problem at bottom is that rigid statistical quantification and measuring are 
decidedly given far more credence through a narrow fixation on the purportedly all-
powerful quest for sustainable development and poverty eradication. The drive for 
“calculating and statistical measuring” (Lemke, 2011a, p.38-39), far from being a dis-
crete, monolithic and coherent whole, as is often thought —well there is, I like to 
think, the likelihood that the ‘wrong’ things could be measured. Worse, if, rightly or 
wrongly, ‘wrong’ things could be measured, then it stands to reason that such errors 
points to the urgent need to increasingly question an overly simplistic reduction of 
complex, nuanced and intricate realities of life to a matter of mathematical and voo-
doo statistical measurements—where data is narrowly subjected to the misguided 
determinism of universally acclaimed norms, global standards of conduct and objec-
tive rules. It seems to me that the one-sided, one-dimensional and the calculating 
performativity of statistical data (Porter, 1995), give false impression about the brute 
fact of existential conditions, and of course, the contingent nature of economic and 
political realities of Africa where the minutiae of everyday life articulation of reality 
is in intimate conversations with ever yawning fissures. Foucault is pellucid on this 
point— “reality always escapes the theories that inform programs and the ambitions 
that underpin them” (1991, p.11).
Strictly speaking whatever the merits of the obsession for politics of calculation 
(Elden, 2007), the crucial matter is that should sustainable development or poverty 
eradication fail to materialise, then the BWIs could conveniently issue a “disclaimer” 
(Collins, 2011, p.3)—relieving them of their biopolitical responsibility—by spuriously 
assigning blame to the inability of the ‘inferior others’—the structurally ‘maladjusted’, 
the highly indebted, aid dependant state—(Tan, 2011) targeted by development 
initiatives (IMF-World Bank initiated structural adjustment programmes, etc.) to 
unshackle itself from constrictive practices such as ‘bad governance’ that impair, jeop-
ardise and self-perpetuate the debilitating structures of underdevelopment. On this 
reasoning, those pathologised as ‘inferior’ and an undesirable ’other’ simply ought 
to embrace the sterile rhetoric of ‘good governance’ as the best alternative to social 
change as having been perfected in the prescriptive West. Only by so doing can the 
‘inferior others’, per the distorted lenses and prejudices of apostles of neoliberalism—
would be quantitatively, not qualitatively forward looking—and that all hand must be 
on deck to aggressively defend and disseminate this façade of development blueprints 
around the globe—inextricably bound tightly to ostensible biopolitical concern not 
to ‘contaminate’ the rest—pure and simple.
Michel Foucault explores the contemporary configurations of power manifested in 
the preoccupation of authorities, such as the bureaucratic apparatuses of State to count 
its resources through the lens of biopolitical techniques of power. These resources are 
defined purely in relation to its human potential all the way to the natural and mate-
rial potential of a given territory to optimise and facilitate the productivity of the 
population (Dillon & Reid, 2000; Dillon & Reid, 2001). The strategic objectives and 
the founding principle of this biopolitical management of the population hinge upon 
the simplistic reduction of a territory to numbers—put otherwise, to statistically rig-
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orous calculative practices “which make life amenable to particular ways of govern-
ing, of “systems of belief and cultural propensities or what one might want to call 
‘ways of life’ (Foucault, 2007; Grayson, 2008, p.384). And these mechanisms, these 
modes of governance, these ‘new techniques’ constitute one of the most efficient and 
intrusive ways of social control—the most pernicious and pervasive means “around 
which the organisation of power over life was deployed” (Foucault, 1991, p.261-262). 
The biopolitical normalisation and apparatus to a large extent, tend to reflect a way of 
making social ‘reality’ it suggests ostensibly exist more visible in a certain manner that 
allow the comparison with others’ performance or behaviour with a specific ‘norm’ to 
‘standardise’ policy making processes (Brivot & Gendron, 2011) that are conducive 
to a larger neoliberal project. And —this is the interesting point however—that the 
realisation of this ‘reality’ no less provides the impetus for client countries to be objec-
tified, defined, named, categorised, individualised, classified and seen in accordance 
with the normalising standard (Duncan, 2007, p.2) of those who fall short of excel-
lence in this regard (Brivot & Gendron, 2011; Neu & Graham, 2006). It is on the 
basis of such general categorisation, classification and objectification which, provides 
the enabling moment for IMF and the World Bank to ‘progressively’ and deliberately 
institutionalise their unrelenting one-way traffic intervention (Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Rose & Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 2008).
The use of statistics regarding techniques of surveillance as part of BWIs working 
practices is “effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory control—
bio-politics of the population” (Foucault, 1991, p.262-63). The inherent biopolitical 
nature of statistics in the global liberal governance can be appreciated when one con-
siders the IMF increasing reliance for example on gross domestic product (GDP) and 
inflation. This example is certainly not an objective, neutral or value free exercise that 
reveals the weakness or vigour of the Ghanaian economy. It is inherently political—
it aims at structuring fields of visibility—which constitutes a vital part of the many 
forms through which biopolitical power is exercised over Ghana. In short: where 
Ghana is to be located on the artificial hierarchy of countries, what kind of advice, 
recommendations and recipes it needs—and in fact, how it can be defined as a terrain 
for ceaseless intervention. A Foucauldian approach suggests how biopolitical strategic 
discourses and practices, have been engendered by the the creation of imposition of a 
marginalised status on those deemed pathological (the degenerate, undesirable or the 
abnormal)—which captures the individual “within a form of visibility, a gaze, ren-
dering the individuals actions and thoughts knowable” (Townley, 1998, p.203)—it is 
normalising gaze par excellence (Foucault, 1977, p.183). Tan writes, ‘conformity with 
the status quo is assured by excluding those states which fail to play by the rules, not 
through force but through the evaluation of their willingness to be subjected to “uni-
versally” recognised policy objective’ (Tan, 2011, p.1042). Thus biopolitical strategic 
discourses that are exercised in the regulation of States are undoubtedly implicated 
within problematic operations of power as governmentality.
It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the process of producing maximum 
visibility of the country is a basic staple of these institutions where the tendency has 
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been—and remains—actively indifferent to the important structural dimensions of 
poverty and blithely ignoring historical elements, the political context and such inter-
national dimensions as debt and commodity prices. In spite of the ever-heaping pile 
of debts Ghana owed to the international financial institutions—in fact, precisely 
because of it—the Bank and the IMF, consciously and unconsciously was interested 
less in knowing why for example, the country was unable to honour its suffocating 
debt overhung. My argument, therefore, is that the numerical data and statistics of 
these institutions have wholly neglected the unfriendliness of the international eco-
nomic order in their so-called complex measurements and computational mod-
els. And of course, the reason why this is the case has less to do with any explicit or 
implicit ideological construct located at the imperial metropoles—but rather has 
everything to do with their assertively bureaucratic procedures which bear directly 
on rationalisation of standards, classifications, categorisations and dishing out policy 
straightjackets which peripheral sites like the African continent are fated to imitate.
The world in the neoliberal biopolitical narrative seems in fact to be a simple place 
in which, strangely enough, not social action is important, but rather the ability to 
adhere to the logic of norms, standards and ‘universal’ values in return for receiving 
aid (Tan, 2011). However, it is my view that such “simplistic psychologism ... takes 
insufficient account of the social and political dynamics of change and lacks an ade-
quate conception of the relationships between ideas and actions, between culture and 
social structure” (Hartmann et al., 1989, p.23). Implicit within heightened visibility 
is the claim that it nurtures and sustains the disciplinary and normalising discourse 
associated with structural adjustment devised by BWIs whence they can safely shape 
and guide a preferred way of being.
7.3.3 Towards the analysis of knowledge rationalisation
By conscripting governable social actors and capturing the domestic (political) space; 
it creates an immanent and unavoidable discursive boundary where it becomes pos-
sible for SAP to act directly on aid-receipient governments and states. This is crucially 
important because for Foucault space is crucial in any exercise of power. Indeed, as 
Rose puts it captivatingly, ‘to govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over 
which government is to be exercised” (Rose, 1999, p.36). By remodelling the “public” 
sphere of ‘politics’ (Picciotto, 2000, p.161-163) ‘aid-recipient’ States can be moulded 
and shaped according to its strategic, transcendental Cartesian mode of thought and 
functionalist interest (Amin, 1980;2006; 2010; Ferguson, 1990; 1999; 2006). From 
this vantage point, aid-recipient States are made knowable—manageable and hence 
governable (Collier, 2009, p.96; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1996; Lemke 2001) to the 
World Bank and the IMF. The rationalisation and operationalisation of knowledge 
inside these institutions are made manifest in this rendering, through the exceedingly 
complex institutional ideological networks that operate in a way that conceals the 
exercise of power. Experts of all sorts, specialised cadre of consultants, an armada of 
expatriate policy advisors, special desks, Bank’s external affairs department, seminars, 
flood of reports, workshops, pamphlets, manuals, etc. (Gutto, 2006; Mkandawire & 
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Soludo, 1999) are conceptualised, sustained and further reified through dominant 
discourse on development. The result is that dossiers, state of or trends on Ghana 
emerge, collected, assembled, harnessed and circulated, giving reality to the numbers 
which the Ghana Statistical Service, the Centre for Investment Promotion, the Cen-
tre for the Promotion of Exports, National Development Planning Commission etc. 
feverishly bring forth in their quantificatory drive.
Since the neoliberal assault, the World Bank and the IMF have tended, quite 
uncritically to establish themselves as the most important and reliable source of 
‘expert’ knowledge in Africa’s development regimes.With that James Wolfensohn, the 
then president of the World Bank was able to muster the chutzpah to egregiously and 
superciliously claim that the Bank commands enormous influence over “knowledge” 
(World Bank, 1996). What is even more striking is that the BWIs over the years have 
sought to reach countries who are made to forfeit their identity—rather like ‘Zombies’ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999) to have little access to its alleged knowledge ‘expertise’. 
Their press desks produce and reproduce knowledge about the social, political and 
economic life of the client countries; and their experts preponderantly assert them-
selves as the gate-keepers of knowledge production in the Ghanaian economy (World 
Bank, 2004f ). The World Bank devotes a significant amount of intellectual energy to 
knowledge exercise which focuses on: publishing information (literally thousands of 
documents, such as project documents, country and regional surveys, analytical and 
advisory work, evaluations, formal and informal research papers, and pushing annual 
reports and books. In fact the Bank devotes so much effort, funds and personnel to 
think tank activities through the Global Development Network (GDN). The GDN 
is explicitly intended to be an important vehicle to potentially operationalise and 
strengthen this new discourse of knowledge and consequently create the global ‘pub-
lic good’ of quantity and quality policy relevant research (Squire, 2001). The myopic 
assumption is that ‘the generation of local knowledge which when shared with local 
policy makers will ultimately lead to the solution of local problems’ (Stone, 2003). 
As already noted the GDN is an intervention to facilitate both the increased and 
improved supply of a global public good; development research about ‘best practice’ 
(Stiglitz, 2000; Squire, 2000).
The Bank’s tedious, regimented and habitual recourse to routine review relies on 
the regular performance examination (assessment) based on benchmarks indictors 
set out in the Economic and Sector Work assessments reports (World Bank, 2005d, 
p.30). Performance assessment reports as technologies of government allow the 
deployment of a “regime of truth” concerning appropriate policy-making and imple-
mentation, a strategy which reinforces normalising power of discipline for which 
Ghana provides an excellent illustration. This notion of performance assessment con-
sist of a knowledge that is “no longer about determining whether or not something 
had occurred; rather it was about whether an individual was behaving as he should, in 
accordance with the rule or not, and whether he was progressing or not” (Foucault, 
1994b, p.59). In the view of Miller and Rose, ‘technologies of government’ seek to 
translate thought into the domain of reality, and to establish ‘in the world of persons 
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and things’ spaces and devices for acting upon those entities of which they dream and 
scheme” (1990, p.8). In Ghana, the Bank’s Economic and Sector Work (ESW) assess-
ments surveillance activities cover wide range of highly specialised areas of which the 
guiding principles are economic. Various examples of these include Poverty and Social 
Impact Assessment (PSIA), Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) or a Develop-
ment Policy Review (DPR), Public Expenditure Review (PER), Country Financial 
Accountability Assessment (CFAA), and a Country Procurement Assessment Review 
(CPAR); which also includes issues such as Investment Climate Assessments (ICAs), 
Corporate Governance Assessments (ROSCs), Education Sector Reviews, Financial 
Sector Assessments (FSAs), Health sector Reviews, Energy-Environment Assess-
ments, Risk and Vulnerability Assessments, Rural Development Assessments, and 
Institutional and Governance Reviews (IGRs) (World Bank, 2006); which are under-
taken to reshape and regulate government in order to subordinate all its activities to 
macroeconomic discipline (World Bank, 2005e, para 6). My understanding is that the 
techniques of economic and financial information-gathering—‘follow-up’ through 
an all-pervading monitoring, routine forms of rigorous reviews, gathering up-to-date 
reports, thorough appraisal of successful development policies, and normative assess-
ments of compliance on Ghana fulfil the goal of making Ghana ‘real’ to these institu-
tions: an ideal representations of panoptic schema of the prison.
The practices and tactics of external inspection of the Bank instrumentalise and 
institutionalise governance from a distance and subjects states and governments to 
‘metropolitan monitoring, intervention and regulation’ (Duffield, 2002, p.1066)—
thereby reducing the need for overt forms of disciplinary practices. In Foucauldian 
understanding, the objective of liberal governmentality is ‘its own self-limitation inso-
far as it is pegged to the specificity of economic processes’ (Foucault, 2008, p.297). 
Processes which I maintain in turn are mutually constitutive of reality as it concomi-
tantly allows the BWIs to impose their frozen representations and dominant dis-
courses of Ghana as the internationally recognised norms of behaviour and ‘regimes 
of truth’ that must be hailed, and repeatedly drawn upon. What needs to be recog-
nised is that the cannons of knowledge production held by the Bank and the Fund 
have triumphantly become invincible, universalistic and uncompromisingly singular 
discourse —a ‘regimes of truth’, that is—the only exceptionally best guides, and certi-
fiers of authoritative source of attaining information on the true ‘reality’ of the coun-
try. But, in point of fact, the BWIs claim that they produce research that is ‘rigorous’, 
self-evident and objective (Broad, 2006, p.398) and therefore have the forensic cred-
ibility and epistemologically-secure truth status in providing technocratic solutions to 
African development challenges, in my view —tend to be enveloped in the decadent 
and myopia of Eurocentricism— in so far as it is so deeply entrenched in fundamen-
talist, teleological certitudes and dogmatism.
These institutions have been particularly adept at using certain forms of knowledge 
to foster and install networks and programmes that organise visibilities for external 
corrective intervention: so much so that, it makes the exercise of discursive or ide-
ational form of power possible and calculable (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.62). This has 
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become an effective tool which perpetuates and sustains hidden agendas, vested inter-
ests, or the habitus of one-best-way logic of development. To put the matter some-
what bluntly: the Bank’s claim as the technocrats with credentials, credibility and 
arrogating to itself eternal superiority to craft workable solutions to Africa’s develop-
ment problems is nothing short of epistemological pretensions, linear, totalising and 
unidimensional narratives. And by extension—it fatally marginalises and excludes I 
believe—the articulation of countervailing epistemic and epistemological knowl-
edge within a supposedly inclusive mainstream development setting. An exploration 
of the notion of “counter conduct” approach to resistance which seeks to destabilise 
and even reinforce the discursive rationalities, strategies, practices and technologies of 
power, and it is to this that the next section of this thesis now turn to.
7.4 Resistance to neoliberal governmentality: Terra Incognita? 
Despite the valuable insights Foucault’s nuanced conceptualisation of governmental-
ity offers; critics charge it lacks any real possibility of resistance to ‘great economy of 
power’ (McKee, 2009). As critics would have it, resistance to the strategies and tech-
nologies of neoliberalism and by extension the mode of its governmentality, which 
emerge as critique of previous rationalities, have barely been linked to a ‘critical poli-
tics’ (O’Malley et al.,1997) and that, if anything governmentality is crippling, totalis-
ing and colonising offering no space for agency (Amin & Thrift, 2002, p.128-108). 
This claim is refutable if we take into account widespread resistance to neoliberal gov-
ernmentality in the form of ‘counter conduct’ by those who refuse to be governed 
‘thusly, like that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in 
mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them (Fou-
cault, 2007b, p. 75; Foucault, 2004, p. 66-79).
In the face of and as counterparty, or rather, as both partner and adversary to 
the arts of governing, as an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting 
these arts of governing and sizing them up, transforming them, of finding a 
way to escape from them or, in any case, a way to displace them, as an essential 
reticence, but also and by the same token as a line of development of the arts 
of governing, there would have been something born in Europe at that time, 
a kind of general cultural form, both a political and a moral attitude, a way 
of thinking, etc., and which I would very simply call the art of not being gov-
erned, or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost. I would 
therefore propose, as a very first definition of critique, this general characteriza-
tion: the art of not being governed quite so much. (Foucault, 2002, p.37)
the central defining feature of this art is a refusal by borrowing member states to com-
ply with the doctrine of conditionality and who consequently conduct themselves in 
ways that, subvert, or even challenge, while at the same time unwittingly acknowl-
Chapter seven – Rehabilitating the Centaur State: Structural Adjustment as a Disciplinary Technology | 157
edging its domineering power (Davidson, 2011; Death, 2010). Meanwhile, critically 
oriented International Relations (IR) scholarship that has drawn on Foucault has 
lamentably failed to acknowledge or broadly neglected sites of contestation to the 
practices and technologies of neoliberal governmentality, inadvertently making neo-
liberal governmentality appear as though it is a ‘noncontestable’ reality (Lemke, 2001; 
Miller & Rose, 2008). This lacuna in the scholarship is all the more surprising given 
that Foucault emphasises how, “the analysis of types of governmentality is inseparable 
from analysis of corresponding forms of “counter-conducts” (Foucault, 2007, p.389).
In 1 March 1978, Foucault gave a lecture at the College de France in which he con-
tinues to analyse resistance, not merely theorised and conceptualised as ‘where there 
is power, there is resistance,’ but as an equally specific set of technologies and tech-
niques leading to movements that seek ‘to escape direction by others and to define 
the way for each to conduct himself ’ (1978, p.195) which he calls “counter-conduct” 
(i.e., “in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting oth-
ers”) (Foucault, 2007, p. 201). Resistance, Foucault maintains is intimately correlated 
to the functioning of governmentality. Focussing in particular on the neoliberal tech-
nologies of governing used to conduct aid-recipient governments towards economic 
reform, what I want to clarify here is that relations between donors and aid-recipient 
governments are far from a one-sided relationship between a mere passive and sup-
pressed African object and an all-powerful supra state institutions subject (Collins, 
2011). Moreover, contrary dominant narratives, aid recipient governments (in vari-
ous ways) have challenged or opposed (passively as well as actively) policy practices 
or reforms they agreed to carry out (Ibid). Three things from Foucault’s reading of 
“counter-conducts” need to be singled out here: firstly, it enhances our understand-
ing of the complex relationship between practices of governance and resistance; sec-
ondly and correlatively, it provides us with insights to grasp the relationship between 
oppression and agency; lastly, and this is the crucial point, it provides us with the 
tools to explore and elucidate previously marginalised subjectivities being generated 
by “counter-conducts”. This observation helps to produce—at least conceptually—a 
counterbalance discourse to challenge the scholarship within the field of IR taking for 
granted that within the context of neoliberal reforms, disciplinary practices of lend-
ing conditionalities associated with structural adjustment programmes, are inevitable, 
unavoidable and irreversible—given the impression that any resistance is inherently 
futile (Bishop, 2014). In light of this insight, I will reflect upon Foucault’s notion of 
“counter-conducts”, as illustrative of resistance to regimes of governmentality through 
‘non-compliance’ by the PNDC government, a government hailed as one of the icons 
of success of the World Bank and the IMF‘s adjustment policies, which can both 
undermine and simultaneously reinforce domineering power (Death, 2010).
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7.5 Governing principles of BWIs: the logic of policy conditionality
In the 1980s, majority of countries in sub Saharan Africa (SSA) turned to the Bank 
and Fund and other international financial institutions (IFIs) for loans to reverse eco-
nomic distress. Typically, these loan arrangements have come with intrusive policy 
reforms (conditionality) as part of an overarching structural adjustment programme 
(Kentikelenis et al., 2016) to reshape and regulate the behaviour of client countries. 
Arguably more importantly, the Bank and Fund support for balance of payment dis-
equilibrium are operationalised through a number of techniques and disciplines, not 
least explicit commitments on the part of member countries to implement intensive 
and painful economic reforms and adjustment that the Bank and Fund deem as a 
necessary policy for ameliorating the borrowing country’s external debt problems. In 
principle, Bank and Fund-mandated policy reforms—so-called conditionality—is a 
practice by which “actions, or promises to make policy changes—by recipient govern-
ments only at the insistence of aid providers—measures that would not otherwise be 
undertaken, or not within the time frame desired by the providers” (Allegret, 2007; 
Killick, 1998, p. 6). For instance, according to this approach, Bank/Fund-designed 
reforms generally demand more privatisation, trade and financial liberalisation, and 
the marketisation of social policies (Kentikelenis et al., 2016). In doing so, the Bank 
and Fund impose severe fiscal and restrictive monetary measures on the Ghanaian 
society. Neoliberal conditionality packages typically entail structural adjustments—
namely, reductions of government spending; removing barriers to international trade; 
removing tariffs, quotas and other restrictions on the import and export of goods; 
general deregulation of the economy; market liberalisation; privatisation; and devalu-
ation of the exchange rate to encourage exports and reduce imports (Heywood, 2011, 
p.371; Williamson, 1993). Taken collectively, these policy reforms embedded in a 
nest of conditionalities have become known as structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs). The logic of Bank and Fund conditionality is to monitor behaviour and pro-
vide incentives for compliance with the policies that are part of its programmes. From 
this point of view, I suggest that the logic of conditionality represents the ideal typi-
fication of an intrusive form of disciplinary framework in the transformation of the 
nation states ‘complex of men and things’ (Foucault, 1991).
7.5.1 The PNDC’s counter-conduct
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) under Flight-Lieutenant Jer-
emiah John Rawlings counter-conduct follows the pattern of revolts of conduct Fou-
cault describes in Security, Territory, Population lecture series. Neoliberal restructuring 
under Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) and the Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme from 1983-2000 reveals that Ghana, a show-case of adjustment, achieved a 
remarkable degree of compliance with Fund conditions (Akunnor, 2006). The IMF’s 
Corbo and Fisher (1995, p.25) for instance, believes that “Ghana ... has been the most 
successful of the African adjusters” —and that Ghana was a “good client” who did 
not resort to criticising the Fund or Bank when reforms run into difficulties” (Mosley 
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et al., 1991, p. 184). However, I will adopt Foucault’s “counter-conduct” approach 
to show instances of resistance to neoliberal governance through ‘non-compliance’ 
with several key IMF policy conditionalities, relating to monetary and fiscal outruns 
(Akunnor, 2006).
Under considerable pressure from the Bank and the Fund, the PNDC in January 
1986, announced a 50 per cent devaluation of the Cedi (C), to a new rate of 1.00 U.S. 
dollars= 90 Cedis, as part of its to avoid the overvalued effects of a currency on eco-
nomic performance. In addition, there was to be a 28.6 per cent increase in the daily 
minimum wage from 70 Cedis to 90 Cedis, together with strategic reduction of mar-
ginal income tax rates to cushion workers from the excruciating effects of devaluation. 
Because of the associated costs, the government was set to face stiff opposition from 
thousands of workers in protest at the devaluation of the national currency in what 
they felt to be gravely irreconcilable with the hike in the minimum wage. As faithful 
as the PNDC apparatchiks was to structural adjustment, its response to the growing 
labour unrest was to brazenly destroy the existing IMF conditionalities by granting 
wage and benefit increases to workers, to assuage the disturbing and biting effects of 
the devaluation of the cedi. For example, wages and salaries bill was increased from C 
14 billion in 1985 to C 30 billion, well above the IMF target. The granting of wage 
and benefit increases to workers can be exemplified as a form of “counter-conduct” 
to neoliberal governmentality through non-compliance in the sense that by refusing 
to be governed ‘thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (Foucault, 2007, p.75), 
the PNDC leadership succeeded in undermining the IMF/Bank backed devaluation 
reforms. Yet, paradoxically while the counter-conduct of the PNDC leadership suc-
ceeded in challenging the legitimacy of IMF/Bank backed devaluation reforms, it 
simultaneously fed back into domineering power of IMF when the PNDC leader-
ship later cunningly sought to attribute the significant increase in wages and salaries 
on arithmetical anomalies. This resulted in a promise to meet certain key policy con-
ditions that deal with budgetary discipline, standby credit arrangement of 81.8 mil-
lion SDRs over a 12-month period. This was accompanied by a major reduction a 25 
per cent pay cut on civil servants in June 1986 and cancelation of most allowances to 
civil servants during the last quarter of 1986 (Financial Times, 1986, p.20). By being 
forced to work within the parameters set by the Fund, resistance that aims to subvert, 
prevent or challenge neoliberal governmentality through non-compliance continues 
to effectively reinforce the status quo (Death, 2010).
The year 1992 (the election year) marked the third phase of the Bank/Fund sup-
ported adjustment programme. The year also saw Ghana’s re-engagement with politi-
cal pluralism and constitutional arrangements crystallizing in popular opinion for 
presidential and parliamentary polls in November and December respectively. 1992 
brought in its wake immense political cost for Jerry Rawlings and the PNDC (Akun-
nor, 2006). In 1992 a combined union of doctors, nurses, workers of the Cocoa 
Board, railway employees and civil servants embarked on serious strike action. These 
spate of strikes by every account, sought to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. 
Ideally, then, with the presidential and parliamentary elections due in November and 
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December respectively, the government retreated from its radical posture to placate 
the suffering and the precarious position of labour and rural population. To be sure, 
in 1992, the Rawlings regime introduced income rationalisation policies to check the 
unprecedented disparities between the civil service and the rest of the public sector. 
The restructurings aim to compensate for and mitigate the potential effects of stan-
dard IMF-adjustment conditionalities. The civil service share of the state’s recurrent 
expenditure increased to about 80 per cent of the nominal payroll, effective as of July 
1, 1992, whereas households were correspondingly granted large transfer payments 
as part of general salary increase. A similar picture emerges for recurrent expenditure 
where accumulated retirement and end of service benefits that had been reversed 
since 1990 were pay out (Leite et al., 2000, p.36). The domestic banking also resorted 
to increasing borrowing by as much as 30 per cent compared to a 22 per cent decrease 
estimated by the Fund (Leite et al., 2000, p.30). Within this period, central govern-
ment expenditure in rural development projects grew exponentially. Green (1995) 
for instance, reckons that among the reasons why the Rawlings government launched 
a National Electrification Scheme in 1992 was ensconced in shoring up its electoral 
fortunes even though the project has been on the drawing board since 1989. Green’s 
study captures how 100 towns and villages were added to the national grid, and the 
way rural patronage benefited from the shifts in policy towards water supply, feeder 
roads and school construction (Akunnor, 2006; Green, 1995, p.578–580). The com-
bined effect of these developments was significant increase in money supply of 51 per 
cent, more than the IMF target increase of 12 per cent (Ghana’s Budget, 1993, p.2, 
cited in Akunnor, 2006). As a result of the PNDC’s regime expansionary fiscal poli-
cies, the budgetary balance cumulatively switched from 1.8 per cent as a percentage 
of gross national products (GDP) to a fiscal deficit of 177 billion cedis (4.9 per cent 
as a percentage of GDP) (Akonor, 2006). In other words, Ghana’s cumulative bal-
ance of payments simply recorded a massive fiscal deficit of $124 million in 1992, 
less than the IMF projected surplus of around $140 million (Ibid). Viewed through 
a Foucauldian lens, this form of counter-conduct entailed President Jerry Rawlings 
and his team activating “technologies of the self ” (Foucault, 2003,p.145) through 
‘expansionary fiscal policies’ in order to challenge the forms of subjection and resist 
what they perceived to be standard IMF-adjustment conditionalities a discriminatory 
discourse behind this neoliberal governmentality which was in marked contrast to the 
IMF conditionalities in eliciting labour and rural support in particular and the gen-
eral population respectively
Notwithstanding all the pledges to maintain fiscal discipline, the government con-
tinued to maintain an expansionary fiscal stance which blatantly violates IMF con-
ditionality. A close examination of the government expenditures in 1996 indicates 
a large fiscal overruns of about 78 billion cedis (Ghana’s Budget, 1997, p.5, cited in 
Akunnor, 2006) even though IMF conditionality requires that government capital 
outlays should not exceed 3.9 per cent of GDP (with road construction programmes 
taking the biggest cuts) (Financial Times, July 9, 1996, p.5). However, the bulk of 
the increase in government capital spending was skewed towards rural infrastruc-
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ture investment. Government unbudgeted capital spending in 1996 on rural roads 
for example increased astronomically to 0.5 per cent as a percentage of GDP which 
contrast sharply with the Fund’s requirement (Leite et al., 2000, p.39). Despite the 
Fund’s objections, the total budgeted expenditure in 1996 saw a dramatic increase by 
20 per cent. At the same time, capital spending in all major categories exceeded their 
projected amounts (Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 1996, p. 23 cited in Akunnor, 
2006). The PNDC’s delay in petroleum tax collections led to lower government rev-
enue which was against the core assumptions of IMF conditionality. A system set up, 
in June 1996, to a strict implementation of the automatic adjustment price formula 
for petroleum products for variations in the price of imported oil. It required gov-
ernment to remove all subsidies on petroleum products. The system was suspended, 
when it became evident that it effect will disproportionately impact on the poor and 
disadvantaged (Leite et al., 2000, p.39) thereby causing a drop in petroleum excise 
duties by 17.2 billion cedis less than the recommended target of 300 billion cedis by 
IMF in September 1996 (Ghana’s Budget, 1997, p.4, cited in Akunnor, 2006). Due to 
these excessive fiscal and monetary policies, the government’s domestic primary sur-
plus sharply declined from 1.5 per cent as a percentage of GDP in 1995 to 0.3 per 
cent in 1996, leaving the government with no other obvious option than to reduce 
its indebtedness through borrowing. The recourse to borrowing to finance indebted-
ness led money supply to increase by 38 per cent, which crossed the critical 5 per cent 
threshold of IMF by the final quarter of 1996, an 33 per cent increase. The non-com-
pliance can be understood as a form of counter-conduct to strategies and technolo-
gies of governmentality because they asked, “not to be governed like that, by that, in 
the name of those principles… and by means of such procedures” (Foucault, 2007, 
p.44). However, while President Rawlings non-compliance largely represents another 
clear example of resistance to neoliberal governmentality as by appealing to donors 
that fiscal excesses that had characterised election years would not happen again, it 
provokes the reinvigoration of oppressive power of neoliberal governance they origi-
nally sought to undermine. For instance, President Rawlings speaking before the par-
liament on January 18, 1996, had this to say: “Some observers . . . have assumed that 
since this is an election year, the government will relax control of economic manage-
ment in order to pander to sectional interests. Let me assure . . . we have no intention 
to subordinate the nation’s economic interests to political expediency. . . . We shall 
pursue our policies and programs with increased vigor and follow up our promotion 
of private investment.” What is more, Kwame Peprah, Ghana’s finance minister when 
presenting the 1996 budget, also states that, “we do not intend to play election year 
politics with the economy . . . we have to take responsible actions and that in spite of 
electoral year risks, our responsibility to the longer term interests of our people must 
remain supreme” (Ghana’s Budget, 1996, p.1-42, cited in Akunnor).
Despite the verbal commitments to tighten fiscal policy, the government, again, 
succumbed to electoral pressures and engaged in the fiscal irresponsibility reminiscent 
of 1992 and 1996 by boosting expenditure spending in the second half of 2000 and 
veering the IMF programme “sharply off track” (IMF, 2001, p.9). When presenting 
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the 2000 budget to parliament, Kwame Peprah, the finance minister, emphatically 
states: “we must resist the temptation to play political football with the economy in 
an election year. Populist demands, populist rhetoric, blackmail threats, wild cat strike 
all combined to wreak havoc on the progress of our economic forward march dur-
ing the two previous elections in 1992 and 1996” (Ghana’s Budget, 2000, p.83 cited 
in Akunnor). However, the government wage bill ceilings exceeded IMF targets. In 
particular, the government granted a 20 per cent across-the-board civil service salary 
increase, as well as further 20 per cent increase in the salary of Polytechnic teachers. 
The persistently high salary increases contributed to a significant increase in a fiscal 
deficit of 6.9 per cent of GDP, against the IMF target of 4.2 per cent (IMF, 2001, p.9) 
.The ceiling on net domestic financing of the government was also missed by a wide 
margin. Reserve money growth jumped from 18 per cent to 36 per cent by the end of 
June 2000 due to unrestrained expenditure. None of the fiscal and monetary targets 
set by the IMF were met by December 2000 (ibid). The PNDC act of not consent-
ing to the terms of conditional lending set by the IMF was a clear form of counter-
conduct, as it involved the regime resisting and explicitly refusing to comply with the 
regimented routines and the disciplinary force of neoliberal governance. A pertinent 
question arises, therefore, as to whether the PNDC was a Foucauldian strategist or a 
neolocolonialist stooge.
7.6 Conclusion
It is largely thanks to quantification, comparisons, categorisation with its rigid discur-
sive forms of disciplinary surveillance (Brivot & Gendron, 2011) via statistical reports 
that the Ghanaian State is increasingly enmeshed within the panoptical gaze and grip. 
By instilling ‘programmes of conduct’ viewed as ‘the attempts to regulate, reform, 
organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices’ (Dean, 1999, p. 43), 
the government of Ghana has been objectified by stringently enforcing practices of 
self-control, self-responsibility, self-assessment, self-improvement, while simultane-
ously allowing greater scrutiny by the BWIs—much like ‘inmates of a panopticon’ 
(Foucault, 1977, p.88). When viewed through a neoliberal lens, the BWIs tactics of 
governance constitute an individualising, an array of disciplinary technologies to ren-
der aid receiving subjects visible—and furthermore measureable (and so governable) 
and in the process the sort of unmitigated and grim description of normalising soci-
ety or disciplinary supervision of societies of Michel Foucault is fully actualised with 
its purported sophistication. Thanks largely to the link between power and the gaze 
of “surveillance” identifiable in Foucault’s analysis of the panopticon—and thanks 
to techniques of observation and supervision or pervasive monitoring carried out by 
personnel and consultants during Bank’s missions and consultancies—the aid recipi-
ents are enjoined to constantly monitor their own performance so as not to depart 
from a pre-determined global norms or practices espoused by the BWIs.
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By deploying the concept of “counter-conducts” in the case of Ghana, I have pro-
vided evidence that even those who lastingly live on the margins of society uncritically 
depicted as ‘powerless’ subjects are capable of creating a space for certain subjectivities 
to emerge, and the ways in which they conduct themselves to counter the patterns 
of behaviour promoted by neoliberal forms of governance through ‘non-compliance’. 
Governmentality, that so engaged Foucault, is represented most clearly by what sub-
jects fundamentally do to themselves as what is done to them. Or, as Peters (2011, 
p.1) has incisively put it “government in this sense only becomes possible at the point 
at which policing and administration stops; at the point where government and self-
government coincide and coalesce”.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Reflections and Concluding Thoughts:  
Revisiting the Main Issues
8.1 Introduction
I started my PhD process by constructing an analytical framework which drew selec-
tively on Michel Foucault’s neoliberal version of governmentality as a diagnostic 
device from which to diagnose the particular configuration of regime of power rela-
tions that feed into or underpin the practices, norms, rationalities, technologies and 
techniques of contemporary mode of governance; in particular looking to examine 
it in the context of Ghana and the Bretton Woods institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The thesis has been concerned with providing 
an important space for alternative interpretation to the more conventionalist modes 
of analysis in conceiving and understanding neoliberal structural adjustment appara-
tus within the context of Ghana. This has involved explicating and exploring the “fine 
meshes of power” inscribed within the neoliberal adjustment regime which works 
through apparent autonomy of “free” subjects, and yet how this “freedom” is also the 
very condition of (im) possibility for the production of subjectivities and their self-
regulation. My task in this concluding chapter is the following. First, I provide a sum-
mary of the thesis, outlining the main findings of each analytical chapter. Second, I 
briefly discuss the contributions made by this thesis to scholarship and finally, I then 
provide my final thoughts which sums up the broad outlines of this thesis. 
8.2 Summary and key findings of the research of this thesis
8.2.1 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 was devoted to describing the deepening economic and governance cri-
sis that engulfed the postcolonial Africa states over the last two decades. This pro-
vided a historical context for understanding the socio-economic-political realities and 
vicissitudes which precipitated structural adjustment experience in Africa in general 
and Ghana in particular. By so doing, I acknowledged the significance of historical 
provenance and set the contextual framing and basis for the subsequent analysis. 
In Chapter 2 critical examination was given to Foucault’s conceptual nuances of an 
analytics of relations between power-knowledge regimes and discourses, and the 
method of problematising and perspectivising subjectivities in the latter. I indicated 
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that subjectivities are constructed by discourses, because discourses are infused with 
power-productivity. This section thus allowed me to highlight that at its core, power-
as-productive representation stresses the importance of knowledge in (re)producing a 
specific kind of subjectivity insofar as it affirms individuals’ power of generating their 
own discourses and practices to resist external or so-called perennially dominant and 
authoritative discourses and practices within which development policies are fore-
grounded, formed and realised. It was seen that the construction and rationalisation 
of policy discourses take place in a discursive space where power and knowledge are 
located, repetitively articulated, circulated and maintained (Foucault, 1984). This 
study also found that subject-object formations of postcolonial African states (includ-
ing Ghana) as they pertain to policy discourses are contingent on western models 
of power and knowledge which are part and parcel of our taken-for-natural beliefs 
and assumptions. Foucault’s explanation of the way in which power-knowledge grid 
dynamically and reciprocally interact to construct dominant regimes and rationales of 
‘truth’ give us a basis to analyse different ways in which the postcolonial African states 
have been discursively constructed and represented in policy documents. These dis-
cursive constructions and representations signal a need to reflect upon and challenge 
the ontological and epistemological truth claims of development policies as part and 
parcel of legitimate technologies of governing life.
Chapter 3 was a critical review of the political economic philosophy of Frederick 
von Hayek and Milton Friedman, typical stooges in the “neoliberal thought collec-
tive” (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) in an attempt to comprehend and adequately map 
out the intellectual pedigree of neoliberalism. A careful re-reading of the text revealed 
that the intellectual duo of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, conveniently 
equated with the Mont Pèlerin Society (established in 1947), without exception 
appear to be the main intellectual impetus of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Mirowski 
& Plehwe, 2009; Plehwe & Walpen, 2005). By analysing political and economic theo-
ries proposed by the two classic icons of neoliberalism I have sought to foreground 
and further derive a more nuanced understanding of neoliberalism that better capture 
the spirit of its peculiar nature. In other words, the foray into the systematic overview 
of neoliberalism’s historical and intellectual origins was to arrive at a more satisfactory 
account through which its polyvalent applicability can be simplified and rendered 
understandable. To be certain, Hayek and Friedman’s interpretation of neoliberalism 
is deeply ingrained in a particular concept of more pro-market and anti-government 
view of the world as the best way to guarantee the maximum individual freedom, eco-
nomic efficiency and economic well-being. Taking a closer and a more a critical look 
at the political economy of Hayek and Friedman, it becomes ever more clear that what 
unites them is that they appear to invoke similar sense of neoliberal utopia fantasies of 
free market dreamland. My claim is that Hayek and Friedman’s utopian vistas have for 
all intents and purposes been most enduring and influential in reshaping and popular-
ising our contemporary neoliberalism. That said, to single out Hayek and Friedman as 
intellectual godfathers of neoliberalism, to be sure, would be a malicious oversimpli-
fication and a historical overstatement after all, the intellectual heritage of neoliberal-
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ism have many roots and many branches of which the neoliberal-ness of their views 
are just two possible representatives (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Plehwe et al., 2006).
In the first part of Chapter 4, I clarified how Foucault’s idea of governmentality 
offer a productive interrogative horizon to an understanding of broader range of 
mechanisms and technologies more concretely rearticulated to historically altering 
complex governmental rationalities and strategies. My central preoccupation with 
governmentalities— or, more accurately, the of arts of government, was to show just 
how Foucault’s analysis of manifestations of power relations working through the idea 
of a rational, calculating and autonomous conduct of “free” individuals, and the pro-
cesses of subjectification this involves rather than techniques of domination. Drawing 
on the well-known lecture of 1978-79 at the Collège de France, published under the 
title The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), the second part of the chapter represented critical 
engagements with Foucault’s spectacular analysis of classical liberalism and neoliberal-
ism as forms of a governmental rationality to provide a solution to the utter conceptual 
and seeming theoretical impasse that lies at the heart of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism 
Foucault tells us fits perfectly with a particular and historically specific governmental 
rationality, which emerged in the eighteenth century and was then expressed in the 
neoliberalism of the so-called Gary Becker’s Chicago-style economics, and the work 
of Ordoliberalism (German neoliberals) in the second half of the twentieth century 
to delineate a German and American neoliberal governmentality. I have emphasised 
that Foucault’s profound rearticulations of neoliberalism built around the idea of the 
discursive politics brought one crucial insight to the fore. Besides doing more justice 
to the discursive nature of neoliberalism, he most explicitly offers conceptual and 
historical account of governmental rationality of liberalism that is fundamentally 
demarcated from its conventional conceptions. More specifically, Foucault’s geneal-
ogy of neoliberalism as a distinct type of governmentality evidently tackles one of the 
most pressing problems of the highly acute accounts of neoliberalism head-on, which 
is to unmistakably destabilise and seriously challenge the existing liberal view of gov-
ernment. To be even more specific, Foucault presents a highly original reading of the 
contemporary neoliberal version of our governmentalities which clearly departs from 
the old-fashioned conceptions of liberalism. Nevertheless, my attitude to Foucault’s 
innovative and productive accounts of contemporary neoliberalism in this study is a 
rather ambivalent one, since it still remains an open and a matter of dispute if in fact 
Foucault’s unflinching position towards what he enthusiastically characterised as neo-
liberalism could wholly be applied to the uniquely changing conditions that confront 
us in our historical present (Behrent, 2009).
In chapter 5, I discussed and offered the various debates and definitions of neo-
liberalism that attest to its elusiveness and vagueness. I noted that the concept of 
neoliberalism poses a peculiar challenge to modern political and economic thought. 
There is nonetheless broad consensus among adherents of neoliberal policies, in that 
they agree that it is clearly quite useful to best characterised neoliberalism as notori-
ously opaque and foggy. One might even suggest that despite neoliberalism’s intrac-
table ascendance, intellectual impetus and exuberance, it defies easy definition and 
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it is quite hard to classify. Neoliberalism, I pointed out is perhaps best thought of, 
then, as a discursive type of politics. Approaching neoliberalism as a discursive form 
of politics I suggested, challenges and opens up new ways of re-imagining, rewriting 
and recasting our view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. This 
thesis has established that it is by reconceptualising neoliberalism as a particular dis-
cursive project or strategy that we can appreciate it seeming nebulous nature. Taking 
such a close reading therefore constitutes a significant entry point not only— or even 
primarily —for rethinking neoliberalism, but also for advancing a potentially pow-
erful and a vigorous critique in destabilising the imagery of neoliberalism an as all-
encompassing discourse now so pervasive in popular accounts.
In chapter 6, drawing on discursive analysis informed by critical, genealogical and 
archaeological insights developed by Foucault, I sought to question the representa-
tions and subject positions of postcolonial African states as have been constructed 
and disseminated by the pervasiveness of the world Bank’s development discourse 
and embodied discursive practices emanating from ‘good governance’ policy package, 
which emerged in the 1990s and deepened in the 2000s as an aspect of structural 
adjustment neoliberal market agenda. Reference is thus made to the Bank’s authorita-
tive policy documents on the underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan 
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Governance and Development, the World 
Bank 1997 The State in a Changing World and 2002 Building Institutions for Markets 
reports. My intention being to expose and divulge the interactions of “micro-technol-
ogies of power”; question the deep-rooted politico-economic institutionalising”truth-
regimes” of policy discourses, the problematic subjectivities it seeks to generate, 
practices legitimated and the cherished orthodoxies that are inscribed and thoroughly 
entrenched within official policy documents. 
Bretton Woods institutions policy narratives are loaded with representations and 
constructions with far reaching consequences for development policy and agendas. 
Notwithstanding the fact that ‘good governance’ reform agenda purports to repre-
sent an ideological and rhetorical shift from the previous parameters —the top down 
approach of the structural adjustment regime, it must hastily be added that this how-
ever is not an unproblematic shift as increasing amounts of evidence suggest that it 
is more explicitly a reinvention of the cookie-cutter neoliberal development para-
digm rhetorically disguised and embellished within the Bank’s development policies. 
In tandem, vestiges of mainstream development discourse and practice, based on 
the overbearing effects of the so-called technico-scientific knowledges, have sought 
to produce and reproduce ‘Western’ constructions of postcolonial nation-states and 
other regions of the global South to standardise, naturalise and rationalise a seemingly 
Eurocentric hegemony. The reformulation and the reconfiguration of mainstream 
thinking about development it has been argued, crystallised and furthered how the 
postcolonial nation-states have been discursively and scornfully construed and rep-
resented in very unflattering and pejorative ways by development agencies within the 
contemporary development episteme. 
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It was evident that ‘good governance’ literature which became an indispensable 
component within an overall governmental technology conjure up and deeply com-
mitted to reinforcing the problematic and contentious construction of postcolonial 
societies in terms of the inferior and exoticised Other of the supposedly progressively 
superior ‘West’. From a discursive point of view, such pathological representations and 
constructions of postcolonial nation-states functioned to reproduce and maintain 
discursive power relations, and consequently, try to universalise and perpetuate spe-
cific policy interventions with the aim of restructuring its (postcolonial nation-states) 
internal affairs in furtherance of market-driven “regime of truth”.
As this study has illustrated, one crucial element in the discursive assemblage of the 
universal code of ‘good governance’ mechanism was to silence, delegitimise, foreclose, 
suppress, obscure and inevitably encumber to a measured extent countervailing optic 
that would examine historical conditions and context within the discursive terrain; as 
well as to mask, yet evasively perpetuates the complicity of the ineffective and regres-
sive economic programmes enthusiastically promulgated by the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions to spread its goodies around the globe. The evidence presented here suggests 
that development apparatus, more generally cannot be technically, culturally and 
ideologically neutral, innocent, apolitical and value-free. This is by no means utopian, 
naïve, illusory and ultimately misleading. Critically, what we should bear in mind and 
grapple with is that apparatus of development more generally powerfully resides and 
inevitably operates to arbitrarily construct certain values that are discursively consti-
tuted within immutable and transcendental truths — which are epistemically located 
within the dominant section of society. Certainly, discursive (re)constitution of ‘real-
ity’ is a corrosive means of power that renders development agenda always already 
political issue. Equally interesting but also disastrous, is that in doing so, it fatally elic-
its deficient or erroneous constructs to depict artificially simulated ‘reality’.
I adopted the position that policies in important ways do not exist in a vacuum. 
What I mean by this is that policies reflect underlying discursive practices within 
development, and it is indeed this Foucauldian discursive practices that are materi-
alised and reconstituted via governmentality—a formidable mechanism through 
which the ‘unruly character’ of the postcolonial societies are shaped, policed and con-
stituted. This study illustrates and confirms that ‘good governance’, as a technology of 
neoliberal rule, provides a comprehensive ‘grid of intelligibility’ within which poten-
tially every aspect of postcolonial nation-states can be governed on the basis of logic 
of development in contemporary world politics. Discourses and practices of develop-
ment agenda as suggested by Foucauldian reasoning, are the veritable vehicle through 
which hidden operations of neoliberalism are masqueraded and conceptualised 
amidst dubious “neutrality”, validated and envisaged through “commonsense” crude 
rhetoric of ‘good governance’. What was evident in the analysis was that discourses, 
practices of development and ‘good governance’, on this reading, are encapsulated 
and deeply embedded on a fundamentally flawed set of assumption: namely that neo-
liberal free market dreamland proselytised by self-proclaimed neoliberal “maestros” 
ostensibly constitutes a silver bullet to solve all problems on issues of development. 
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And this is imperceptibly implicit in the way Ghanaian political elites — and other 
regions of the global South wittingly and/or unwittingly, continue to be entrapped in 
succumbing to donor or externally driven policy prescriptions as dominant ‘common 
sense’ in our contemporary world order, thus rendering them prodigiously susceptible 
to the pervasive effects of power (Foucault, 1990, p.291). This made me suggest that 
‘good governance’ regime might in fact be usefully understood and regarded as invari-
ably enmeshed with the power-knowledge grid which provided the desirable discursive 
landscape within which development has been conventionally predicated, and this, in 
turn, ultimately exposes the discursive linkages and interactions inherent in them.
Reflecting on the particular illustrative example of Ghana, I elucidated the ways 
political technology of ‘good governance’ emerged most pre-eminently as a mode or 
technique of governmentality. A Foucauldian lens of analysis established that ‘good 
governance’ agenda in the context of Ghana procreates domain of knowledge; it 
enables governable subjects and effective modes of behaviour, and deploys technolo-
gies and techniques to produce the desired governmental objectives — forming dis-
cursive nodes and modes to firmly entrench, maintain and reinforce the neoliberal 
political-economic epistemic condition. Using Ghana as an exemplary point of refer-
ence enabled a development of some empirically exuberant conclusions regarding the 
extent to which the rhetoric of post-Washington consensus phase of governance claim 
to have left behind one-size-fit all model, totalising ontology of orthodox structural 
adjustment work to perpetuate neoliberal policies under a different guise. 
That means that the prevalence of discourses and practices within neoliberal 
policies, pertaining largely to the development architecture in an important way, 
were reconfigured towards more subtle governmentalising interactions, targeted at 
transforming and shaping the government of Ghana into a self-disciplined and self‐
regulating, neoliberal subject under the guise of local “ownership”, “partnership”, 
“transparency”, “accountability”, active intervention of civil society, “capacity-build-
ing” and, above all, “empowerment discourse”.
As well, in this chapter using a genealogical approach, I critically unmasked alter-
native discourses by examining how localised grassroots social movements’ have 
articulated the possibility of resistance to the imposition of reforms by donors. For 
Foucault, resistance
is coextensive with (power) and absolutely its contemporary. (…) As soon as 
there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. We are never 
trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and 
according to a precise strategy. (Foucault, 1977, p.224)
Foucault makes exactly this point when he argues for the explicit connection between 
power and resistance. ‘I think that resistance is a part of this strategic relationship 
of which power consists. Resistance really always relies upon the situation against 
which it struggles’ (p.168). Despite policies that reinforce the established order, I have 
augued and demonstrated in the Foucauldian vein how disaffected and vociferous 
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grassroots social movements act to resist, reverse and discursively dismantle the exist-
ing neoliberal practices and rationalities. Simply, by activating and articulating practi-
cal case of grassroots social movements rigorous challenge against the pervasive and 
dominant discourses to effect policy change not only served as an exemplary moment 
in showing how spaces of resistance is possible in restructuring power relations, but 
also cast new light which requires some reflection to see why the persistent objection 
that Foucault’s work allegedly completely paralysis rather than promote practices of 
effective resistance, is to say the least misguided, disingenuous and badly misleading. 
In the seventh and final chapter, I developed my argument by drawing on Foucault’s 
idea of practices of ‘discipline’ and disciplinary mechanisms, coupled with an explora-
tion of technologies of normalisation, and stressing their interaction with discourse of 
‘governmentality’ to analyse the intimate symbiosis between strategies of ‘discipline’ 
and neoliberal structural adjustment apparatus. Doing so allowed me to demonstrate 
how neoliberal disciplinary regime and practices seek to mobilise idealised schemata 
of “social reality” to produce states and governments who construct itself through 
their own autonomy, self-regulation and self-subjectification or shape their own con-
duct through what Foucault calls the “technologies of the self ” (1988, p.18). In other 
words, states and governments who voluntarily embrace particular economic choices, 
and perform in certain ways which are normatively desirable in promoting market-
friendly neoliberal reforms. The above observations encapsulate the view that struc-
tural adjustment typifies a specific form of neoliberal governing rationalities.
 Empirical study on the case of Ghana demonstrates that embedded in the disci-
plinary practices and regimes of structural adjustment apparatus and rationales is an 
ubiquitous normalising discourse constituted through global standards of conduct 
by which a balance sheet can be made to constantly scrutinise the degree to which 
different countries have fared better in meeting satisfactory performance targets and 
which can be used to blame countries when these standards are not seen to have been 
achieved.
This thesis thus argued that heavily enmeshed in neoliberal governing practices 
and discourses are diverse combinations and productions of normalised truths, expert 
knowledges and policy techniques not imposed but are applied using a complex pro-
cess of benchmarks and performance indicators, pervaded by calculus of compliance, 
supervision, target setting which reflect a rationality of governing from a distance 
according to an established set of certain ‘global best practices’ and standards. Jeremy 
Bentham’s idea of Panopticon was invoked to illustrate a Foucauldian understanding 
of monitoring as surveillance, most tellingly prevalent in the structural adjustment 
framework to show the applicability of the Panopticon which Foucault famously 
stresses in his genealogical magnum opus Discipline and Punish (1977). This thesis has 
described how statistically determined standards are tied up with disciplinary practice 
that represents technologies of disciplinary power which act as a biopolitical normal-
ising power through which BWIs produce regimes of development knowledge about 
the government of Ghana. The findings also indicate that this is made actionable and 
thinkable within a governmental reason overtly constructed, formulated and opera-
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tionalised to control, transform and shape the conduct of conduct of the government 
of Ghana from a distance, ‘the international conduct of the conduct of countries’ 
(Merlingen, 2003, p.367) through the “freedom” and autonomy of individual actors.
The analysis has shown that with the biopolitical tactic of neoliberal government 
call for certain rationalities to be subjected to ‘rigorous’ statistical measurement with a 
whole set of related quantitative and qualitative calculation practices, emphasise pre-
cisely the need for inquiring more profoundly into many of the strategies of disci-
plinary and panoptic forms of power in the contemporary world. This was reflected 
most visibly in examination, standardisation, target seeting, benchmarking etc., which 
underpin, legitimise and enable biopolitical intervention. 
Within such a framework, this study suggests that neoliberal biopolitics in con-
cert with dominating governmentalities provide the fertile ground for conceptualis-
ing and exploring how normalising technologies systematically operate to objectify 
the government of Ghana as self-regulating entrepreneurial subject of neoliberalism. I 
have demonstrated that liberal governmental logic of biopolitics more clearly outlines 
that BWIs governed through “freedom” and disciplinary normalisation, producing 
self-governing aid-dependent subjects who needed to conform to the imperatives and 
technologies of neoliberal ethos of government. 
That implies that governmentality perspective provides new methodological and 
theoretical credentials for reconceptualising and reconceiving structural adjustment 
policies in Ghana as in other countries where it was implemented, as establishing par-
ticular ways of governing the self through increasing disciplining and surveillance on 
the one hand , and the scrutinisation of the self that have contributed to and are still 
contributing to the everyday understandings of neoliberal discourses as a way of life, 
on the other. Attending to these formations also means that governmentality, is but 
another critical perspective to demonstrate how Ghana became disciplined biopoliti-
cal subject of a neoliberal structural adjustment apparatus through an array of “ration-
alised” technologies of power (Crichlow & Northover, 2009, p.286) which compelled 
her to inculcate and perform particular economically-responsive subjectivities (Dar-
dot & Laval, 2014).
In drawing upon Foucauldian understandings of neoliberal “counter-conduct” 
within the framework of governmentality study, I have examined how the road 
towards neoliberal governmentality is fraught with defiance and possible frictions. 
Whilst governmental strategies and tactics of power try to govern the everyday life 
of individuals, understood as the arts of conducting conduct — paradoxically such 
rationality constructs subjects that self-reflectively govern themselves or attempt to 
resist normalised conduct and subjugating discourses and practice. The Foucauldian 
analysis performed in this thesis has revealed how ‘non-compliance’ as a transgres-
sion to the dominance of neoliberal political technologies and rationalities showed 
themselves in the formation of “counter-conduct” such as that of the PNDC regime. 
Yet it also inadvertently reinforces and legitimises dominant power structures as 
has been illustrated in the case of PNDC regime. Thus, by recognising the implicit 
contradictions and fractures intrinsic to discourses of neoliberal governmentality, it 
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avoids naively assuming that aid-dependent governments supinely accept normalis-
ing discourses of imposition. This thesis has made clear that the aid-dependent gov-
ernments rather recruit alternative discourses to productively and strategically resist 
neoliberal subjectification has been instrumental in highlighting the fact that there is 
always the possibility for reversibility of the status quo. The analysis of PNDC’s ‘non-
compliance’ with IMF conditionality instantiates the way in which aid-recipient gov-
ernments have more effectively resisted their docility by opposing (passively as well 
as actively) policy practices or reforms (Collins, 2011). The decision to engage with 
Foucault and his observations of “counter-conduct” was an attempt to locate Fou-
cault’s insatiable concern with ‘thoughtful indocility’ and ‘desubjectivisation’ mani-
fested at the critical reflection of his notion of critique: “how not to be governed like 
that, by that, in the name of principles such as that, in view of such objectives and by 
the means of such procedures” (Foucault, 2002, p.384). 
8.3  Contribution of the research: neoliberal governmentality, structural 
adjustment and neoliberalism
My findings have a number of valuable insights and contributions in the context of 
empirical and theoretical research for several strands of the Foucault-inspired govern-
mentality literature. For the purposes of the overall research question, they contribute 
to the contemporary debate on burgeoning literature on governmentality beyond the 
territorial and juridictional confinement of the nation-state constituted and re-consti-
tuted through the IMF and World Bank which in general has largely been ignored. I 
try to fill this disappointing gap and to deliver starting points for further analysis of 
neoliberal governmentality on a supra-state level by asking: To what extent can Fou-
cauldian governmentality perspective be applied to International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank structural adjustment programmes in Ghana’s contex? While I was reflect-
ing upon the dynamics of the governing principles of the IMF and the World Bank 
policies for Ghana and using the concept of governmentality, I find that neoliberal 
adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank in the example of Ghana work 
through the mechanisms, discourses, techniques, a set of practices and rationalities of 
power which neatly fit in with and form an ineliminable part of the governmentality 
of neoliberalism explained by Foucault, that is to say, a form of governmental tech-
nique understood as the conduct of conduct or governance without government. This 
is interesting precisely because it is the same complex array of techniques, calculations 
and tactics (Foucault, 2007, p.108) that are used by the IMF and the World Bank 
through their adjustment programmes. 
The richness of this thesis contribution revealed how the use of a governmental-
ity perspective remarkably allows an investigation of power dynamic between donors 
and aid-recipient gvernments. This study conceived of power as productive, empower-
ing and constitutive as opposed to a visibly repressive and centrally originated form 
of power. Such a reflection may help to destabilise and disrupt the paralysing idea 
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of techniques of domination; one in which donors impose their priorities on poor 
African countries in order to analyse the subtle yet insidious ways in which power 
is exercised and rationalised through practices of freedom (Death, 2011, p.3). This, 
I think, is perfectly consonant with Foucault’s vehement appeal “not to look for the 
headquarters that presides over its rationality” (1998, p.95).
At many point throughout this study I have presented evidence suggesting that 
the relations between donors and recipient countries is characterised by a neoliberal 
mode of governance : namely, that attempt to shape and reshape the government of 
Ghana’s behaviour as a subject through specific strategy or mechanism of power — 
construct a neoliberal “regime of truth” upon which discourses that construct social 
reality, modes of control (norms, values, standards, devices and techniques), properly 
function or rather operate through, rather than against, eliciting different ways in 
which recipients’ subjectivity is formed. I have also presented evidence suggesting that 
this form of mentalities or rationalities of government—the art of rendering social 
reality visible, knowable, governable, administrable and manageable (Collier, 2009, 
p.96; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1996; Lemke, 2001, my emphasis) typically target African 
borrowing governments. This thesis thus suggests that the position, taking by some 
IR theorists like Jonathan Joseph (2010, p.224) who argues that ‘contemporary forms 
of governmentality can productively be applied only to those areas that might be 
characterised as having an advanced form of liberalism’, I would propose, is mistaken 
and grossly erroneous , no less - and no more. His dogmatic insistent on the con-
trast between the ‘effectiveness of governmentality in advanced liberal societies”and 
its failure in societies at different levels of development”( Joseph, 2012, p.5 & p.16) 
that neoliberal forms of govermentality require is deeply problematic. Because rely-
ing heavily on the characteristically uneven‘ and unequal distribution of neoliberal 
governmental practices between the developed and those societies perceived outside 
the developed West, it presupposes the study of govemmentality, a field traditionally 
focused on internal conditions as discrete entities and spaces to our politics.
Joseph‘s rather seemingly superficial analysis inevitably ignores the genealogy of 
neoliberalism Foucault outlined in his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) 
or those substantial contributions by governmentality scholars that have highlighted 
non-liberal (e.g. post-colonial or post-socialist) societies as reverberating specifically 
with the neoliberal political rationality ( Jeffreys, 2009; Ferguson, 2010; Ailio, 2011; 
Collier, 2011; Death, 2013; Kangas, 2015, p.482). Indeed, by holding on to a sup-
posedly suffocating separation between liberal governmentality on the one hand, and 
illiberal governmentality on the other, Joseph’s understanding of neoliberalism tends 
to be over determined, problematically reductive and unreflective of his own uncritical 
engagement of neoliberal narrative. Contra Joseph, the analytical dichotomy between 
domestic-international, micro-macro-levels and the advanced liberal societies and the 
so-called non-advanced liberal context) in many dominant scripts, obviously limit 
our overall understanding of the way in which the world is contemporarily ordered 
and governed (Kangas, 2015, p.483). If anything, it seems just entirely plausible to 
suggest that the key concern is to provide generic analytical tools for IR enquiries. 
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Governmentality as a general analytical grid of ideas that give form to programmes, 
techniques, rationalities and strategies of governance, is implicated in the produc-
tion, reproduction, and circulation of power showing how through everyday routines, 
banal and most mundane practices which are associated with “governance” structural 
adjustment, predictably, govern to foster as well as (re)produce specific liberal modali-
ties of subjectivity and social relations necessary to sustain the logic of neoliberalism 
through biopolitical tactics.
This thesis links with the broader literature on structural adjustment policy analy-
sis offering cutting edge insight into the intimate relationship between neoliberalism, 
governmentality, and biopolitics. To be clear, this thesis has made a modest contri-
bution to the literature for future studies on structural adjustment policies in the 
Ghanaian and in African contexts where there is a paucity or dearth of theoretical 
research which has apply Foucault-inspired governmentality perspective to structural 
adjustment policies.
Another significant theoretical implication that can be drawn from the present 
study is that it has made a worthwhile contribution to some of the shortcomings 
within the mainstream IR theoretical traditions in comprehending and explaining 
debate in scholarship on neoliberalism. In particular, neoliberalism is framed within 
this discussion as a form of governmentality and discourses (England & Ward, 2007; 
Larner, 2000; Lemke, 2001; Springer, 2012c). More accurately, following Foucault, 
I have defined neoliberalism as an art of government that renders and normalises a 
certain understanding of social and political reality knowable. In this regard, we must 
recognise that governmentality perspective allows an analysis which transcends the 
simplistic and simplifying understanding of neoliberalism in terms of typical hege-
monic top-down model, hierarchical and monolithic imperative—albeit deployed 
conterminously, increasingly overlap and become blurred together. Stated otherwise, 
the governmentality perspective eschews and readily disavows the kinds of analysis 
that reduce neoliberalism to a set of free market policies (i.e., privatisation, trade and 
financial liberalisation, deregulation and so on), or the Marxian political economy 
narrative which often tend to designate neoliberalism as ideology that seeks to justify 
or generate support for those policies (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; 2011; Harvey, 2005, 
2009; Castree, 2009). 
I have read neoliberalism as an intricate web of various forms of knowledge, sub-
jectivities, political rationalities and techniques devised for exercising various forms 
of power over people—the central concern of Foucauldian biopolitics — rather than 
as an ideological rhetoric or a political economic reality. The result was to suggest 
that these distinctive and evolving governmental rationalities create the conditions 
that encourage, and indeed inexorably make possible, a whole range of governmen-
tal technologies, strategies, calculations and tactics that grease the wheels of “varie-
gated global neoliberal hegemon” (Springler, 2014, p.158) that suffuse the quoditian 
aspects of our lives (Kiersey & Weidner, 2009, p.354).
This thesis has shown that the utility of a governmentality approaches in particular 
gives due deference to new critical insights. Indeed, this study found the governmen-
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tality approach very promising as it it qualitatively reinvigorates a potent interroga-
tive frame for epistemological propositions to unpack and deconstruct what Foucault 
(1997) forcefully calls “politics of truth” which implies and even explicitly marks a 
radical rupture with a reification of ideologies, ideas and concepts. Instead of analys-
ing ideas, ideologies, concepts and theories that problematically and simplistically 
reinstates the binary poles of true or false statements, this thesis has contributed to 
this knowledge by investigating how prevalent “regimes of truth” are imbricated in 
the production and reproduction of corrosive power technologies which also work 
on the supra-national level. The Foucauldian aim in relation to particular regimes of 
dominating rationality and practice, our own and those of others, as I see it, would 
simply be to end it by constantly and diligently unveiling, unmasking and rearranging 
them in order to construct critical “ontology of ourselves” in relation to truth through 
which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge” (Foucault, 1984, p.315-317) 
and of our historical reality. 
Hence this study has sought all along to question and critique the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and contextual “regimes of truth” propagated by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund considered as best templates for global development 
which leave very little room for counter‐narratives or alternative strategies that will 
benefit aid-dependent governments. The analysis revealed how these transcenden-
tal “truths” advanced by these institutions are implicated in pervasive and insidious 
power-knowledge relations but are not inherently true. It is neither Foucault’s inten-
tion nor mine to disavow and/ or reject the problematic and contentious nature of 
truth-claims as such; it is certainly Foucault’s intention, as is well known, to suggest 
that we should consistently be careful about the precarious nature of ‘truth claims’; 
precisely because it is discursively constituted within a particular and historically 
contingent frame of reference of the so-called ‘champions of reforms’. Implicit in this 
view is the idea that long arduous, but elusive search for the ‘truth’ is unknowable 
and unpredictable (Foucault, 2007). On this note, to argue that commonly accepted 
“truths” advanced by these institutions have largely operated to serve other interests 
and these need to be robustly interrogated by those who engage with them to open up 
possibility for reconfiguration is exactly Foucauldian in spirit. This thesis is a modest 
but serious contribution to that critical interrogation and further reflection by the 
repertoire of governmentality studies.
8.4 Concluding reflections
The past does not repeat itself in the present, but the present is played out, and 
innovates, utilising the legacy of the past (Robert Castel, 1994, p.238).
The perspective articulated in this thesis is far removed from offering the cynical 
nature of the Bretton Woods institutions—it seems not—that would be overly sim-
plistic and utterly naïve. In terms of this thesis, I am primarily concerned with the 
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quest to produce critical diagnostics in order to rethink our present history from a 
very specific illustrative example. And in doing so, I revisited structural adjustment 
policy in Ghana with greater depth and nuance. This has involved emphasising the 
logics that have become suffused with belligerent regulatory practices, technologies, 
techniques and rationalities spectacularly connected with an illustrative example 
which few scholars have disappointingly and insufficiently addressed. Be that as it 
may, it is my candid view that the overarching influence of such a logic speaks to a 
situation where domestic policy space has effectively been conscripted as targets for 
governmental techniques. The argument raised here is not, however, simply to retell 
and to historicise the past. But then, I have done so in the hope to contextualise post-
colonial developmentalism in order to adequately grasp, deeply problematise and 
perspectivise more explicitly the key discursive shifts, phases and structural underpin-
nings that are generally invisible and unobtrusive, albeit pervasive in mainstream can-
ons of orthodox development.
I have been wryly skeptical about the old and discredited notion that development 
aid is an instance of an evil plan to impoverish the periphery. Here I would go as far 
as to argue that structural adjustment agenda is emblematic of a social project which 
articulates itself in discursive and institutional practices, or worse still, masked in the 
‘disciplining’ and pre-dominant rotten ideology of the “free” market rhetoric applied 
to the development of countries in the global South. From this point of view, I follow 
Foucault in suggesting that for all their rhetoric and pronouncements of structural 
adjustment agenda as a moniker to address the seemingly endemic poverty and perva-
sive underdevelopment, I insist structural adjustment regime is in fact a continuation 
of domestic politics, and one that is integral in the promulgation of a particular vision 
of the industrially advanced North with other means. 
This claim, of course, does not mean that structural adjustment as a policy package 
is inherently bad or good. Yes, I am in entire agreement with the idea that structural 
adjustment policy corresponds to a real messianic impulse to seemingly ‘alleviate’ or 
bring about ‘the end of poverty in our lifetime’ (Sachs, 2005). Yet, sadly, when I look 
through the unfathomable depths of disciplinary rationalities, strategies, technolo-
gies, and techniques, actively embedded in such a social project, one cannot help but 
come to the conclusion that the logic behind such messianic impulse is somewhat 
ironic—mere pretence—at best phoney and hypocritical nonsense at worst.
Structural adjustment regime with it discriminatory policy reforms startlingly 
reveal that it quite simply, cannot stabilise or materialise development in a number 
of countries beyond rhetoric (Ghana for example) where the banality of neoliberal-
ism is riven by exacerbated poverty and marked increase in inequality. Now it does 
seems to me that structural adjustment agenda in many ways is deployed to aggres-
sively and deafly serve the dominating structures of capitalism at the global level, and 
this further explains its evangelical zeal and excessive romantic desire in containing 
the risk which the so-called global South poor such as Ghana poses to the ‘stability’, 
‘order’ and security of countries of the global North rich as well as market fundamen-
talism. The question as to whether Ghana would have been better off without struc-
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tural adjustment policy is conceivably less convincing, moot and as far as I am aware, 
hardly sustainable. I strenuously reject the idea that Ghana and indeed other post-
colonial African countries would have been better off without structural adjustment 
policy. There is no denying the fact that Ghana, as indeed most developing countries, 
needs structural adjustment policy.
More troubling (and deeply disqueiting) for me though is how such countries 
should acquire the ability to create new critical space spawned by contestation and 
emancipatory politics enmeshed within the powerful structural forces and micro-
practices in which they find themselves. I think of this critical space in terms of 
discursively ‘imagined’ and re-visioned – wherein they could inexorably transcend, 
subvert, tramp and crush the logic of the superordinate regulatory-knowledge ensem-
ble (and intervention)—that often pervades the mundanity of neoliberal rhetoric and 
its unabashedly “depoliticised and technocratic fetishisation of the market” (Venu-
gopal, 2015, p.166). My argument here, put simply, is that such a new critical space 
(however defined or articulated) can be legitimately and meaningfully be found in 
the way in which global South countries like Ghana, revalorise indigenous (indeed, 
endogenous) knowledges and erased epistemologies, which is of crucial importance 
in the quest for crafting ‘alternative development’ thinking and practice beyond the 
regnant neoliberal credo : “a virtual break which opens a room, understood as a room 
of concrete freedom, that is possible transformation” (Rose et al., 1996, p.5).
It is telling here, I would suggest that to understand the ways in which the postco-
lonial states have been represented in neoliberal times is to acknowledge the nebu-
lous discursive reality underpinning development practices (see chapter 6) not only 
in terms of explicitly rejecting it, as Foucault (1972) poignantly points out; but the 
crucial point, therefore, is to critically challenge and dismantle the tranquillity with 
which they are accepted. And pertinently for me here, our collective failure to subvert 
and jeopardise “regimes of truth” consolidated, neutralised and naturalised (at least 
in my mind) corroborates and perpetuates the historical imperatives of development 
thinking; thereby making it more difficult to resist the variegated discursive confine-
ments towards transformative change. Among the points I wish to emphasise here is 
that the power of development discourses, in it different guises, constitute a profound, 
albeit an opaque and obscure, discursive entrapments or impediments that unless de-
masked, deformed, disrupted and troubled, it will always continue to undermine and 
subvert any attempts towards change. 
It is worth some pause to reflect this idea that in considering the specific case of 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the concept of governmentality is 
better at explaining practices, specific techniques and technologies of power framed 
through the notion of normalisation that underlie dominant forms of contemporary 
governance (see chapter 7). Reading Foucault from Ghana, it strikes me that this line 
of thinking is more tenable and perhaps opens up new analytical possibilities and crit-
ical tools we can develop to re-conceptualise and offer fresh perspectives to undress or 
critique development. Often the predominant view is that international development 
policy and practices are marked by some kind of omnipotent leviathan, of course, not 
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the kind Hobbes suggested, though. However, the deepest problem with this com-
mon view is that while correct, I would like to suggest is (at least) somewhat naïve, as 
it seems oddly unaware of the contradictory and complex processes of mutual consti-
tution of the making and breaking of boundaries, evinced in the contested flows and 
counter flows of practices, rationalities and discourses — derived from various spatial 
and temporal configurations — which specifies the productivity of power as distinct 
from techniques of domination.
From this standpoint Foucault’s constructs of governmentality as a ‘specific’ and 
“complex form of power” (Foucault, 1988, p.18) conceptualised and explained in 
terms of the multifarious and often conflicting discursive constructions of politi-
cal rationalities and related subjectivities, strategies, techniques and technologies of 
governance adroitly provide an erudite account in understanding the contemporary 
world order. This, I would contend, is the reason why, as has been pointed out, the 
conceptual architecture of governmentality is suited to all sorts of inquiries into par-
ticular governing and governmental practices: thereby opening up ways of analysing 
the shifting boundaries, overlapping and competing rationalities in all sorts of areas of 
government that constitute the problematic of the political present. 
While I concede that it may be particularly challenging in appropriating modes of 
governmentality as fitting for explaining the global workings of power in say Ghana 
which exemplifies a non-Western or advanced liberal context, at the same time, I 
also wish to state that we cannot ignore it continually unfolding vibrant poten-
tial. To my mind, the proclivity, obsession and penchant to “tame and provincialise 
Foucault”(Merlingen, 2011, p.189, emphasis mine) constrains its productivity and 
mystifies any serious engagement with it. My concluding suggestion is that govern-
mentality thesis transcends disciplinary borders and accounts for both micro and 
macro workings of power which unravel as neoliberalism becomes “a standard of ref-
erence against which all forms of life (individual, communal political) can be assessed 
according to modern conceptions of civilisation and order” (Vrasti, 2013, p.64). 
Indeed, as Foucault suggests, in terms of scale of application, governmentality is —
not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a sector of the scale, but 
should be considered simply as a point of view, a method of decipherment which may 
be valid for the whole scale, whatever its size”(p.183). As such, Foucauldian IR theo-
rists should critically foreground various dimensions of particular practices, contin-
gent ways and conditions of possibility that not only shape, but constitute objects of 
critical inquiry at particular local sites in a particular time. This is exactly what I have 
attempted to do by providing illustrations of the ways in which changes generated by 
IMF and World Bank structural adjustment regime in Ghana can be understood as 
characteristic feature of actual practices of neoliberal governmentality. I suggest that 
the theoretical strength of governmentality is that it has the possibility to offer critical 
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